Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD1705
2009-06-26 13:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT SALAH AD DIN: LOCAL OFFICIALS RESENT GOI

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL PTER PINS KCRS IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #1705 1771346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261346Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3667
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001705 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PTER PINS KCRS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: LOCAL OFFICIALS RESENT GOI
"INTERFERENCE"

REF: BAGHDAD 624

Classified By: PRT Leader David Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Salah ad Din
(SAD) reporting cable.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001705

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PTER PINS KCRS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: LOCAL OFFICIALS RESENT GOI
"INTERFERENCE"

REF: BAGHDAD 624

Classified By: PRT Leader David Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

This is a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Salah ad Din
(SAD) reporting cable.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Salah ad Din (SAD) provincial government
officials complain of Government of Iraq (GOI) interference
in provincial affairs, such as the direct role the GOI has
taken in Samarra's security, and its recent decision to
expand its direct authority over the local police into two
additional districts. SAD officials view the GOI's
involvement as a serious encroachment on provincial
authority. END SUMMARY.

GOI OPERATIONS IN SAD ANGER LOCALS
--------------


2. (C) On June 20, the Deputy Commander of MNC-I and the OPA
Chief met with SaD Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Ahmed
Abdullah, (AKA Abu Mazin),the two Deputy Governors Ahmed
Ahmed Abed-al-Jabar and Dr. Ameen Azeez Jiwad, and other PC
members. The 3/25 IBCT Commander and PRT Leader also
attended. The primary concern expressed by SAD officials was
the recent GOI decision to place SAD police districts in
Balad and Dujayl under the control of the Samarra Operations
Command (SOC). (NOTE: Following the terrorist bombing of the
Golden Mosque in 2006, the GOI Prime Minister's Office moved
a National Police (NP) force to Samarra and established the
Samarra Operations Command (SOC) to secure the Mosque and the
historic area around it during the restoration process, and
secure the city against terrorist attacks. Local officials
insist that Samarra enjoys good security now and it is time
for the NP to move out. There is deep concern among
Samarrans and provincial officials that the SOC is now
essentially a GOI occupying force, put in place to further
Shi'a interests in the city and province. END NOTE).


3. (C) PC Chairman Abu Mazin repeatedly reminded the US
delegation that he was elected by the people, he represents
them, and the people are afraid of GOI interference. He
stated that he would rather have Peshmerga in Samarra than an
expanded SOC authority. He maintained that the SOC presence
"usurps the authority of the provincial leaders, who should
be in charge of the police in the province." He was also
critical of the GOI's decision to send the Iraqi Army (IA) to
arrest former Ba'athist officers in Tikrit. Even though the
IA had a warrant, Abu Mazin said that the area was under the
jurisdiction of local police and that they should be the sole
agency conducting arrests. Though the arrest incident was
resolved peacefully, it is emblematic of the ongoing tension
between the IA and the IP, and between the provincial and
national governments. The other officials present expressed
similar outrage at GOI's involvement in the province, which
they view as a serious encroachment on provincial authority.


4. (C) Security clearly remains SAD Iraqis' primary concern,
particularly with the impending withdrawal of U.S. military
forces from Iraqi cities on June 30. As Abu Mazin said,
"Violence will increase. The Central Government doesn't
represent us. We need Coalition Forces. People are afraid.
Time is short. The Central Government needs to respect local
governments."
FORD