GOI OFFICIALS SUPPORT TRANSFER OF CIVILIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001786

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PHUM SOCI IZ
SUBJECT: GOI OFFICIALS SUPPORT TRANSFER OF CIVILIAN
DETAINEES FROM MOD FACILITIES

REF: BAGHDAD 1699

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Peter Vrooman for reason 1.4
(d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Iraq's Ministry of Defense holds thousands of
civilians in more than 65 detention facilities throughout the
country, often for longer periods than permitted under Iraqi
law. Conditions in MOD prisons are among the worst in Iraq,
and inmates often remain outside the reach of the judicial
system. However, during the past two weeks numerous key GOI
officials have indicated, both publicly and privately, a
desire to transfer prisoners currently held by the Ministry
of Defense to the custody of the Ministry of Justice or the
Ministry of Interior. Through engagements with a variety of
GOI contacts, Emboffs have encouraged this course of action
and pledged USG assistance to catalyze GOI progress -- while
consistently noting that this must be an Iraqi-driven
process. End summary.

--------------
MOD in the "Detainee Business"
--------------


2. (C) The Ministry of Defense (MOD) currently holds
between 2,000-2,500 detainees in various detention facilities
throughout Iraq. Most are held in the Ninewa Operations
Command (NOC) or the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC). Both
the NOC and the BOC fall under the Office of the Commander in
Chief (OCINC) -- an appendix of the Prime Minister's Office
-- although the MOD does have some influence over them.
Higher Judicial Council Chief Justice Medhat has noted
publicly that the MOD has no legal authority to detain
civilians for more than 72 hours, at which time it is
required to hand them over to the Ministry of Interior (MOI)
for investigation and then, space permitting, to the Ministry
of Justice (MOJ). Despite these regulations, many of these
inmates have been languishing in MOD facilities for months
with limited due process and recourse to the judicial systemQ
Moreover, many of these detainees are confined in facilities
that are overcrowded and lack adequate sanitation and
ventilation.


3. (C) Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 10,
dated June 5, 2003, and still in effect, vests MOJ with full
authority and control over detention facilities. At a recent
meeting, Chief Justice Medhat clarified the separate roles
and duties of the various ministries involved in detention
operations: while MOI has responsibility for investigating
cases, MOJ has sole responsibility for the custody and care
of detainees as they proceed through the judicial system.
MOD has no role whatsoever in this process beyond the initial
arrest. As outlined by the Prime Minister's Executive Order
207, MOD must transfer not only the individuals but also any
investigative documents for detainees held in its detention
facilities to the MOI's office of investigation for further
inquiry.

--------------
Recent Developments Appear Positive
--------------


4. (C) In a June 17 Ministerial Committee on the Rule of
Law and Detention (MCROLD) meeting, Higher Judicial Council
(HJC) Chief Justice Medhat raised the illegality of MOD,s
detention practices, stressing that the Defense Ministry is
neither authorized nor trained to investigate criminal cases.
Since that meeting, there has been significant movement
within a number of ministries to effect the transfer of MOD
detainees to MOI or MOJ custody.


5. (C) Following on the heels of the MCROLD meeting,
Emboffs haQ engaged with numerous senior GOI officials to
assess their support for the transfer of MOD detainees to MOJ
Qassess their support for the transfer of MOD detainees to MOJ
or MOI custody:

-- On June 19, the DCM met with Speaker of Parliament Ayyad
al-Samarraie who expressed his support for consolidating all
detainee operations under one ministry. In his opinion, such
an action would "depoliticize" the issue.

-- On June 25, Emboffs met with Minister of Human Rights
Wijdan Salim who said she was "firmly behind the transfer"
and agreed to track the whereabouts of each prisoner moved to
MOJ custody.

-- On June 25, Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi's office
hosted an interministerial meeting consisting of senior

BAGHDAD 00001786 002 OF 002


working-level representatives from the Ministries of Defense,
Interior, Justice and Human Rights. Each attendee agreed on
the illegality of MOD's detention practices and pledged their
ministries' support for the transfer.

-- On June 28, Emboffs met with the Senior Advisor to the
Minister of Defense (a British national) and the MOD's
Director of Human Rights. They conveyed the Minister's
support for the transfer, but noted a concern over MOJ's
capacity to handle the influx of people. MOD is planning to
host a human rights conference on July 13 at which the
Minister may announce agreement on an interministerial plan
for the transfer of custody.

-- On June 30, Emboffs received confirmation that
renovations are underway at an MOJ-run facility in
Khadamiyah. When completed, these repairs have the potential
to significantly increase pre-trial detainee capacity at this
location.

-- On July 1, Emboffs attended the MCROLD meeting and
obtained a copy of a letter from Prime Minister Maliki
directing MOD to transfer its entire civilian detainee
population to MOJ.

--------------
Comment
--------------


6. (C) There has been more movement on this human rights
issue in the past two weeks than in the past year. Following
the Sadrists' claims in Parliament of detainee abuse and the
media attention which accompanied these allegations (reftel),
GOI officials from the various ministries responsible for
detainee operations have begun to focus on taking corrective
action. We have used our meetings to encourage these
developments while acting in a strictly supporting role --
the process is and should continue to be driven by the
Iraqis. As the vast majority of MOD civilian detainees are
held by operations commands such as the Ninewa Operations
Command (NOC) and Baghdad Operations Command (BOC),which in
practice lie outside the Defense Ministry's traditional chain
of command and report directly to the Prime Minister's
Office, it is essential that any agreement incorporate these
units as well. We have developed a detailed diplomatic
strategy with the key GOI players on this issue and will
continue to assist Iraqi efforts wherever possible. End
comment.
HILL