PRT DIYALA: UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PRT MOVEMENTS POST

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001924

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PRT MOVEMENTS POST
JUNE 30

Classified By: PRT Diyala Leader George White for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

This is a PRT Diyala reporting cable.


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Conflicting U.S. and Iraqi interpretations
of the implications of the U.S. military's June 30th
withdrawal from Iraqi cities are disrupting PRT and Coalition
Forces (CF) operations in Diyala. The handover of local
military bases has also been complicated by this uncertainty,
and has been exacerbated by increased Government of Iraq
(GOI) involvement in the province. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) CF were required to withdraw from urban areas in all
parts of Iraq on June 30. Yet confusion over how this should
happen, and how CF and the PRT will operate after June 30,
has hampered USG activities in Diyala province. Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) in Diyala apparently have a much
stricter interpretation of the USG-GOI Security Agreement,
and of the understanding of how freely U.S. vehicles can move
in the province now. The PRT has received a copy of Diyala
Provincial Director of Police (PDOP) order 5446, dated July
3, 2009, (in Arabic) to all Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units
which states, in part: "Patrols and duties in cities, urban
centers, and towns in all of your AO (area of operations) by
all of the American Forces, in all forms, are prohibited."


3. (C) CF report numerous incidents with local Iraqi Police
(IP) questioning the right of movement of U.S. military and
civilian personnel in Diyala, and even the continued U.S.
presence in rural areas. On July 1 and 2, the IP questioned
why CF were outside of FOB Warhorse; in several cases CF were
denied access to local Diyala GOI and Provincial Government
contacts. On July 3, IP rebuffed CF responding to a report
of gunfire in the area around Abu Sayda and asked them to
leave the town. As CF exited the area they came under attack,
including fire from a rocket propelled grenade.


4. (C) The GOI has called into question the unrestricted
movement of PRT Diyala personnel and our required CF escort.
Normal PRT operations, including planned visits to Diyala
Provincial Government officials, have been disrupted and are
now in flux. On July 7, the PRT Deputy Team Leader was
delayed by several hours for a scheduled meeting with the
Provincial Governor while his convoy waited for the
(required) IP escort to arrive. The PRT's Governance and
Public Affairs teams' movement to a meeting at the Diyala
Provincial Council building was cancelled when IP escorts
failed to appear.


5. (C) Plans to transition CF bases and other facilities to
Iraqi control in Diyala were disrupted by an official from
the Office of the Prime Minister identified as Security
Advisor Samir Al Haddad. Al Haddad arrived unannounced at CF
COP (Combat Outpost) Gabe in Ba'aquba, Diyala, and demanded
that CF vacate the base immediately. (NOTE: This demand
came before/before June 30. END NOTE). He demanded that
U.S. personnel depart right away and that equipment
(specifically infrastructure items such as generators) be
left behind.


6. (C) Al Haddad made similar demands at the transition of
previously USG-occupied office space at the Diyala Government
Center. He also stated that documents related to
transitioning bases should be made out to a GOI "Receivership
Secretariat" rather than to the Ministry of the Interior.


7. (C) COMMENT: The uncertainty over ISF's movement
requirements reduces the PRT's effectiveness. The abrupt
departure of CF training teams from Diyala bases as ordered
by Al-Haddad has left ISF ill-prepared to maintain security
in the province. This approach has also led to a noticeable
Qin the province. This approach has also led to a noticeable
decline in the ISF's willingness to cooperate with CF
training units with which the ISF has previously partnered.
END COMMENT.
HILL