GOI PLANS ULTIMATUM TO CLOSE ASHRAF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001811

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019
TAGS: IR IZ PHUM PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: GOI PLANS ULTIMATUM TO CLOSE ASHRAF

REF: BAGHDAD 1699 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Acting Political-Military Counselor W.S. Reid for reason
s 1.4(b-d).


1. (C) Summary. In a series of meetings between GOI and USG
officials last week, the GOI committee responsible for the
Mujahedin-e-Khalq's Camp Ashraf appeared increasingly intent
on closing Camp Ashraf. GOI officials informed acting
Pol-Mil Couns that plans are underway to enter the camp,
establish a police presence, and transfer the camp residents
to another location away from the border with Iran. A visit
by Iranian Ambassador Qomi to the GOI committee to accuse the
MEK of infiltrating Iran from Camp Ashraf contributed to an
escalation of tensions over Ashraf following the Iranian
elections (reftel). We reminded GOI Ashraf Committee Chairman
Ali Abdul Amir al-Yassery of the humanitarian assurances
provided by the GOI to the USG and urged the committee to
work with the Ashraf residents to reach a mutually agreeable
solution. Based on recent discussions between Ashraf
leadership and Emboffs, without such an agreement, the
residents would likely refuse to move, setting up a potential
violent confrontation between the GOI and Ashraf residents.
End Summary.


2. (C) On June 29, Emboffs and MNF-I TF134 CG met with
al-Yassery regarding the GOI,s refusal of entry of
humanitarian supplies into Camp Ashraf. Al-Yassery denied
the claim, stating that diesel fuel, which was possibly
obtained illegally and could be used to create a humanitarian
crisis, was the only supply being denied entry. CG TF-134
rebutted al-Yassery saying that U.S. forces personally
witnessed the denial of food and water into the camp by the
Iraqi Army (IA).

3. (C) Appearing to shift the discussion, al-Yassery
questioned the role of U.S. military forces in Camp Ashraf,
stating he opposed the idea of U.S. military forces inside
the camp and claimed &it is impossible for two forces to be
inside the same base.8 He claimed that PM Maliki has
decided that U.S. forces need to leave Camp Ashraf. CG
TF-134 assured him that U.S. forces were in the camp in an
oversight capacity to monitor the humanitarian sitution.
Al-Yassery then appeared to step back from his earlier
statements, claiming U.S. forces could remain in the camp,
but there needed to be a determination of which force had
authority over the camp. CG TF-134 reiterated that the GOI
has authority over Camp Ashraf and that U.S. forces are
merely serving in an oversight capacity, per the agreement
contained in an exchange of diplomatic notes between the USG
and the GOI.

4. (C) Playing on the sovereignty theme, al-Yassery
reiterated the GOI,s desire to place an Iraqi police station
(IPS) at Camp Ashraf, stating the station would include 800
Iraqi police officers (IP) and would be introduced whether or
not the residents agreed. CG TF-134 indicated that forcing
the issue on the residents could set off a humanitarian
crisis. Al-Yassery seemed to discount this scenario, stating
the GOI has a plan in place. He suggested that he agrees
with USG officials regarding offering some type of temporary
residency status to camp residents if they agreed to allow
GOI officials to enter, and ultimately close the camp, moving
the residents to another location in Iraq. He also appeared
to agree with our suggestion to limit the number of IP to
about 100, increasing at some future date, once trust had
been established.

5. (C) Regarding an alternative location for camp residents,
al-Yassery claimed the GOI would like to move the residents
Qal-Yassery claimed the GOI would like to move the residents
to Samawa, near the Saudi Arabian border. He also said he
would consider Camp Echo in Diwaniyah as an alternative
location, provided the camp was of adequate size and could
accommodate the residents and GOI authorities.

6. (C) At the end of the meeting, al-Yassery requested that
the next scheduled trip to Camp Ashraf by the Committee and
USG officials be postponed in order to allow the situation to
cool off. He indicated that he does not want to go to Ashraf
prematurely because he intends to issue an ultimatum with a
strict timetable for opening the police station, USG
officials agreed to delay the visit.

7. (C) On July 1, acting Pol-Mil Couns and Emboffs met again
with al-Yassery, following a short-notice request from his
office. Al Yassery said he had met with Iranian Ambassador
Qomi regarding Camp Ashraf. In this meeting, Qomi claimed
that on June 15, 10 members of the camp departed the camp
escorted by U.S. forces. He claimed the residents crossed
the border into Iran, led anti-election demonstrations, and
returned to the camp two days later. Qomi claimed this was
evidence of USG interference in internal Iranian affairs and
asked the GOI to look into the matter. Al-Yassery said he
informed Qomi that Iraqi forces had given him no indication
that any such thing had happened. Acting Pol-Mil Couns Reid
assured al-Yassery that accusations were scurrilous and

BAGHDAD 00001811 002 OF 002


reiterated that the USG respects Iranian sovereignty. (Note:
We have since confirmed that the report is baseless and
informed al-Yassery of that fact. End Note.)

8. (C) Al-Yassery also informed USG officials that he sent a
representative to the camp to make sure that humanitarian
items were being allowed entry into the camp, as a result of
the last meeting. His representative reported that camp
residents were dressed in military uniforms (Note: This is
plausible per U.S. observations of camp activity. End Note.)
and driving military vehicles (Note: possibly dual-use
trucks, we estimate, not armored vehicles. End Note.) and
that GOI signs in Arabic language recently placed on the
buildings had been replaced with FARSI signage. He stated it
now looks more like Iranian soil than Iraqi, and this would
anger the Iraqi public if it became known.

9. (C) Al-Yassery stated that GOI officials will travel to
Camp Ashraf on July 7 to inform camp residents that the GOI
will be entering the camp to begin the transfer of residents
to another location. He told acting Pol-Mil Couns that the
GOI was leaning toward Camp Echo as the relocation site.
(Note: TF-134 still is assessing whether Camp Echo could be
ready as soon as the GOI would like and whether it would be
adequate in size and services to house the entire 3400 Ashraf
population. End Note.) He revealed the transfer process will
start on July 12 and will take approximately one month,
hoping to complete the transfer by August. Following the
transfer, the GOI would then engage in negotiations with the
residents regarding possible resettlement locations abroad.
He added that the UNHCR and the ICRC would have offices at
the MEK location site to facilitate this next step on status.

10. (C) Embassy officials reminded al-Yassery that the GOI
had committed to the USG to treat Ashraf residents humanely
and that their cooperation in any transfer would be necessary
to avoid inhumane treatment. Emboffs suggested the GOI use
an inducement to obtain voluntary agreement from the
residents to relocate within Iraq, possibly offering
temporary residency status in Iraq. Al-Yassery countered,
&In our law, there is no volunteer,8 and restated this
would all be discussed once the residents transfer out of
Camp Ashraf.

11. (C) Al-Yassery also pointed out that once residents
transfer, U.S. military forces will not be allowed to
co-locate on the new camp and that USG officials would have
to request access to fulfill their oversight role under the
agreement. He stated he did not want U.S. forces to take part
in these visits and did not interpret the agreement between
the USG and the GOI to include a physical oversight presence
by U.S. military forces. He also reiterated that the PM did
not want U.S. forces inside the camp.

12. (C) USG officials originally planned to travel to Camp
Ashraf to inform the residents about the GOI,s plans on July
2, per al-Yassery,s specific request. The trip however was
cancelled due to weather conditions. USG officials now plan
to travel with GOI officials to Camp Ashraf on July 7 to try
to defuse the current situation and assist the parties to
come to a mutually agreed upon solution.

13. (C) Comment. It is clear that the GOI is intent on
moving the MEK from Camp Ashraf, increasingly even by force,
if necessary. The allegations made by the Iranian Ambassador
have added fuel to an already combustible issue. We plan to
remind Camp Ashraf residents that we have no basis to object
Qremind Camp Ashraf residents that we have no basis to object
to the GOI's plans to close Camp Ashraf, as long as it moves
the residents humanely in accordance with Iraq's laws,
constitution, and international obligations. We will remind
the GOI that it does not have the capacity to move the
residents humanely should they elect not to cooperate
voluntarily. If both sides are not convinced of the need to
reach a mutually agreeable solution, a confrontation will
likely cost lives, damage the reputation of the GOI in
international opinion, set back Iraqi,s efforts to normalize
its relations with international organizations, and put
strains on the Iraqi-U.S. bilateral partnership. End Comment.
HILL