AMB, CG AND PM DISCUSS UPCOMING VISIT, SYRIA AND

S E C R E T - N O F O R N SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001950

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -- ADDED NOFORN HANDLING

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2019
TAGS: IZ MARR MOPS PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: AMB, CG AND PM DISCUSS UPCOMING VISIT, SYRIA AND
NATO

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Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: In their regular weekly meeting with
Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki on July 16, the
Ambassador and MNF-I Commanding General (CG) Odierno
discussed the PM,s upcoming visit to Washington, the NATO
agreement and foreign fighters crossing the border into Iraq
from Syria. In response to Ambassador's question about the
focus of his visit, the PM stated that &launching the
Security Framework Agreement8 would be the main goal.
Maliki stressed the importance of &building the foundation
to sustain the bilateral relationship in the future8 and
said that his visit would focus mainly on the economic
aspects of the SFA. Maliki discussed reports of 32 suicide
bombers enroute to Iraq via the Syrian border in coming days.
He intends to summon the Syrian Ambassador to share the
information and warned of a potential deterioration of the
Iraq/Syria bilateral relationship. The PM bemoaned the
Syrian government's facilitation of foreign fighters crossing
the border and claimed that he is aware of the Syrian's
ambitions to reinstall a Ba,athist regime in Iraq in order
to have control of Iraqi oil. The CG expressed concern about
changes being made to the NATO agreement and warned of the
potential for NATO training forces being withdrawn if the
agreement was not passed quickly. Maliki promised to push
the agreement through the Cabinet on July 19 but predicted
that passage through the CoR would be difficult. End summary.

VISIT TO WASHINGTON: LAUNCHING THE SFA
--------------


2. (S/NF) During their last meeting before PM Maliki,s
visit to Washington, the Ambassador asked the PM what he
viewed as the primary objective. Maliki responded that
&launching the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA)8 would
be the focal point of his visit. The PM stated that now was
the time for the U.S. and Iraq to start &building the
foundation that would sustain the bilateral relationship in
the future.8 Under the umbrella of the SFA, economics would
be his focus for this trip and setting the basis for
cooperation on activities like an investment conference in
the fall is one of his primary goals Maliki said. The PM
referred to the Ministers of Defense and Interior who will
travel with him, and said that during their meeting with the
Secretary of Defense they will present security and
military-related requests (such as fighter jets, navy patrol
vessels and other military equipment),but that meeting would
be secondary to his overall goal of advancing the SFA and
setting the foundation for long-term ties.
FOREIGN FIGHTERS FROM SYRIA
--------------


3. (S/NF) The PM discussed reports that 32 suicide bombers
were enroute from Syria to Iraq in the coming days. (The CG
confirmed the recent intelligence showing Syrian acquiescence
to foreign fighter flows). Maliki declared &I am going to
summon the Syrian Ambassador and hand over the information we
have, this may lead to deterioration of our bilateral
relationship.8 The PM bemoaned the Syrian government's
facilitation of foreign fighters crossing the border into
Iraq. He stated &I have full details of the Syria's
ambitions in Iraq, they want to see the re-emergence of a
Ba,athist regime so that they can control Iraqi oil.8
Describing the Syrian government's engagement as &lies and
disguise8 (saying one thing and then doing another),the PM
Qdisguise8 (saying one thing and then doing another),the PM
said the overall goal was to make it appear that the GOI had
failed in order for the Ba,athist party to win 30 percent of
the seats in the CoR during the national elections. The CG
assured that Coalition Forces would continue to share
intelligence and help the Iraqi Security Forces in stemming
the flow of foreign fighters crossing the border. Maliki
concluded the discussion by saying &These things happen,
what is important is that we know about them. We never
expected things to be easy.8 (Note: Maliki has for years
bemoaned Damascus' acquiescence (at best) or active
facilitation (at worst) to remnants of the Iraqi Ba'ath
Party, hosting and protecting its former leaders and primary
financiers. He believes Damascus seeks to take focus off
that primary issue, by emphasizing Iraq-Syrian border
security, when the real issue, to Maliki, is the Assad regime
and its intentions to keep Iraq weak, violent, and fractured,
paving the way for a return of the Ba'ath. End Note.)

CHANGES TO NATO LTA
--------------


4. (S/NF) Turning to the NATO long-term agreement (LTA),the
CG expressed concern over changes that were being made to the
LTA by the Council of Ministers (CoM). The CG warned that if
significant changes were made, it would require the LTA be

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sent back to NATO headquarters for internal re-approval of
the agreement which could take months. The CG emphasized to
the PM that if that were to happen, it would be highly likely
that the NATO Training Mission forces currently in Iraq would
be withdrawn. The PM pledged that he would push for the
passage of the LTA through the Cabinet on July 19 and
underscored his desire to keep the NATO forces in Iraq.
After that, he said, he would work to see it passed in the
Council of Representatives (CoR). The PM predicted the
difficulty of passing the LTA through the CoR and lamented
that anything originating from the government was always
automatically rejected. The CG opined that due to rampant
absenteeism in the CoR, a small group was allowed to control
what happens in the CoR due to the constant lack of a quorum.
The PM replied that &The CoR is a problem, but what can I
do? This is democracy.8 Likewise, Ambassador and CG noted
importance to the U.S. of CoR rapid conclusion of the third
and final reading of the UK bilateral security agreement. PM
Maliki generally reflected a commitment to keep it under
consideration in the CoR, acknowledging that absenteeism left
the agreement in limbo several times in the face of Sadrist
bloc walkouts depriving the CoR of a quorum. He saw the July
CoR session as the agreements next chance to pass.

KURD-ARAB TENSIONS
--------------


5. (S/NF) (Note: This discussion is from the meeting between
the Ambassador, CG and PM on July 9. End note.) PM Maliki
was keen to discuss Kurd-Arab tensions and sought a readout
of AMB Hill's just-completed visit to
Erbil. (The Ambassador visited Erbil July 6-7 to reinforce
VP Biden,s message to Barzani to delay the proposed KRG
constitutional referendum.) Maliki said that he had
appreciated VP Biden,s readout to him of his earlier
discussion with Barzani. Maliki welcomed AMB Hill's
confirmation that the KRG Parliament would postpone the
referendum. (Maliki considered the referendum an
ill-conceived Barzani gambit to undercut the DIBS process
with Kurdish electoral facts on the ground.) Maliki,
however, was not sanguine that the root causes of the core
Kurd-Arab dispute had been allayed in any way. Maliki
further feared that the KRG constitutional draft, even if
now placed aside, might lead to a broadening of the rift
between the two peoples Kurd and Arab which before
always had been between the government in Baghdad and the
Kurds. Other regions might get involved now, he added,
the Kurds don't understand this. It is not just about them
and they are not reading the situation right. PM Maliki
added that it was helpful that the Kurds had not embraced
what he described as a Saudi effort to build a Sunni-Kurd
front against the Shi,a in Iraq. He said that renewal of
sectarian alliances along these lines would be disastrous for
Iraq - making Iraq no different than Lebanon, with competing
identity-based groups, supported by hostile outside actors.


6. (S/NF) AMB Hill said that the postponement gave the
issue time to be re-focused within DIBS channels and could
help alleviate the tense atmosphere which had arisen in
recent days. In this light, the PM welcomed the upcoming
arrival of newly-announced UN SRSG Ad Melkert, who, as a
non-Muslim and non-Arab, fit Maliki,s specific formula to
UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon for a potentially
successful successor to Steffan de Mistura.


7. (S/NF) AMB Hill twice urged Maliki to get off the
sidelines and use the opportunity of the anticipated
Qsidelines and use the opportunity of the anticipated
postponement announcement to re-build a dialogue directly
with Barzani to explore a way ahead on the DIBS issues.
Maliki said that the government would play its appropriate
part in engaging on the DIBS process. He averred that he
had a long-standing positive personal relationship with
both Barzani and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, labeling
the latter flexible and open to talking. Maliki
described Barzani as "an old friend", who he had known for
30 years. He described how he had also been a peshmerga
in the mountains with the Kurds. However, he acknowledged
that nowadays they were not "on the best of terms." Maliki
demurred, however, when the AMB suggested a personal note
to Barzani to move through the psychological barriers
currently blocking constructive dialogue on the thorny
Kurd-Arab disputes. Maliki also lamented that discussions
of his possible first trip to the KRG, under consideration
before the referendum issue arose, now had been postponed
at Kurdish request. AMB Hill said that the period
following the July 25 KRG Parliamentary elections might be
another opportunity to reconsider such a PM visit, after the
groundwork is set.


8. (S/NF) Additionally, the three men recounted a series of
attacks in northern Iraq and Kirkuk, discussing likely

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Ba'athist, Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi and AQI
efforts to test Iraqi security forces in Mosul and Nineveh
province. PM Maliki flatly said that the GoI,s security
forces would not be allowed to fail in the face of this
insurgent offensive. CG Odierno reiterated that U.S.
forces stood ready to assist the ISF in its
counterinsurgency efforts.
FORD