Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD1669
2009-06-23 15:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

MEK BLUSTER, IRANIAN ACCUSATIONS HINDER CHANCE FOR

Tags:  PREL PTER PINR IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6996
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHGB #1669/01 1741548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231548Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3621
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001669 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I, NEA/IR AND SAGSWA
NSC STAFF FOR MAGSAMEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: MEK BLUSTER, IRANIAN ACCUSATIONS HINDER CHANCE FOR
COOPERATION AT CAMP ASHRAF

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1484

B. BAGHDAD 1106 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b-d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001669

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I, NEA/IR AND SAGSWA
NSC STAFF FOR MAGSAMEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR IR IZ
SUBJECT: MEK BLUSTER, IRANIAN ACCUSATIONS HINDER CHANCE FOR
COOPERATION AT CAMP ASHRAF

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1484

B. BAGHDAD 1106 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b-d).


1. (C) Summary: Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) leader Miriam
Rajavi wrote to Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki on June 22 to
assail the Iranian government and urge greater accommodation
of the MEK's Camp Ashraf, even as Iranian media carried
accusations that the MEK instigated deadly post-election
rioting in Tehran. Camp Ashraf leaders were in a triumphal
mood June 21 during a meeting with Embassy Baghdad and MNF-I,
highlighting Rajavi's June 20 speech in France in which she
cited Ashraf frequently directly linking it to demonstrations
in Iran. We assess these actions will not be well-received
by the GOI and will undermine recent Embassy efforts to
defuse a standoff between the Camp residents and Iraqi police
at the gate of the camp (REF A) including the June 10 first
visit by the new Camp Ashraf committee. Although the Iraqi
government has been willing to use a measured approach on
Ashraf, the combination of Iranian accusations and MEK
bluster could hinder the chances for cooperation. End Summary.



2. (U) A variety of Iranian press reports on June 20 and 21
accused the MEK of instigating violent demonstrations
following the June 12 presidential elections including
purported confessions of MEK members broadcast on TV and the
charges of a Tehran police official that the MEK sparked a
demonstration in which 10 people were killed. Meanwhile MEK
leader Miriam Rajavi spoke at a June 20 rally in France
making repeated reference to the "steadfast" Ashraf,
referring to the camp at one point as "the strategic nucleus"
while calling Ashraf residents "the combatants of freedom."
On June 22, an Iraqi website carried the text of a letter
Rajavi reportedly sent to Iraqi PM Maliki calling for Iraqi
officials to "separate their path from the path of the
Islamic Republic's Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei and Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad." She also recommended that the
GOI turn Ashraf over to U.S. or U.N. supervision.


3. (C) The speech and letter coincided with Embassy and MNF-I

efforts to defuse a dispute over the GOI desire to place a
police station in the camp (Ref A). TF-134 CG and Pol-mil
mincouns arranged a visit by a delegation from the new GOI
Ashraf Committee headed by PM advisor Ali al-Yasseri to meet
with CAR leadership on June 10. After convincing al-Yasseri
to brave the residents blockade at the gate of the camp,
Yasseri spent 90 minutes explaining the GOI position on a
police station and the need for the Ashraf residents to
consider a voluntary move to another facility in Iraq further
from the border with Iran that would be safer and not subject
to Iranian attack. The Camp residents asked for recognition
of their status in Iraq and presented a list of allegations
of GOI refusal to let goods into Ashraf. While strongly
opposed to the idea of a police station inside the camp, the
leadership agreed to consider the idea. Al-Yasseri promised
to look into the list of allegations.


4. (C) In an Embassy/TF-134 visit to Ashraf on June 21 to
follow up on the June 10 visit with the Camp leadership, an
unusually upbeat Mojgan Parsaei uncharacteristically focused
almost exclusively on MEK politics and recounted for Pol-Mil
Mincouns and TF134 CG the highlights of Rajavi's June 20
speech, noting that Rajavi mentioned Ashraf a dozen times.
Parsaei also relayed a message she said was from Rajavi to
QParsaei also relayed a message she said was from Rajavi to
the Embassy and MNF-I that Ashraf residents will return to
Iran in the event of democratic change there. Parsaei said
Rajavi reiterated longstanding MEK complaints (reftels)
including a claim that the GOI is holding the camp in a state
of siege at the behest of the Iranian government. Although
Iraqi Army units controlled the perimeter of the camp, Rajavi
wanted the USG to know that residents would never permit
Iraqi police to establish a station inside Ashraf and would
rather die than give in to the Iraqi government, Parsaei said.


5. (C) Pol-Mil Mincouns responded that Rajavi's speech
references to Ashraf as a clearly anti-Iranian political
entity will cause the GOI to redouble pressure on Ashraf as a
demonstration of Iraqi sovereignty, making compromise more
difficult. He said that Camp Ashraf has many enemies inside
Iraq and that the speech suggested that Iraq was not
responsible for Ashraf. He and TF134 CG urged the Ashraf
leadership to work with the GOI to establish mutually
acceptable conditions for a police station in Ashraf as a
signal of recognition of Iraqi sovereignty over Ashraf city.


6. (C) Comment: Maliki has made crystal clear his absolute

BAGHDAD 00001669 002 OF 002


unwillingness to allow the MEK to continue to operate in Iraq
as an anti-Iranian government organization. The MEK remains
domestically unpopular because of widely-held belief that it
carried out violence for Saddam Hussein against both Shia and
Kurds. If the MEK continues to portray Ashraf as a base for
resistance to the Iranian government, the natural GOI
inclination to respond firmly to the instigation will be
compounded by Iranian pressure (after the recent violence) to
get the GOI to take action against the camp. Alternately,
with the current climate of instability in Iran and the MEK's
long and violent history, it is always possible that the
Iranian government would attempt some type of action against
Ashraf, likely through insurgent surrogates in Diyala
province. In response, the Charge will urge caution with
Maliki's chief of staff, while Pol-Mil Mincouns will engage
with the head of the GOI's Ashraf committee and follow up
with the Minister of Human Rights, who we believe has an
increasing stature in the GOI to assist with this issue. We
will seek a timely follow-up visit by the Ashraf committee to
the camp. Where appropriate, we will remind relevant GOI
officials of the GOI's assurances to treat Camp Ashraf
residents humanely and in accordance with Iraq's
constitution, laws, and international obligations. We will
also continue to press the Camp Ashraf leadership to
compromise with the GOI although Parsaei, who is typically
gracious but taciturn, will have to come down from her
buoyant mood, as she joked to the departing Pol-Mil
Minister-Counselor that she would next see him in Tehran.
FORD