PRT SALAH AD DIN: GOI INVOLVEMENT IN SAMARRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001910

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PTER PINS KCRS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: GOI INVOLVEMENT IN SAMARRA
ANGERS SUNNIS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1705

B. BAGHDAD 624

Classified By: PRT Salah Ad Din Leader David Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b
).

(U) This is a PRT Salah ad Din (SAD) reporting cable.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since the terrorist bombing of the Al-Askari
Shrine (Golden Mosque) in 2006 pushed the country to the edge
of Sunni-Shi'a civil war, the Government of Iraq (GOI) has
taken a direct role in Samarra's security. Since the
bombing, the city has made remarkable progress in
establishing security and strengthening its civil society and
basic governance. With this progress has come a desire among
local (Sunni) Samarrans for greater control over local
affairs. Sunnis in Samarra also think that the largely Shi'a
GOI's involvement in the city is a Shiite power-grab, using
security restrictions as leverage to bring the local economy
under Shi'a control. The SAD Provincial Council (PC) views
the GOI's involvement as a serious encroachment on its
authority and an attempt by Iraqi Shiites and Iran to take
Samarra away from the Province. END SUMMARY.

GOI SECURITY FORCES OPERATING IN SAMARRA
--------------


2. (SBU) Following the terrorist bombing of the Golden Mosque
in 2006, the Prime Minister's Office moved a National Police
(NP) force to Samarra and established the Samarra Operations
Command (SOC) to secure the Mosque and the historic area
around it during the restoration process, and secure the city
against terrorist attacks. The SOC commander, Major General
(MG) Rasheed, has partnered with CF for the past several
years to take responsibility for security in the city, an
effort that has also been supported by Sons of Iraq (SOI)
units.

SUNNI SAMARRANS WANT TO MANAGE THEIR OWN SECURITY
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Local officials insist that the city now enjoys good
security and it is time for the NP to move out. There is
deep concern among Sunni Arab Samarrans that the SOC is now
essentially a GOI effort to control Sunnis in that city and
to further Shi'a aims. At the same time, significant
progress is being made in standing up the Samarra Joint
Coordination Center (JCC),which will be critical going
forward in coordinating all security forces (national and
local) in Samarra. The JCC cannot succeed without clear,
visible support from MG Rasheed, which has not been
forthcoming. The close personal relationship between MG
Rasheed and the SAD Provincial Chief of Police, who
inappropriately ignores city officials and deals directly
with the General on city matters, further empowers the SOC.

PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS WANT COALITION FORCES TO STAY
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Provincial officials share Sunni Arab Samarrans' view
that NP must depart Samarra, but they are not as confident
that local Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are ready to maintain
security. In a May 24 meeting with the PRT Team Leader and
Coalition Forces (CF),the PC Chairman, Ahmed Abdullah, (AKA
Abu Mazin, whose immediate past position was Governor's
Assistant for Security Affairs) requested that CF not
withdraw from Samarra, as they are still needed to maintain
security. He said that both the Samarra City Council and the
PC would rather have CF stay in the city until the SOC is
closed and NP leave the city.


5. (C) While being careful to affirm respect for Iraq's law
and Constitution, Abu Mazin voiced strong resentment towards
the continued NP presence. "It's not right that the shrine
gets more security and attention from the Central Government
Qgets more security and attention from the Central Government
than the citizens do. Samarrans don't want national security
forces from Baghdad stationed there any longer...They want to
take Samarra from us. We are knocking on all the peaceful
doors first" in order to get the outside security forces out
of Samarra, "but if that doesn't work we may take other
actions... Samarra is not a district of Baghdad or Iran, and
I won't take orders from them either." Despite his clear
frustration, Abu Mazin was hopeful that a constructive
solution could be found.

GOI FAILS TO INTEGRATE SAMARRA SOI FORCE
--------------


6. (SBU) Local resentment of what Sunni Samarrans see as the
NP's role as an "occupying force" is complicated by a large
number of local out-of-work SOI members. Over the past two
years seven SOI units comprising 2,400 defenders have been


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