Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD1707
2009-06-26 16:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

VP HASHIMI ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #1707/01 1771610
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261610Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3671
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001707 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: VP HASHIMI ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
ELECTIONS

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Ford for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001707

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: VP HASHIMI ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
ELECTIONS

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Ford for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a June 22 meeting, Vice President Hashimi told the
Charge he was concerned that upcoming withdrawals of U.S.
combat forces from urban centers would lead to a
deterioration of security, possibly mandating a return of
U.S. forces in some areas. The Vice President expressed
support for the idea of transferring all detainees held by
the GOI to MOJ custody, but stopped short of offering to
raise the idea directly with PM Maliki. In a moment of
particular candor, Hashimi admitted he was ashamed of Iraq's
human rights record and said "we need help" to improve it.
Hashimi was equivocal on preparations for the 2010 elections,
and predicted sectarian voting blocs, reminiscent of 2005,
could reemerge. On developments in Iran, Hashimi expressed
sympathy for the demonstrators, but expected the Iranian
government to crush them. Hashimi, just back from Turkey,
claimed credit for a Turkish decision to triple the amount of
Euphrates river water flowing downstream. End summary.

--------------
Troop Withdrawals
--------------


2. (C) The Charge told the Vice President the withdrawal of
U.S. combat forces from urban centers was proceeding on
schedule. So far, the total number of U.S. occupied combat
bases and security posts in the cities had dropped from 397
to 330, and would reach zero by the end of June. Hashimi
sought confirmation that U.S. troops would be on stand-by in
bases near the cities, on hand to assist Iraqi security
forces if needed. The Charge affirmed that they would, but
underlined that any such help would have to be formally
requested by the GOI. Hashimi predicted that security
conditions would deteriorate.


3. (C) Citing recent terrorist attacks - in Battha, Dhi Qar
province, in Taza, near Kirkuk, and, just that day, in Abu
Ghraib, West Baghdad, the Vice President expected that events
would prompt a GOI request for U.S. troops to remain, at
least in certain areas. The Charge asked VP Hashimi whether
Iraqis would be surprised, after 30 June, by the sight of

U.S. military training and support elements who will continue
to be visible on the streets of Iraq's city's after 30 June.
Hashimi thought the Iraqi public, focused mainly on the
withdrawals, might indeed be surprised by this sight. The VP
also asked whether private security contractors would still
be visible, and the Charge affirmed that they would, as they
protect Embassy diplomats, as well as other international
institutions.

--------------
Human Rights - Addressing Detainee Problems
--------------


4. (C) The Charge told the Vice President the Embassy was
concerned about the status of thousands of detainees in Iraqi
government custody. There seems to be a particular problem
with detainees in Ministry of Defense custody, who are not
receiving legal due process and are often held in inhumane
conditions, the Charge added. The Embassy would like to see
all detainees brought under Ministry of Justice supervision -
would the Vice President support such an idea? "I fully
agree, but will the Prime Minister?" Hashimi responded.


5. (C) Human rights and detainee matters are becoming a more
prominent issue, he added, saying he intended to write to
Vice President Abdel Mahdi about the idea. The Vice
President suggested it would be useful if Minister of Human
Rights Wijdan Salim broached the idea directly with Prime
Minister Maliki, and also thought the UN might play a
QMinister Maliki, and also thought the UN might play a
constructive role. (Comment: Apparently reflecting Hashimi's
very cool relations with Maliki, the VP notably did not say
he would himself broach the idea with the PM. End comment.)
The Charge welcomed Hashimi's suggestions and said the
Embassy would follow up on them.


6. (C) In his most candid remarks of the meeting, Hashimi
said he was ashamed of Iraq's human rights record (and noted
recent UN human rights reports on Iraqi detainees),saying it
was a national problem rather than a sectarian problem. He
has seen Shi'a officials mistreat Sunnis, but has also seen
Shi'a mistreat Shi'a and (in Anbar for example) seen Sunnis
mistreat Sunnis. "We need help," to come to grips with
Iraq's poor human rights record, Hashimi underlined.

--------------

Elections Outlook
--------------


7. (C) The Charge asked Hashimi if he had any information on
the status of the 2010 election law whose passage is becoming
important. Hashimi said he was unaware of any parliamentary
activity on the law, though he was sure they would get to it
"at some point." The Charge emphasized that the U.S. thought
it important that work start soon, so that the elections can
take place on time in mid-January, and added that the U.S.
believed an open list ballot would be preferable - enhancing
the transparency of the process and accountability of the
candidates to the electorate. Most important, he underlined,
is the holding of elections by the end of January.


8. (C) The Charge also asked Hashimi how he saw, looking
forward, Iraqi political blocs coalescing in advance of the
elections. The Vice President said he expected that if the
United Iraqi Alliance (which grouped Maliki's Da'wa together
with ISCI and Shi'a independents) was reconstituted (after
ISCI and Da'wa's falling-out in 2008),Sunni and Kurdish
coalitions would follow suit - resulting a repeat of the
sectarian competition that marked the 2005 national
elections.


9. (C) Hashimi thought that Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq's most
influential, yet reclusive, Shi'a leader, preferred to see
cross-sectarian cooperation among political blocs. The
Charge suggested that the Sunnis might consider sending an
emissary, perhaps Sunni Waqf President Sheikh Ahmed Abdal
Ghaffour al-Samara'ie, to visit Sistani and explore common
ground, but Hashimi was dismissive, noting Sheikh Ahmed has
already launched his own political movement (and, for good
measure, is claiming he has American support, which we
discounted).

--------------
Iran
--------------


10. (C) Asked about developments in Tehran, Hashimi said he
felt sympathy for the demonstrators, but expected that they
would be crushed by a government crackdown "unless the West
intervenes." He added that President Obama "has not been
clear" on where the U.S. stands on the crisis in Iran, and,
given the advance of technology, couldn't accept that there
was a dearth of information about what is really happening
there. The Charge responded that the U.S. has been clear -
we want to see a fair and transparent process in Iran: in a
sense who wins is less important than the credibility of how
they win.

--------------
Turkey/River Water
--------------


11. (C) Vice President Hashimi, who had recently returned
from Turkey, boasted that he had convinced the Turks to
increase the downstream flow of Euphrates water from 300
cubic meters/second to 700. Though satisfied for the
interim, Hashimi believed that the UN should become involved
in regulating what is, ultimately, an international legal
issue, not merely a bilateral or multilateral concern.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) Having stepped down last month as Secretary-General
of the IIP, Hashimi seemed even more detached (though at the
same time more cheerful) than usual. Despite his high
profile position, our sense is that Hashimi has spent more
time complaining (especially to the U.S.) about problems and
perceived injustices than in harnessing the power of his
office to do anything about him. We doubt he will stay on as
Vice President when the new government is formed following
the 2010 elections. As his interest seems to diminish, Ayed
Samarraie, the Parliament Speaker, will also take on a more
important role representing Sunni Arab concerns in the
government. End comment.
FORD