PM MALIKI DECIDES THAT IT IS TOO DANGEROUS TO OPEN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002350

SIPDIS

STATE FOR DS/DSS/IP CHARLENE LAMB AND DS/DSS/TIA ROBERT
ECKERT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2019
TAGS: ASEC IR IZ KCRS MARR PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI DECIDES THAT IT IS TOO DANGEROUS TO OPEN
THE IZ FURTHER BEFORE THE JANUARY ELECTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron P. Munter for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary. At the August 30 meeting of the
International Zone (IZ) Security Joint Sub-Committee (JSC),
the Government of Iraq (GOI) declared its intention to delay
opening of the north-south highway bisecting the IZ until
after national elections are complete. The GOI also stated
that it would not make any modifications to the current
barrier system in the IZ without prior concurrence from
Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). While clearly in line
with Embassy and MNF-I preferences, the move came without any
U.S. prompting, and the Iraqis admitted their concern that
opening the highway to normal traffic now could be an
invitation to more incidents similar to the August 19
bombings jut outside the IZ. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki
appears to have concluded that he has more to lose from
another security failure in the capital than by prolonging
the traffic jams wrought by current security measures. End
Summary.


2. (S) At the regularly scheduled August meeting of the IZ
Security JSC (note: the JSC coordinates implementation of
Article 28 of the Security Agreement),attended by Major
General Hummer, Management Counselor Jackson, Deputy Regional
Security Officer Moretti, and Iraqi General Faruq al-'Arji,
who heads the Prime Minister,s personal military staff in
the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC),stated that the
PM had ordered a delay in the opening of the IZ segment of
the July 14 highway. The six-lane road runs through central
Baghdad connecting the northern and southern districts across
the July 14 Bridge. Faruq clarified that in the wake of the
August 19 bombings on the periphery of the IZ that
temporarily shut down the Council of Representatives (COR)
and devastated the Foreign Ministry (MoFA),the GOI
anticipated that the threat of attacks in central Baghdad
would remain at levels that would make the opening of the
July 14 highway a potential vulnerability which militants
would be happy to exploit.


3. (C) General Faruq also stated that the GOI would not
undertake to move any barriers in the IZ absent prior
consultation and coordination with MNF-I. According to
Faruq, the OCINC will confer with the PM,s National
Operations Center (PMNOC) to determine at what date after the
January national elections the road can be opened. In the
interim, jointly planned preparations for its opening,
including the placement of new barriers, and modifications to
existing checkpoints, will continue so that all of the
necessary security measures will be in place once the
decision is made.


4. (C) Though neither MNF-I nor the Embassy had made any
request to delay the opening of the highway beyond September
15, the target date proposed by the GOI, all U.S.
stakeholders were pleased that the GOI opted to postpone.
Once opened, the thoroughfare will cut the IZ in two from
north to south, leaving only a two-lane underpass at the
northern end of the July 14 Bridge to facilitate the movement
of all IZ traffic from east to west. While the bulk of the
U.S. presence in the IZ is now concentrated in its western
half, including the Embassy, Forward Operating Base (FOB)
Prosperity, and FOB Union III, the eastern portion is home
to USAID, Phoenix Base, LZ Washington, numerous contractor
Qto USAID, Phoenix Base, LZ Washington, numerous contractor
support facilities, and key GOI institutions such as the
PM,s Office, Ministry of Defense, and the COR. Though the
GOI must at some point open this route, forcing all of the
internal IZ traffic through a single narrow chokepoint is
clearly preferable later rather than sooner, especially in
the face of recent GOI security failures at the margins of
the IZ.


5. (S) Comment: The PM has been under considerable
pressure from Baghdad residents to improve the traffic
congestion that plagues the capital. Burdened by more than
twice as many vehicles as it is designed to handle,
Baghdad,s road network suffers in part because the IZ,
sitting at the city,s core, blocks several of the highways
that could help to relieve much of the gridlock. Combined
with the omnipresent barriers that narrow already crowded
streets, the closed highways are a source of unending
frustration for millions of the PM,s constituents. His
decision to postpone the opening of the July 14 Highway
appears to reflect a realization that he will have more to
lose from another spectacular attack in Baghdad than from the
snarled traffic that the IZ,s security measures produce.

BAGHDAD 00002350 002 OF 002


End Comment.
HILL