Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD188
2009-01-26 03:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

SECOND MEETING OF JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS

Tags:  MOPS MARR MASS PREL IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4690
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0188/01 0260310
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260310Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1383
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000188 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2019
TAGS: MOPS MARR MASS PREL IZ
SUBJECT: SECOND MEETING OF JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS
COORDINATING COMMITTEE (JMOCC) CONFIRMS PROCESS DESPITE
DISTRACTIONS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 0082

B. BAGHDAD 00149

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000188

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2019
TAGS: MOPS MARR MASS PREL IZ
SUBJECT: SECOND MEETING OF JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS
COORDINATING COMMITTEE (JMOCC) CONFIRMS PROCESS DESPITE
DISTRACTIONS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 0082

B. BAGHDAD 00149

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (U) Summary. On January 19, the United States and the
Republic of Iraq conducted the second meeting of the Joint
Military Operations Coordinating Committee (JMOCC),a
military operations steering committee established under the
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA). Consistent with the first
JMOCC, the Iraqis used a substantial portion of the meeting
to resolve internal organizational issues, including the
Minister of Defense,s (MinDef,s) replacing the co-chair of
the joint subcommittee on Provincial Security (PS),National
Security Advisor representative Dr. Hamza Sharif Hasan, with
Air Force General and Vice Chief of Staff Nasier Abadi.
MinDef also announced that General Babakir, co-chair of the
Military Operations, Training, and Logistic Support (MOTLS)
JSC, will be replaced for future meetings by LTG Ali, Iraq
Ground Forces Commander. Though no explanation was given for
this change, it is likely due to Babakar,s direct advisory
role to the MinDef as the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.


2. (U) Despite the slow start, the JMOCC has established a
good foundation and appears to have successfully imprinted on
the Iraqis the JMOCC and joint subcommittee (JSC) procedure
and process. The test will come with the third meeting of
the JMOCC, to be held during the first week of March, during
which the JMOCC for the first time is scheduled to deal with
substantive issues. End Summary.


3. (U) The second meeting of the Joint Military Operations
Coordinating Committee (JMOCC) convened at the Camp Blackhawk
Conference Center, International Zone, on January 19. The
meeting was co-chaired by General Raymond Odierno, Commanding
General of MNF-I, and Iraqi Minister of Defense Abd al-Qader
al-Mufriji, assisted by U.S. SA Secretariat Director Major
General (MG) Timothy McHale, Iraqi SA Secretariat Director MG
Mohammed Askari, PolMil Counselor Michael Corbin, and PM
Senior Advisor Ambassador Jackson McDonald. The meeting was

attended by key leaders and deputies representing the
sub-committees under the JMOCC as well as the staffs of the
respective secretariats.

4. (C) Following brief opening remarks by General Odierno
and Iraqi MinDef Abd al-Qader, just as with the inaugural
JMOCC meeting on January 8, the Iraqis spent about 40 minutes
engaging in protracted internal political discussions,
chiefly over the role of the National Security Advisor,s
office (NSA) as chair of the joint subcommittee for
Provincial Security. MinDef al-Qader argued that if the NSA
wishes to be the lead GOI rep to that subcommittee, then for
protocol reasons NSA Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie should co-chair,
that is, the NSA should send a co-chair of commensurate rank
with the U.S. Overruling NSA representative Dr. Hamza Sharif
Hasan,s objections, the MinDef announced Hasan,s
replacement as co-chair of the joint subcommittee for
Provincial Security (PS) to be Air Force General Nasier
Abadi, Vice Chief of Staff, claiming he was not usurping the
Prime Minister,s orders on responsibilities. (Note: Dr.
Rubaie was out-of-country during this JMOCC meeting; it will
be informative whether MinDef,s replacement of Dr. Hamza
holds firm when Rubaie returns. End Note.) MinDef also
announced that General Babakir, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces and co-chair of the Military Operations, Training, and
QForces and co-chair of the Military Operations, Training, and
Logistic Support (MOTLS) JSC, will be replaced for future
meetings by LTG Ali, Iraq Ground Forces Commander. Though no
explanation was given for this change, it is likely due to
Babakir,s direct advisory role to the MinDef as the COS of
the Armed Forces.


5. (U) The remainder of the meeting proceeded according to
form. The agreed minutes of the inaugural JMOCC meeting were
ratified. All four JSCs had held organizational meetings,
and the co-chairs presented their reports.

6. (U) LTG Lloyd Austin, co-chair of the Military
Operations, Training, and Logistic Support (MOTLS) JSC, with
his co-chair General Babakir, noted the MOTLS JSC,s mandate
is to provide the operating framework for issue resolution
and shaping of US/GOI combined military objectives, policies
and procedures that ensure achievement of the full spectrum
of military operations. He noted that the JSC is not a forum
for the discussion of each and every issue and would not
interfere with normal chain of command, where most
operational decisions are to be made.

7. (U) MG Guy Swan, the co-chair for the JSC on Green Zone
Security, in collaboration with his Iraqi co-chair, General
Faruq al-A,araji, Director of the Prime Minister's military
staff, the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC),noted
that a joint operational plan is in place with the Baghdad

BAGHDAD 00000188 002 OF 002


Brigade and that integrated joint command centers had been
established. Badging, entry/exit control, and the Iraqi,s
requirement for existing specialized equipment are issues to
be reviewed over the next several months. On March 31, the
Iraqi Security Force (ISF) training process will be assessed,
and training will either be extended or the certification
process will begin.

8. (U) BG Kurt Stein, the U.S. co-chair for the Vehicles,
Vessels, and Aircraft Movement (VVAM) JSC, in cooperation
with LTG Abdullah, informed that the implementation of
Article 9 will occur in three phases: short, medium and
long-term. Iraqi ground forces are working well with U.S.
Forces and a good relationship exists. The Navy and sea
movement is new and the transition will be longer; likewise,
air space transition will take longer and the GOI will need
U.S. assistance.

9. (C) RDML David Buss, the U.S. co-chair of the JSC for
Provincial Security (PS),noted that the PS JSC replaces the
former Joint Committee for the Transfer of Security
Responsibility (JCTSR). Citing the JCTSR,s work over the
past several years and the return of thirteen provinces to
Iraqi Provincial Iraqi control prior to December 31, 2008,
RDML Buss stated that the JSC would continue to assess and
make recommendations regarding the remaining five provinces,
but he also noted the PS JSC has yet to determine its
objectives and goals. (Note: This JSC is not called for in
the SA. There is concern from the U.S. side that the PS JSC
holds firm to making assessments and not infringes on matters
that belong to military operations; multiple committees
dealing with the same or similar issues must be avoided. End
Note.)

10. (C) Comment. As with the first JMOCC meeting, the
MinDef and the Iraqi participants were less than fully
prepared and engaged in what should have been internal
discussion for much of the meeting. The JMOCC process
nevertheless appears to be working. Despite the still
unsettled matter regarding the Iraqi co-chairs of both the
VVAM and PS JSCs, all of the JSCs managed to hold their
initial meetings and report back to the JC. Most
importantly, Iraqi buy-in to the process appears to be
occurring; there is general consensus as to the role of the
JMOCC as a supervisory/review committee over the JSCs and
that most issues should be resolved at the lowest level,
either in the JSCs or through bilateral discussions. Now
that the JMOCC and its JSCs have moved beyond the
introductory phase, the test will come when the JMOCC and
JSCs tackle real issues. End Comment.
CROCKER