NINEWA OPERATIONS COMMAND: SOME DETAINEES FINALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001427

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2019
TAGS: PHUM PJUS PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA OPERATIONS COMMAND: SOME DETAINEES FINALLY
RELEASED BUT SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAIN

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1117

B. BAGHDAD 884

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Ford for reason 1.4 (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) The Government of Iraq is trying to adequately
address problems relating to its detainee population. The
Ninewa Operations Command (NOC) is a particularly egregious
offender. Although most of the approximately 1,000 people
incarcerated at the NOC have had their cases reviewed by an
investigative judge, the NOC Commander has refused to release
hundreds of prisoners in possession of valid judicial release
orders. These detainees have languished behind bars for
months and sometimes years. In addition, conditions at the
various NOC detention facilities fall well short of
international, and even Iraqi humanitarian, standards for
prisoners. Despite efforts by the Minister of Defense,
Minister of Human Rights and the Chairman of the Higher
Judicial Council, the NOC Commander has disregarded due
process (ref A). However, on May 20, after repeated
approaches by PRT-Ninewa, MOD officials and Emboffs, the NOC
Commander finally released a group of 68 former Camp Bucca
detainees held at the NOC and 59 additional individuals in
possession of release orders. End summary.

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The Process is Broken
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2. (C) From May 9-12, Poloff accompanied the MOD's Director
of Human Rights, Iman Naji, and a representative from
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) on
an unannounced inspection visit to the NOC, one of a number
of operations commands under Ministry of Defense (MOD)
authority. In cooperation with Coalition Forces (CF) and
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),the team inspected facilities at
al-Kindi, Command Outpost (COP) Spear, and al-Kisik, all of
which are under NOC control. Nearly a thousand detainees are
currently held at these locations. While this number has
been decreasing over recent months, new prisoners continue to
arrive; during the visit to COP Spear, Poloff witnessed a
busload of 21 prisoners entering the detention center.


3. (C) Various ministries, including the MOD, Interior
(MOI),Justice (MOJ) and Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA)
have responsibility for and are in control of detainees (ref
B). Under Iraqi law, the MOD has no authority to detain
citizens for lengthy periods. However, citing overcrowding
in other facilities, and given a lack of communication among
the various ministries, the MOD has independently established
detention facilities under the auspices of various operations
commands, including the NOC and the Baghdad Operations
Command (BOC). (Note: During a May 18 meeting with Poloff,
the MOI's Director of Human Rights disputed MOD's
often-repeated charge that it continues to hold detainees to
accommodate overcrowding at MOI facilities. The MOI official
claimed that the MOD prefers to hold prisoners in its own
facilities, rather than send them to an MOI pre-trial
detention center, to circumvent the judicial process. End
note.).


4. (C) Within this overburdened, overcrowded and
often-dysfunctional system, the NOC stands alone for its
categorical disregard of judicial release orders. In
February, nearly 500 of the detainees in custody were in
possession of such orders (ref B). This number has since
dropped to between 100-200. Many of these detainees received
their release orders over six months ago, yet continue to
languish in the NOC's facilities. When questioned about this
disregard for the judicial process, ISF officers claimed that
Qdisregard for the judicial process, ISF officers claimed that
they are simply waiting for confirmation from other
ministries that no outstanding warrants exist for the
detainees. (Comment: As no centralized warrants database
exists in Iraq, this can be a process without end. End
comment.). Moreover, once a judge issues such a decree, the
individual's case is essentially closed. Although the
judiciary has the authority to open a criminal investigation
as to why a detainee remains incarcerated, neither the police
nor the judiciary have the power to enforce release orders.
Thus, if the order is not properly executed, the detainee as
a practical matter has little legal recourse. His freedom
rests largely in the hands of the NOC Commander.


5. (C) Many of the problems at the NOC are attributable to
its commander, Staff Major General (SMG) Hassan Khodeer
Abdul-Karim. According to ISF officials responsible for the
various detention centers, they may not release detainees
without SMG Abdul-Karim's permission. Release requests often

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sit on his desk for weeks or months before he provides a
response, or he may ignore it entirely. Despite attempts by
the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Human Rights,
PRT-Ninewa and Emboffs, SMG Abdul-Karim has refused to comply
with validly issued judicial release orders in accordance
with Iraqi law if, in his opinion, the prisoner constitutes a
security threat.

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Bucca Transferees
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6. (C) In late 2008 and early 2009, 73 prisoners were
transferred from USG custody at Camp Bucca to NOC control.
In November 2008, a group of 25 detainees was transferred to
USG-controlled Camp Cropper and from there to local police
forces in Ninewa, who handed them over to the NOC on January

22. An additional 48 former Bucca inmates were sent to COP
Spear in February. Since these transfers, MNF-I, in
cooperation with the GOI, has instituted a formal structure
for the review of all detainees held by CF (ref A). (Note:
Detainees are only transferred to the GOI if an arrest
warrant or detention order is procured. End note.). Despite
this close cooperation between the USG and GOI, and the lack
of outstanding arrest warrants on these particular
individuals, the "Bucca 73" remained incarcerated in Ninewa
by order of the NOC Commander for months.

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Some Detainees Released
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7. (C) PRT-Ninewa, in cooperation with the local bar
association, has engaged for months with NOC officials, local
judges and Ninewa police in an attempt to secure the release
of all detainees holding release orders, including the Bucca
transfers. In April, the Ministry of Human Rights sent an
inspection team to the NOC whose findings were conveyed to
Prime Minister Maliki. The Embassy has raised the issue with
GOI officials, including the Prime Minister and his staff.
Poloff visited the NOC facilities between May 9-12 and met
with numerous NOC officials during this trip. Additionally,
Naji met privately with the NOC Commander on May 12 to press
for the release of all detainees holding release orders. On
May 20, PRT-Ninewa confirmed that 68 of the 73 Bucca
transferees had been released. Warrants or detention orders
were procured for five individuals who will be transferred to
appropriate pre-trial detention facilities. On May 21,
MNSTC-I confirmed that an additional 59 detainees were
released.

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Inhumane Conditions at the NOC
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8. (C) Humanitarian conditions at the NOC are also of grave
concern. None of the facilities meets internationally
recognized standards for detention centers. Despite the fact
that the NOC, which is under the MOD's authority, does not
have a mandate to hold prisoners, some have been incarcerated
in these facilities for upwards of a year and a half. Many
of the structures being used as detention facilities were
clearly not built for such a purpose. Some prisoners are
being held in an old stadium. Over 50 detainees are kept in
a "holding cell," no more than 20 feet by 20 feet, which more
closely resembles a broom closet than a detention facility.
Prisoners are typically held in this room prior to being
transferred to one of the larger facilities; while this
usually takes place within 48 hours of arrest, some detainees
claimed to have been there for over two weeks.


9. (C) Detainees across the board complained of a lack of
access to lawyers, infrequent contact with family members,
and inadequate medical care. In some of the facilities,
Qand inadequate medical care. In some of the facilities,
prisoners lacked potable drinking water, sufficient bathroom
facilities and little-to-no outdoor time. Overcrowding was a
problem throughout the NOC; at the primary detention center
on FOB Shield, over 100 inmates were being held in each of
five 500 square foot rooms, and had to share one toilet and
one shower per room. While none of the detainees complained
of current abuse at the hands of their guards, many of them
displayed scars from earlier beatings, which typically took
place within 48 hours of arrest, during their
"interrogation."

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The Ministry of Human Rights Jumps Into the Fray
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10. (C) Poloff raised the inhumane conditions at the NOC
with Minister of Human Rights Wijdan Salim, who confirmed
that she is aware of the situation at the NOC. An inspection

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team from the ministry visited the facilities in April,
finding conditions very similar to those on evidence to
Poloff last week. Despite assurances from the NOC commander
that detainees with release orders would be immediately set
free, hundreds remain. Salim said that SMG Abdul-Karim had
assured the Ministry of Human Rights team that the
approximately 50 people being held in the "holding cell"
would be transferred to appropriate MOI pre-trial detention
facilities. One month later, they were still there.
Minister Salim is drafting a second letter to Prime Minister
Maliki on the subject and plans to raise the issue in her
next meeting with Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi. She also
plans to discuss it with the Minister of Defense and Chief
Justice Medhat. If these "private" approaches do not
succeed, she plans to "go public" with the NOC detainee
situation, providing details and photographs to the local and
international media.

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Comment
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11. (C) While the humanitarian situation at the NOC would
be sufficient reason for immediate GOI intervention, the
breakdown in the legal system is of even more concern. Iraq
has made important strides implementing the rule of law since

2003. The police force has grown exponentially. Judges, for
the most part, do not feel threatened or intimidated to rule
in a particular manner, and their personal safety has
improved. Though often forced to wait several months, those
who are arrested generally do get their day in court. Yet
the Ninewa Operations Command remains one of the system's
"problem children."


12. (C) The release and/or transfer of most of the Bucca
detainees on May 20 is a step forward. However, it remains
to be seen whether this is truly a permanent change of
direction or merely an attempt by the NOC Commander to
assuage specific USG concerns. Although security in Ninewa
is perhaps the most tenuous of all Iraq's governorates, the
province is not in a state of martial law; due process and
judicial orders still apply to its citizens. The Embassy and
PRT-Ninewa will continue to monitor the situation and, as
appropriate, remind the NOC Commander of his legal
obligations and the need to adhere to the established rule of
law.

HILL