RUBAIE CLAIMS HE CARRIED MESSAGE OF CONFIDENT IRAQ

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000197

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR
NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: RUBAIE CLAIMS HE CARRIED MESSAGE OF CONFIDENT IRAQ
IN VISIT TO IRAN

REF: BAGHDAD 91

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Michae
l Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b-d).


1. (S) Summary: National Security Advisor Mowafaq al-Rubaie
carried the message of a more confident Iraq to Tehran in
meetings with senior Iranian officials January 19-22,
according to a readout of the visit Rubaie gave to Ambassador
Satterfield, PMIN and Pol-Mil Counselor after returning to
Baghdad. Rubaie said his Iranian interlocutors did not react
harshly to the USG-GOI Security Agreement signed in December,
while he characterized to them the problems of drug
trafficking and other border issues as a threat to Iraq. He
denied telling the Iranian press that the GoI would close the
Mujahedin-e Khalq's Camp Ashraf in two months. He said he
responded to Iranian questions about the "Erbil 3" by saying
that after MNF-I turns these detainees over to GoI custody,
the GOI would determine whether they face Iraqi judicial
charges and release them if not. Rubaie said he believed the
Iranians were ready to make overtures to the new U.S.
administration and were waiting for the right "signs" to
respond. Separately, Rubaie outlined his goals for the visit
in a note to Ambassador Crocker, saying that he wanted to
demonstrate Iraq is not a proxy for anyone. End summary.


2. (S) In a meeting with Ambassador Satterfield, PMIN and
Pol-Mil Couns, NSA Rubaie said that during his January 19-22
visit to Tehran he met with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
Foreign Minister Manuchehr Motaki, Parliament Speaker Ali
Larijani, and Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National
Security Council. In addition, when pressed by Ambassador
Satterfield, Rubaie said that Qasem Soleimani, head of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qods Force, had "stopped
by" for a "very short meeting" on January 22 before Rubaie
saw Ahmadinejad. Rubaie said he believed the Iranians were
ready to make overtures to the new U.S. administration and
were waiting for the right "signs" to respond.


3. (S) Rubaie said the focus of his presentations to the
Iranian officials was on Iraq's new status as a country more
"confident" due to the reduction in violence. He said he had
not heard a harsh reaction to the GOI decision to sign the
U.S.-Iraq security agreement, instead the Iranians "were
impressed" by what the GOI had obtained from the U.S. through
effective bargaining. In response to a question from
Ambassador Satterfield, Rubaie said the subject of a
referendum on the security agreement had "not been raised at
all" by the Iranians. Rubaie said he had told them that the
GOI intended to monitor the implementation of the security
agreement over the next six months to see if it met GOI
expectations.


4. (S) On other issues, he said he focused on the dangers of
drug trafficking and border problems from Iran, describing
these issues as a threat to Iraq. Regarding the Mujahedin-e
Khalq (MeK),Rubaie said he had reiterated the GOI's position
that the MeK should leave Iraq, but would not be forcibly
expelled. He claimed he had not stated as reported in
Iranian press that the MeK's Camp Ashraf would be closed in
two months.


5. (S) Rubaie said the Iranians had raised the issue of the
"Erbil 3" -- IRGC officers detained by MNF-I in 2007 who
claimed to be in Iraq as diplomats -- and asked when they
would be released. Rubaie said he had responded that when
MNF-I handed them over to the GOI, the GOI would determine
whether they faced any Iraqi judicial charges. If not, they
Qwhether they faced any Iraqi judicial charges. If not, they
would be released. Ambassador Satterfield asked if the
Iranians had raised their longstanding request for
accreditation of two "diplomats" (know to the GoI and US to
be IRGC officers) to Iranian consulates in Irbil and
Sulaimaniyah. Rubaie said the subject did not come up.


6. (S) In terms of atmospherics, Rubaie said all of his
interlocutors had been speaking from the same set of talking
points. They had all also had a binder of press clippings of
statements by Rubaie critical of Iran going back over the
past three years. Rubaie had responded that these statements
were reactions to Iran's continual squeezing of Iraq. In an
elaborate metaphor, he said he had told the Iranians that
there is an Arab proverb that when one steps on someone's
stomach, the victim involuntarily protests by exhaling.
Soleimani had responded that "Iran is the mother of all Shia
in the world" and had quoted back a Koranic proverb that "no
matter what one's parents do, a child should never criticize
them."

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7. (S/NF) Separately, Rubaie outlined his goals for the
visit in a note to Ambassador Crocker. He said that he
wanted to demonstrate Iraq will not be a proxy for anyone,
build a cooperative relationship with Iran, explain GoI MeK
policy, express the advantages to Iran of a stable Iraq, and
explain the advantages to Iraq and its neighbors of the
"Withdrawal Agreement." Among his planned talking points were
concerns about the discovery of Iranian-made weapons and
ammunition used against Iraqis and Americans, while noting
that "the rate of this has been much lower in recent weeks
than in the past." (NOTE: Shortly before Rubaie departed for
Iran, MNF-I intelligence officers briefed him about recently
discovered Iranian munitions in Iraq that were apparently
manufactured as recently as 2008.)


8. (S) Comment: In contrast to Rubaie's tough-talking
descriptions of the Tehran meetings, press accounts portrayed
the visit as a warm affirmation of Iraqi-Iranian relations.
Both depictions are self-serving; the truth is likely
somewhere in the middle. But Rubaie's description of Iranian
acquiescence to the Security Agreement is consistent with
reports of PM Maliki's visit to Tehran this month (reftel)
and other indications that the Iranians are treating visiting
Iraqi officials with increasing degrees of respect. The
Iranians haven't publicly objected to the Security Agreement
and may be hopeful that we are going to withdraw relatively
quickly.
CROCKER