PRIME MINISTER MALIKI'S VISIT: LAUNCHING THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 001932

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2024
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER MALIKI'S VISIT: LAUNCHING THE
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Prime Minister Maliki returns to Washington
for the first time since July 2006, having grown in
three years from the feckless neophyte other leaders
thought they could control, to a proven leader, who
those same leaders now purport to fear. Maliki
believes, unlike his Green Zone rivals, that he has
legitimate and popular support as a national and
unifying figure -- having taken on the Shia
extremist Jaysh al-Mahdi, built ties to Sunni tribal
leaders, and succeeded beyond expectations in local
elections. He is now seeking to build a broad
national alliance to compete in national elections.
On this visit, Maliki will be seeking to deepen
Iraq's long-term partnership with the United States,
building normalized ties in security and non
security areas, with bilateral relations governed by
the Security Agreement (SA) and the Strategic
Framework Agreement (SFA),which he hopes to be the
trip's focal point. He will also seek U.S. support
internationally and at the United Nations, fearing
plots from neighboring Sunni states to keep Iraq
weak, divided, and paying for Saddam's Crimes,
through Chapter VII restrictions and debt burdens.

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ENHANCING STABILITY THROUGH ENDURING TIES
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2. (C) The Prime Minister's visit comes three weeks
after U.S. combat forces withdrew from Iraqi cities
under the Security Agreement. The event has proven
to be a psychological watershed for Iraqis, the
first major on-the-ground milestone in fulfilling
the U.S. commitment to withdraw forces from Iraq.
Maliki told us he would use this event to begin
making the case inside Iraq for a long-term
relationship with the United States, beyond security
and military areas, and he has begun to do so.
Maliki told the Ambassador on July 16 that if this
trip had a title he hopes it is "Launching the
Strategic Framework Agreement." He hopes to hear
that Iraq remains a priority for the United States,
that the United States is committed to the SA and SFA, and
that we are thinking of Iraq as a long-term partner
and ally. The visits this year by the Secretary of
State and the Vice President have helped set the
right foundation, and his visit can drive it home.
Assuring Maliki and all key political leaders that
the United States views Iraq as a long-term partner can help
them broker compromises on outstanding political
issues, such as disputed internal boundaries.
Pressure alone does not work, and often works
against our interests, as the different groups
return to their sectarian corners and harden their
bargaining positions. Maliki sees the U.S.
relationship as the key to unlock the relationship
with Sunni Arabs.


3. (C) Maliki will raise the issue of Chapter VII
obligations and outstanding debts and claims in most
of his meetings. We do not believe he is sectarian,
yet his bitterness at the Sunni Arab world is
palpable. He considers Iraq and in particular the
Shia community to be the primary victims of Saddam
-- losing a member of his family and fleeing the
country as Saddam was being supported and bolstered
by Saudi Arabia and other key Arab states. He saw
the international community rise to force Saddam out
of Kuwait only to turn away as Saddam slaughtered
tens of thousands of Shia in southern Iraq. With
this history, for Maliki and most of the post-Saddam
Qthis history, for Maliki and most of the post-Saddam
leadership it is in their view a gross injustice
that they are now saddled with paying tiny Kuwait
billions of dollars in compensation and remain under
Chapter VII restrictions dating to 1990. They
understand they represent Iraq and have obligations
to meet, but they want to hear that we understand
their plight (and that we will help them on Chapter
VII issues pursuant to Article 25 of the SA). With
this understanding and assurance, Maliki should be
encouraged to "help us help him" on Kuwait and other
issues by embracing the way forward proposed by
former SRSG Staffan de Mistura, and by working with
us in the UN Security Council on Iraq's remaining
Chapter VII obligations.

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MALIKI'S STATE OF MIND: A NATIONAL LEADER, OR BUST

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4. (C) Maliki is the compromise political candidate
who has grown into his job, much to the
consternation of his rivals. He is greatly
constrained by the system of checks and balances
under the Iraqi constitution, especially when
combined with the ethno-sectarian division of spoils
from the December 2005 elections. He controls at
best a handful of the 275 seats in parliament. Key
members of his delegation to Washington, such as
Minister of Interior Bolani, are openly competing to
unseat him from power. Key members his cabinet,
including his two deputies (one Sunni, one Kurd)
routinely conspire against him and seek to block his
initiatives; other ministers answer to their
political parties, not to him -- yet he lacks legal
authority to build a cabinet or fire ministers.
Maliki chafes at this state of affairs and has
sought to compensate for it by using his
constitutional authority as "Commander in Chief" to
bolster his command of Iraqi Security Forces. While
his rivals cite this as an example of "dictatorial"
tendencies, the picture is far more complicated, and
he is by no means the Saddam-in-the-making those
rivals suggest.


5. (C) Maliki hopes to build a national alliance
(Shia, Kurd, Sunni) to compete in elections, and win
a majority that would allow him to build a cross-
sectarian government and advance an ambitious
economic agenda. He believes he has popular support
for such a move, and recently visited Anbar Province
to burnish his credentials with the new tribal-based
Sunni leadership there. His tenure in power,
however, has given rise to so many opponents and
antibodies that his ability to forge such an
alliance is questionable. Pressure from his Shia
bedfellows, and from Iran, are also pushing the
Shia parties together again, to compete in a grand
sectarian-based coalition that will protect the only
Shia Arab state from the Sunni world. Maliki and
his primary political advisor Sadiq Rikabi tell us
repeatedly that he wants to break away from this
alliance, but without any strong Sunni or Kurdish
partners, he probably cannot do so. The Sunni and
Kurdish "Green Zone" set, for their part, are
trapped in an "anyone but Maliki" mindset -- and may
be forcing the Shia back together, since nobody but
Maliki appears to have the strength or determination
to break away.


6. (C) It is unclear what Maliki will do if the
Shia Alliance reconstitutes, particularly if he is
not guaranteed the premiership after the January
elections. While he clearly wants to stay in
office, he has begun in recent weeks to discuss
(perhaps only half in jest) retiring to his farm
south of Baghdad and growing watermelons. Maliki
tells us he does not want to use the U.S. visit to
bolster his political credentials in Iraq, and
instead hopes to bolster enduring long-term ties
between the United States and Iraq that will outlast
successive Iraqi and U.S. administrations. He takes
great credit for starting this process, by closing
the SA and SFA, and he hopes to establish real
traction on both before he leaves office or begins a
new term. He has said he plans to pay tribute to
U.S. sacrifice, through a wreath laying at Arlington
and through public remarks before and during the
trip. (Note: The Arlington visit is locked; the
public remarks have yet to be seen. End Note.)
Whatever Maliki's long-term future, this will likely
be his last official visit to Washington during his
Qbe his last official visit to Washington during his
tumultuous term as Prime Minister -- a term that has
spanned a horrific sectarian war, the surge, and now
relative stability.

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BUILDING TOWARDS NATIONAL UNITY
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7. (C) The Prime Minister over the past 90 days has
sought to stabilize the political environment
through regular meetings with parliamentary blocs,
the Presidency Council, and other key leaders, such
as the Chief Justice and Speaker of Parliament. He
has pledged to support an agenda under the
"Government Reform Document" that passed near
unanimously through the parliament, supported mainly

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by Maliki's political rivals. He has told us
quietly that he fully supports the political issues
we continue to press: the UNAMI DIBs process; SOI
integration; hydrocarbons reform. But he complains
that public statements decrease his maneuvering room
and makes any compromise appear to be at the behest
of American pressure, the death knell for any leader
here. He will be eager to address his plans on
these and other issues in the meetings with U.S.
officials, but hopes in public to advance a
message of normalization and enhancement of ties
across all civilian fields (education, economics,
culture, trade) as our military forces draw down. It
will be helpful for Maliki to hear that we
understand his constraints, but expect him to lead,
particularly on the issue of disputed internal
boundaries.


8. (C) Disputed internal boundaries is one of
several issue that could derail Iraq's progress over
the next 12 months. We can emphasize our strong
line with Massoud Barzani -- but expect Maliki to
follow our efforts by appointing serious and high-
level negotiators to participate in the UNAMI
process. Maliki must also be mindful of the
perception created when security operations target
local Sunni political leaders (such as happened
recently in Diyala). When reminded of this, Maliki
will point to statistics that Iraqi forces round up
Shia detainees at an outsized ratio to the
population (demonstrating, in his view, the non-
sectarian nature of his policies),and that nearly nine
in 10 of MNF-I detainees were Sunnis (but nobody
accused MNF-I of being sectarian, he says). The
facts, however, matter far less than the perception,
and Maliki can do a better job at enhancing the
transparency of security operations, particularly
sensitive ones that target high profile local
leaders. Mistreatment of detainees and overcrowding
in Iraqi prisons and detention centers has also
angered Sunni and Shia communities. Maliki has
responded positively to complaints, but he will be
judged by the extent of his follow-through.

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REGIONAL RELATIONS: STRAINED IN THE BEST OF TIMES
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9. (C) Maliki sees potential enemies surrounding Iraq
and believes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, and Iran,
seek to keep Iraqi fractured, weak, and divided.
(Note: This is one reason he seeks tangible signs of
a long-term security relationship with the United
States, such as through sale of M1-A1 tanks, and
F16s. End Note.) He likens the situation to Germany
after 1919, and believes Iraq is unfairly being
asked to pay for the sins of Saddam (and being
branded as a danger to the neighborhood six years
after Saddam's fall). He has sought outreach and
built solid relations with Turkey, Jordan, and most
recently with Egypt (although follow through on the
latter has yet to be seen). He has promised to
personally handle the Kuwait issue and broker a
compromise, telling us he is "willing to accept
injustice" and stand up to a popular tide of opinion
running against Kuwait's public efforts to keep a
Gulf War compensation scheme in place (under which
Iraq pays $2 billion per year to Kuwait). On Saudi
Arabia, Maliki has hit a brick wall with King
Abdullah, and openings appear closed, at least until
after national elections in January. Maliki
complains about Fatwas from Mecca justifying the
killing of Shia under Koranic law -- and Abdullah
Qkilling of Shia under Koranic law -- and Abdullah
complains about Maliki as a leader who can't be
trusted and is too close to Iran. The big
unanswered question is whether (Maliki or no Maliki)
King Abdullah can ever accept a Shia Prime Minister
in Baghdad with popular support and legitimacy among
the Shia masses here. While we need to pressure
Maliki to keep reaching out to the Sunni Arab states
(even if he needs to hold his nose) we must also
press Sunni Arab leaders to establish a diplomatic
presence in Baghdad and work with Maliki on issues
of mutual interest. It is their absence which could
ultimately drive Iraq into Iran's sphere of
influence; as of now, Iraq is seeking to tilt slowly
but surely towards the west, the Arab world, and
global integration.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) Like most leaders here, Maliki is imperfect
at best, but he has managed over three years to do
things nobody thought he could -- and he expects
some credit for the remarkable turnaround in Iraq's
fortunes since the dark days of 2006. His overall
mindset of hope beset with paranoia reflects the
general population here: fiercely proud and
independent, yet fearful and isolated, haunted by
the past, unsure about the future, surrounded by
interventionist neighbors, and trying against the
odds to overcome two generations of social and
economic dislocation, foreign wars, and internal
violence. A message that the United States stands
with the Iraqi people and seeks to transform our
bilateral relationship -- from decades of hostility,
to occupation, and now to a genuine partnership
based on respect and mutual interests -- will be
extremely well received. It will help Iraqi leaders
build towards durable political compromises and
further take the steam out of those few remaining
groups willing to take up arms against U.S. forces
and the Iraqi state.
HILL