Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD1388
2009-05-27 13:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

TRADE MINISTER STEPS DOWN IN RESPONSE TO

Tags:  ETRD KCOR PGOV IZ 
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VZCZCXRO3853
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1388/01 1471314
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271314Z MAY 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3220
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001388 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2016
TAGS: ETRD KCOR PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: TRADE MINISTER STEPS DOWN IN RESPONSE TO
CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS

REF: A. THOME-NEA/I EMAIL 5/26/2009

B. BAGHDAD 1355

C. BAGHDAD 1308

D. BAGHDAD 1235

E. BAGHDAD 1224

F. BAGHDAD 1176

Classified By: Economic Counselor Michael Dodman, Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001388

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2016
TAGS: ETRD KCOR PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: TRADE MINISTER STEPS DOWN IN RESPONSE TO
CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS

REF: A. THOME-NEA/I EMAIL 5/26/2009

B. BAGHDAD 1355

C. BAGHDAD 1308

D. BAGHDAD 1235

E. BAGHDAD 1224

F. BAGHDAD 1176

Classified By: Economic Counselor Michael Dodman, Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. 1. (C) SUMMARY: Trade Minister al-Sudani has finally
resigned after weeks of public allegations of corruption in
the Ministry of Trade (MOT),the arrest of three employees
including his brother, and a looming vote of no confidence in
the Council of Representatives (COR). The MOT scandal and
the election of Ayad Sammaraie as Speaker has prompted the
COR to assert itself on corruption issues, and led Prime
Minister Al-Maliki to respond by intensifying his own public
anti-corruption message. However, our sources question
whether any further arrests or convictions will occur at the
MOT, and whether Al-Sudani himself will face criminal
charges, despite the apparently rampant corruption within the
ministry he ran. Also unclear is whether or not the
Al-Maliki Government is ready to begin implementing real
institutional changes to fight corruption, rather than simply
content itself with rhetoric or discussions of canards like a
cabinet reshuffle. We expect the Sammaraie-led COR to
continue pressuring officials close to the prime minister,
perhaps in the hope Maliki will overreact to criticism levied
against his loyalists. END SUMMARY.

The Minister Resigns but Faces No Charges
--------------

2. (SBU) In a public statement, the Iraqi Council of
Ministers (COM) announced May 25 that Prime Minister Nouri
Al-Maliki had accepted a letter of resignation from Trade
Minister Abd Al-Fadah Al-Sudani. Despite initial rumors that
Al-Sudani had already fled to London, contacts in the MOT and
COR told us that Al-Sudani was still in Baghdad and that he
had met briefly with the PM prior to the COM's releasing its
announcement. Al-Sudani's ministry was rocked in late April
when the Iraqi Committee on Integrity successfully obtained
arrest warrants for 10 MOT employees -- including two of
Al-Sudani's brothers -- on charges of corruption (Refs E and
F),and Al-Sudani himself faced two days of embarrassing
public questioning before the COR in mid-May (Ref C). News

of Al-Sudani's resignation has also been accompanied by wide
press speculation regarding broader cabinet reshuffle.


3. (C) According to press reports, Al-Sudani had tendered his
resignation on May 14, prior to his appearance before the
COR; however, Al-Maliki reportedly did not accept it until
after the COR had the chance to question him. On May 20, the
Prime Minister's Chief of Staff Tariq Abdullah told the DCM
that the COR's questioning of the Trade Minister was
"political" and complained that MPs involved in questioning
al-Sudani were themselves involved in corruption. However,
on May 22, Dawa COR leader Sami al-Askari, a close Maliki
advisor, told an Iraqi newspaper that al-Sudani's answers did
not satisfy MPs and indicated that a no-confidence vote
against the minister would succeed. Askari's public
statement likely signaled that the PM would not stick his
neck out for the tainted minister. Al-Sudani currently faces
no criminal charges, and the Iraqi Commission on Integrity
(COI) as well as the Chairman of the COR's Integrity
Committee have expressed doubts that any charges will be
filed (despite COI head Judge Raheem Al-Ugaili's confiding to
us that he personally regarded Al-Sudani as implicated in the
alleged corrupt practices at the Ministry).


4. (C) Nevertheless, Integrity Committee Chairman Sabah
Q4. (C) Nevertheless, Integrity Committee Chairman Sabah
al-Sai'di (who led the COR's questioning of al-Sudani)
announced in the COR session on May 26 that he intended to
discuss the resignation and forced a vote on the floor to put
the issue on the COR agenda. The session adjourned on May 26
without the resignation being discussed. One IIP MP told
poloff that the petition for the no-confidence vote had 101
signatures, and he was confident the vote would proceed and
pass. (Comment: The member was unclear on the legal
ramifications of withdrawing confidence from a minister who
had already resigned, but was insistent that the process must
be completed, suggesting a strong political motivation. End
Comment.)

Additional Arrests and Prosecutions in Question
-------------- --

5. (C) Of the ten MOT employees for whom arrest warrants were
issued, only three have been detained. One of those detained
is Sabah Al-Sudani, the minister's brother; however, a second
brother and six others remain in hiding or have fled abroad.
COR Integrity Committee sources expressed optimism that
Al-Maliki would not shield the 10 from prosecution under the
controversial Provision 136b, but they likewise noted that

BAGHDAD 00001388 002 OF 002


there have been no additional arrests and it still remains
unclear whether the three detained will actually be
prosecuted.

Comment
--------------

6. (C) After he was elected speaker in April amid strong
opposition from Maliki, Ayad Sammaraie promised his COR would
use its authority to oversee the executive and question
ministers. For Maliki rivals such as Samarraie, this issue
also presents an opportunity to retake political momentum
from the PM, who is still basking in the glow of his party's
successful showing in provincial elections. Maliki's public
statements of determination to fight corruption likely
represent, therefore, the PM's recognition that he must fight
for the high ground. (For example, Maliki's public comments
about a possible cabinet reshuffle -- which the press siezed
with vigor -- represent an effort to help the PM get ahead of
the issue. However, such comments are a canard, given that
the PM cannot unilaterally shuffle the cabinet; he needs COR
approval to do so.) The COR's public grilling this month of
Sudani, a Maliki supporter, is a first step to fulfill
Samarraie's promise. It may also be a political gambit by the
IIP to re-position itself for the upcoming national
elections. Despite Sudani's resignation, the May 26 session
clearly indicated a desire to pursue a no confidence vote
against the minister. There also appears to be blood in the
water as rumors proliferate of an increasing number of
additional oversight hearings concerning official corruption.
It is likely that some COR members hope to maintain pressure
on Maliki, forcing him to either publically defend officials
accused of corruption and mismanagement or else turn his back
on more of his loyalists. END COMMENT
HILL