REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - PSC OVERSIGHT

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 001720

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/NEA/I, NEA, A/QM, M, A/LM,
NEA/SCA/EX

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - PSC OVERSIGHT


1. (U) This is an action request - See paragraph 11.


2. (SBU) Summary: Post remains strongly committed to taking
actions necessary for meeting the mandates and intent of USG law,
policies, and procedures for sound private security contractor (PSC)
oversight. To continue moving forward and based on actual
experience, a number of issues have been identified requiring
resolution and clarification including defining the roles and
responsibilities of other DOS bureaus and offices in PSC oversight.
The active participation of other Department stakeholders is
essential and we urge their involvement in this effort.
Consideration should also be given to shifting PSC oversight
functions (other than WPPS security providers) to DOD. Doing so
realizes a number positive outcomes including diminishing the
possibility of confrontations involving the use of force, and
collectively meeting Congressional mandates in a cost effective
manner. Determining RSO resource requirements for PSC oversight,
particularly in relation to its other core missions is another
important factor for consideration. In light of the above, Post
requests clear guidance and direction concerning the following four
key issues:

-- The role, responsibility, and authorities RSO Baghdad has for the
oversight of DOS/Chief of Mission (COM) affiliated PSCs.

-- The scope of PSCs falling under DOS/COM oversight.

-- The roles, responsibilities, and most importantly, authorities
DOS bureaus and offices, and COM agencies have for carrying out PSC
oversight.

-- The assets and resources that are required by RSO Baghdad in
order to establish and carry out a viable PSC oversight program.


RSO is fully committed to providing a safe and secure environment,
but an unstable security environment combined with other factors
dictates continuing reliance on PSC assets. Resolution of these
issues, along with other key components, is essential for
successfully implementing a viable PSC oversight regime. End
summary.

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Background and Message Objective
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3. (SBU) PSCs are vital to providing security services and
activities supporting USG efforts in Iraq. With few exceptions,
these services are delivered professionally under difficult and
dangerous conditions. However, since September 2007, PSCs, and
their affiliated USG agencies, have come under intense government,
public, and media scrutiny and review, a process which is still
ongoing. To strengthen oversight of PSCs, DOS, the Department of
Defense (DOD),and Congress took action to propose and implement
laws, regulations, directives, memorandums of agreement and
understanding (MOAs & MOUs),and instructions, resulting in a
collective body of policy and mandates for the oversight of private
security contractors. To meet these policy mandates Diplomatic
Security (DS) established the position of Coordinator for Armed
Contractor Oversight at RSO Baghdad, formed a Force Investigation
Unit to investigate PSC related incidents, assigned DS Special
Agents as agents in charge of Worldwide Personnel Protective Service
(WPPS) Chief of Mission (COM) protective security details (PSDs),
conducted quarterly meetings of the Regional Security Office (RSO)
Baghdad - Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-I) - USAID Joint Incident
Review Board, and enhanced engagement with key Iraqi Ministry of
Interior (MOI) officials concerning PSC operations and issues
including conducting joint investigations of PSCs involving serious
incidents.


4. (U) However, a number of issues have yet to be resolved,
Q4. (U) However, a number of issues have yet to be resolved,
decisions made, and policy and guidance formulated with respect to
oversight of DOS/COM affiliated PSCs. The objectives of this Action
Message are to identify and seek guidance on core issues, discuss
leveraging DOD PSC oversight capabilities and capacity for oversight
of DOS/COM affiliated PSCs, and request clear policy and direction
on the role, responsibilities and authorities of the RSO and other
Department of State stakeholders in the oversight of DOS/COM
affiliated private security contractors.

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RSO Role in PSC Oversight and Other Stakeholders
--------------


5. (U) The collective body of policy governing PSC oversight
identifies DS, and by extension RSO Baghdad, as having a major role
in carrying out PSC oversight in the field. What is now required
are clearly defined objectives and responsibilities, along with the
requisite authorities and resources necessary for implementing a PSC
oversight program. Determining programmatic responsibility for PSC
oversight must also extend beyond DS and RSO Baghdad to other DOS
offices and Bureaus having equities, responsibilities, and most
importantly the inherent authorities and subject matter expertise
necessary for leveraging PSC compliance with applicable policies,
procedures, and standards for private security contractor operations
outside of the United States. The active participation of other
Department stakeholders is essential and we urge their involvement.

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Leveraging DOD Capabilities and Capacity for Oversight of
PSCs
-------------- ---


6. (SBU) As the transition to greater Iraqi control and
responsibility for governmental functions continues moving forward,
DOD is reassessing its mission in Iraq, along with the tasks and
functions it has been performing. However, along with maintaining a
presence in Iraq, DOD is expected to require some level of PSC
provided security services. At the same time, a number of DOS/COM
affiliated agencies and activities in Iraq also will require private
security contractor services necessary for sustaining a broad range
of American efforts, initiatives, and programs in Iraq.


7. (SBU) The collective DOS - DOD need for PSC services, along with
shared responsibilities for exercising appropriate PSC oversight,
makes this an opportune time to raise the subject of shifting
greater control for oversight of private security operations, other
than private security providers working under WPPS contracts, to
DOD. By shifting the majority of PSC oversight to DOD, along with a
commitment of requisite DOS resources, a number of mutually
beneficial, cost effective, and positive outcomes are realized,
including:

-- Centralizing oversight, maintaining uniformity of standards and
procedures, and combining resources reduces the possibility of
future confrontations, including those involving the use of force,
from occurring;

-- Collectively (DOD - DOS) meeting Congressional mandates for PSC
oversight;

-- Serving as a force multiplier by which each agency is able to
meet its PSC oversight responsibilities in a cost constructive,
resource efficient and collaborative manner;

-- Leveraging resources and subject matter expertise (e.g. DS
investigative skills and capabilities, and depth of DOD contracting
resources and expertise) in a mutually supportive manner;

-- Sharing in the preservation of critical DOD PSC oversight
infrastructure (e.g. the MNC-I Contractors Operations Cell -
CONOC);

-- Leveraging DOD access to Iraqi military leadership to deconflict
issues involving PSCs and other GOI ministries;

-- Meeting the intent of the December 2007 DOD - DOS MOA calling for
unity of effort;

-- Deconflicting DOS and DOD policies, procedures and instruction;

-- Meeting the GOI preference for simplified and uniform operating
procedures;


-- Establishing uniform and theatre-wide PSC arming certification,
authorization, and documentation procedures;

-- Providing USG, GOI, and private security contractor stakeholders
with a single source of authority and point of contact for PSC
issues and operations; and

-- Creating an exportable operational model for PSC oversight for
utilization in areas requiring enhanced PSC services and
operations.


8. (SBU) In the context of a DS initiative, the concept of placing
DOS/COM affiliated PSCs (other than WPPS) under DOD oversight
programs was raised at a working level meeting with DOD/MNF-I
counterparts in Baghdad June 1. The meeting was highly cordial and
representative of the continued strong working relationship that
Qrepresentative of the continued strong working relationship that
exists between RSO and DOD counterparts concerning PSC matters.
However, before any discussion concerning the transfer of PSC
oversight functions can take place in Baghdad, executive engagement
and buy-in at the Washington, DC level has to take place, and
guidance and direction communicated to the respective DOS - DOD
elements on the ground.


9. (SBU) In a discussion with Multi-National Forces Iraq June 24
regarding the text of this message, it was explained that the
concept of DOD assuming a greater role in oversight of DOS/COM
affiliated PSCs comes at a time when the U.S. Military is reducing
its presence and moving to the formation of a combined U.S. Forces
Iraq. For these reasons, they are not prepared to take on a new and
enduring mission, i.e. oversight of DOS/COM affiliated PSCs.
Looking to the future, the counterpart opined the concept will be
for the Department of State, in conjunction with the Government of
Iraq to take on a greater role in PSC oversight and that increasing
GOI capacity in this area should be a focus of the effort. For
these reasons, the counterpart stated that they "non-concurred" with
this cable, specifically with those areas suggesting DOD undertake
greater responsibility for the oversight of the non-WPPS PSCs.
Resources


10. (SBU) DOS/COM affiliated PSCs currently employ a collective
force of over 6,000 armed personnel working for a number of private
security contractors throughout Iraq. The resource implications of
undertaking oversight of a force of this size and scope have to be
considered in the context of the mandated requirements for the
oversight of USG private security contractors, including those
having a DOS/COM affiliation. Measured against scope and mandate,
it becomes obvious that neither RSO nor Post have the resources,
personnel, and infrastructure necessary for establishing and
maintaining an effective PSC oversight program throughout Iraq,
while still being able to effectively perform other critical
missions. Based upon experience and knowledge of this subject gained
over the past year, we believe that establishing and maintaining a
viable PSC oversight program is achievable, particularly by taking a
coordinated, multi-disciplined approach to this problem and drawing
on the expertise, resources, and authorities of other stakeholders.
But in relation to its other missions and core programs, RSO Baghdad
at this time has neither the authorities nor the resources necessary
for undertaking oversight of PSCs beyond the WPPS program. Nor is
it possible to identify resource requirements without first having
the framework of a program to serve as a point of reference.

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Issues for Decision and Action Request
-------------- --------------


11. (SBU) Action Request. Post requests clear guidance and
direction on the following four issues:

ISSUE FOR DECISION 1 - The role, responsibility, and authorities RSO
Baghdad has for the oversight of DOS/COM affiliated private security
contractors.

Action Request:

-- Develop and promulgate clear and unambiguous policy clearly
defining the role, responsibilities, and authorities of RSO Baghdad
for PSC oversight.


ISSUE FOR DECISION 2 - The scope of PSCs falling under DOS/COM
oversight.

Action Request:

-- Develop clear and unambiguous policy regarding which categories
of PSCs come under DOS/COM oversight, i.e. prime contractors,
subcontractors, PSCs providing security to grantees, implementing
partners and other USG award recipients, and internal security
components of non-PSC organizations and businesses.

ISSUE FOR DECISION 3 - The roles, responsibilities, and most
importantly, authorities DOS bureaus and offices, including RSO and
DS, and COM agencies have for carrying out PSC oversight.

Action Request:

-- Identify DOS bureaus and offices (including RSO and DS),and COM
agencies having PSC oversight responsibilities;
-- Establish and promulgate policy clearly defining the scope,
applicability and responsibilities of PSC oversight with respect to
Qapplicability and responsibilities of PSC oversight with respect to
DOS/COM entities;
-- Clarify the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of these
entities;
-- Integrate these DOS/COM entities into PSC oversight; and
-- Obtain commitments for theater and/or Washington based resources
from these DOS/COM entities dedicated to PSC oversight.

ISSUE FOR DECISION 4 - The assets and resources required by RSO
Baghdad in order to establish and carry out a viable PSC oversight
program.

Action Request:

-- In close collaboration with RSO Baghdad, determine the resources
necessary for exercising oversight of COM affiliated PSCs in Iraq
personnel; and
-- Commit to putting in place the resources necessary for carrying
out PSC oversight, both at RSO Baghdad and at the Washington level.

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Conclusion
--------------


12. (SBU) RSO is unwavering in its commitment to pursue its mission
of providing a safe and secure environment for the conduct of
diplomacy and advancement of American interests in Iraq. In looking
to the future, an unstable security environment, a reduction of U.S.
Military forces in Iraq, and continuing global demands for DS
personnel and resources will dictate continued reliance on PSCs for
essential security services. Providing the requisite oversight of
these PSCs requires three key components:

-- Clearly defined PSC oversight program objectives, authorities,
roles, and responsibilities;

-- Buy-in and active engagement by other DOS and USG partners and
stakeholders; and

-- Processes, mechanisms, and resources necessary for execution.
All three of these components are critical, and mutually dependent
upon one another for successfully implementing a viable PSC
oversight regime.


13. (U) POC is Regional Security Office Baghdad.

HILL