KIRKUK: ARTICLE 23 COMITTEE UNABLE TO FIND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001475

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL IZ
SUBJECT: KIRKUK: ARTICLE 23 COMITTEE UNABLE TO FIND
AGREEMENT IN KIRKUK

Classified By: PRT Kirkuk Leader Howard Keegan; reasons 1.4b and d

This is a PRT Kirkuk reporting cable.


1. (C) SUMMARY: On May 24, the Article 23 Committee (A23C)
completed its last meeting in Kirkuk before heading to
Baghdad. The A23C is no closer to an agreement on the issues
raised under Article 23 of the Provincial Elections Law than
it was when it was formed in November 2008. The A23C
meetings in Kirkuk were characterized by a lack of
organization and structure, which impeded serious negotiation
and dialogue. While some A23C members may be unwilling to
request another extension, and one would be unlikely to lead
to agreement, the committee's continued existence could help
reduce political tensions. If, on the other hand, the Kirkuk
elections issue is passed back to the CoR, we expect some
Arab and Turkomen representatives to attempt to pass a
national elections law that sets quotas for the Kirkuk
Provincial Council (PC),an idea the Kurds will vehemently
oppose. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On May 24, the A23C completed its last meeting in
Kirkuk before the 31 May deadline. The committee's
recommendations on issues including power-sharing,
"trespassers" (a reference to post-2003 Kurdish migrants,
some of whom were returning victims of Arabization),and
voter registration are due to be presented to the Iraqi
Council of Representatives (CoR) in less than one week. The
A23C has been unable to find consensus on any issue of
significance. Only three of the seven A23C members attended
the May 24 meeting in Kirkuk, while one of the missing
members (Omar Jabouri) instead held a press conference in the
same building just a few doors away. The lack of attendance
at the last meeting, and the decision not to hold any further
meetings until the day before the deadline, attests to the
frustration felt by committee members over their lack of
progress.

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A23C Characterized by Lack of Organization and Structure
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3. (C) Over the last three and one-half months, the A23C
generally held three meetings per week (Sunday - Tuesday).
PRT Kirkuk had an observer sitting in all the A23C meetings
that took place in Kirkuk. Additional attendees usually
included the A23C technical advisors and representatives from
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The
only active participants in the meetings were the A23C
members themselves. All other attendees acted almost
exclusively as silent observers.


4. (C) The A23C meetings in Kirkuk were disorganized,
unstructured and unprofessional. The PRT would often show up
at the Governor's conference room at the appointed meeting
time only to find one A23C member present (usually Yonadum
Kanna - the lone Christian). As the rest of the committee
trickled in, sometimes up to two hours late, they would often
grouse about the missing committee members who were still
socializing in other offices of the KGB. Early on, the A23C
decided to have a rotating Chairman for each of the meetings.
The A23C never established an official Chairman schedule;
instead the first few minutes of each meeting were spent
choosing a Chairman, seemingly at random. The Chairman's
job, although never officially defined, seemed to consist
mainly of recognizing speakers during the meeting.


5. (C) A23C meetings rarely began with an agenda, and when
one was decided upon it would typically be very general, such
as "power-sharing." PRT never saw an official agenda, and
Qas "power-sharing." PRT never saw an official agenda, and
the lack of one seemed a significant contributing factor in
the committee's inability to have useful negotiations and
dialogue. Once an agenda and a chairman were decided upon,
the A23C meetings usually consisted of dueling speeches
punctuated by occasional emotional outbursts and arguments.
The Chairman ran the meeting by recognizing individual
speakers, who proceeded to give 5-10 minute speeches that may
or may not have had anything to do with the chosen agenda.
Speakers often gave speeches on completely different topics
from the preceding speaker, preventing any sense of
continuity during the meeting.

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Arabs and Turkomen versus the Kurds
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6. (C) Although the A23C members should have conducted their
first meetings in November 2008, they did not begin in Kirkuk
until three months later. The leaders from each of the three
main ethnic blocs quickly emerged: Khalid Shwany for the

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Kurds, Mohammed Tameem for the Arabs, and Saladin Ergic for
the Turkomen. Each ethnic bloc presented a unified voice in
A23C meetings; individual members of the same bloc never
publicly disagreed with one another. A loose alliance seemed
to form immediately between the Turkomen and Arab A23C
members. This unstated alliance held through all the
meetings in Kirkuk; PRT never observed a significant
difference of opinion between the Turkomen and Arab A23C
members. Meanwhile, the lone Christian A23C member, Yonadum
Kanna, tended to play a neutral role while occasionally
siding with the Kurds on contentious issues such as the
hiring of teachers from the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG).


7. (C) The two most vociferous A23C members turned out to be
Mohammed Tameem of the Arab Bloc and Khalid Shwany of the
Kurdish bloc. One or both of these members tended to either
instigate or prolong major arguments during the meetings. At
times, meetings would devolve into a series of personal
attacks between these two. In one particular meeting on 30
March, a verbal exchange between Mohammed and Khalid over
information-gathering became so intense that the A23C had to
take a recess while they left the room for 15 minutes to work
out their differences in private. While A23C meetings were
often very contentious, before and after meetings all A23C
members seemed to get along well and often joked and laughed
with one another.


8. (C) The Kurdish bloc appeared to enter the A23C meetings
in February with a hard-line approach to any negotiations.
For example, Khalid Shwany, as the main Kurdish spokesman,
opposed any groups within the A23C soliciting directorates
for information without the express permission of the entire
A23C. This caused much consternation, since the Kurdish bloc
seemed to have reams of information at its fingertips each
meeting. Whenever another bloc would attempt to gather
population or ethnicity statistics from a directorate, Khalid
would immediately object and call their information gathering
"illegal." In one meeting on 31 March, Arab A23C member Omar
Jabouri attempted to read a draft letter to the Ministry of
Trade asking for statistics for the A23C. Khalid objected to
the letter several times, interrupting the reading but never
explaining his objections. These actions and others like it
resulted in accusations that the Kurds were obstructing
negotiations. In private meetings with the PRT, both
Turkomen and Arab A23C members accused Khalid Shwany of
outright obstruction, and complained that his antics during
meetings prevented any useful dialogue or progress.

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Kurds Try to Make Deal in Final Week, but Too Late for Arabs
and Turkomen
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9. (C) When the A23C returned from its UN-sponsored trip to
Northern Ireland (May 4-9),attitudes on the committee seemed
to dramatically reverse. The Kurds in general and Khalid
Shwany in particular took a much more conciliatory tone
during A23C meetings. Their main issue of concern over the
final weeks was the transfer of 7000 Kurdish teachers from
the KRG to Kirkuk as part of a power-sharing agreement. Both
Khalid Shwany and Sarteep Kakayi made clear their interest in
giving up high-level government positions in the province in
exchange for the hiring of these teachers. For the first
time, the Kurds were trying to negotiate. Khalid often
backed down from arguments with Mohammed Tameem and Saladin
Ergic, even when provoked - unheard of for Khalid over the
QErgic, even when provoked - unheard of for Khalid over the
first few months. When it became apparent that the Arabs and
Turkomen would not agree to a guarantee for these teachers,
the Kurds resorted to media statements accusing the Arabs of
obstructionism.


10. (C) The Arabs and Turkomen, on the other hand, came back
from Northern Ireland more unified than ever. Arab and
Turkomen speakers often complemented each other during their
speeches, as if the two blocs had coordinated their positions
before the meetings. There was a feeling in the A23C
meetings that they did not need to give in to any Kurdish
demands, as if they believed the Kurds were negotiating from
a position of weakness. The Arab and Turkomen blocs refused
to even discuss the Kurdish teachers unless the Kurds gave
guarantees on trespassers and ID registration. In the final
meeting in Kirkuk on May 24, Mohammed Tameem almost seemed
eager to bring Article 23 back before the CoR. At one point,
he smiled and told Khalid that the President can only veto an
elections law twice.


11. (C) Several influential Kirkuki Arab leaders, including
Arab Unity Bloc Chairman Abu Saddam and Deputy Governor Rakan
Saeed, told the PRT that they expect no extension for the

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A23C, and that the CoR would implement a special elections
law in Kirkuk along the lines of Article 24. This also seems
to be the opinion of Turkomen leaders in the province. Arab
leaders in Kirkuk are making regular trips down to Baghdad,
where they are holding meetings with Shi'a parties -
ostensibly to discuss this very topic.

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Extension Unlikely to Achieve Consensus, but May Contain
Political Passions
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12. (C) Over the last four meetings in Kirkuk, the A23C never
formally discussed requesting a second extension from the
CoR. The issue was raised a few times in the last few
meetings, but it met with a muted response. It is not clear
whether A23C members actually desire an extension. Arab and
Turkomen A23C members appear to believe they have the votes
in the CoR to pass an elections law to their liking, and over
Kurdish opposition. PRT engagements with Arab and Turkomen
Provincial Council (PC) members show without exception that
the two ethnic groups would like to see the A23C wrap up its
work and pass the issue to the CoR. Kurdish leaders seem to
still want to work through the A23C. It is doubtful, even if
an extension is requested, that the A23C will be able to
reach a consensus with an additional few months. In seven
months of work, the A23C has failed to even scratch the
surface of the issues listed under Article 23.

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Comment: Avoiding a Dispute at the CoR; Reevaluating the UN
Role
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13. (C) CoR legislation forcibly dissolving the current
Kirkuk PC and replacing councilors according to a quota
system that does not reflect provincial demographics would be
anathema to the Kurds and raise tensions in Kirkuk province.
PRT has received numerous opinions from A23C members, Kirkuk
PC members, and political leaders over the role of UNAMI in
the Article 23 process. The majority of these contacts
characterized the UN, somewhat critically, as silent
observers during the Article 23 negotiations. There seems to
be a genuine desire from the Iraqi side for a more robust
role for the UN in the discussions over Article 23, including
setting the agenda for meetings, keeping the committee
members on task, and mediating during disputes. End comment.

HILL