VP HASHIMI CLAIMS POLITICAL TARGETING BY PM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001365

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL IZ
SUBJECT: VP HASHIMI CLAIMS POLITICAL TARGETING BY PM

REF: 09 BAGHDAD 1308

Classified By: Amb. Christopher R. Hill for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In his first meeting with Ambassador Hill May
23, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi complained that Prime
Minister Maliki is targeting Sunnis Arabs and the Iraqi
Islamic Party (IIP). Hashimi claimed that the Council of
Representatives' (CoR) anti-corruption interrogation of the
Minister of Trade had led to retaliatory GOI attacks on the
IIP/Tawafuq (reftel). The VP pointed to the recent arrest of
a Diyala Provincial Council member as part of a strategy of
retribution, and linked the slower rate of detainee releases
and more re-arrests to the same strategy. Hashimi said this
would have a chilling effect on reconciliation and
participation by Sunnis and other political groups. On
elections, Hashimi noted that while the Iraqi people
preferred open lists, the big parties would seek closed
lists. IIP colleagues said it would take time to pass an
election law and would be very complicated. IIP CoR members
said that the Independent Higher Electoral Commission (IHEC)
would be called before the CoR for questioning on June 2. The
Iraqis expressed concern about inadequate implementation of
the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA),and the participants
stressed the need for more educational assistance and
exchanges in the context of the SFA. The group discussed
using Deputy Prime Minister Rafe Essawi's visit to the U.S.
to open dialogue between Iraqi and U.S. universities. END
SUMMARY


2. (U) In addition to the Ambassador, Commanding General
Raymond Odierno attended. Iraqis in attendance included IIP
CoR members Abd al Karim al Samarraie, Alaa Mekki, and Omar
Abd al-Sattar al-Karbouly, and Tawafuq Coalition member
Dhafer al-Ani from the Iraqi People's Conference. Senior
Advisor to the Vice President Saif Abdul Rahman also
attended.

Elections
--------------


3. (C) When the Ambassador inquired about elections, Hashimi
responded that the parties were taking the pulse of the Iraqi
people, and said that the Iraqi street seems to prefer open
lists. Abd al Karim al-Samarraie, an IIP leader, noted that
the big parties prefer closed lists. Alaa Mekki, recalled the
complex party negotiations on the provincial elections law,
and opined that the national election legislation will take
time, and will be difficult to pass. He noted that the Iraqi
people are calling for coalitions and identifying candidates,
and want change and better services. Mekki also thought that
IHEC activities in the previous election had been problematic
and noted that the commissioners were scheduled for a
parliamentary interrogation on June 2, 2009.

Anti-Corruption Efforts in the CoR
--------------


4. (C) Hashimi noted that the COR had undertaken an
anti-corruption agenda under the leadership of Ayad
al-Samarraie, and pointed out the parliamentary interrogation
of the Trade Minister. Both Hashimi and his Tawafuq
coalition colleague Dhafer al-Ani claimed, however, that the
CoR's anticorruption efforts had resulted in the Prime
Minister's targeting of Sunni political leaders. Al -Ani
said that there were additional threats of political arrest
against other IIP members. He noted that the threats and
intimidation would hinder the anti-corruption efforts and
silence moderate voices in the political process; extremists
would take over. Hashimi requested U.S. intervention with
the Prime Minister on this issue.

Political Targeting of Sunnis
--------------


5. (C) On reconciliation, Hashimi noted that it is necessary
to reconcile those in the political process before embracing
Qto reconcile those in the political process before embracing
outsiders, and raised the issue of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. In
addition to questioning the identity of the individual in the
video, Hashimi claimed that the video confession linking the
IIP with Ba'athists and AQI was part of the Maliki's strategy
to discredit IIP leaders and target Sunnis. Samarraie also
expressed concern that Maliki was using security files on
various political leaders to weaken them and strengthen the
Da'wa party. Hashimi claimed that the government was copying
Saddam. In the past, said Hashimi, staff judges would issue
warrants on demand, try the individuals and then put them
into the special jails - all within the confines of this
single agency. He also insisted that Maliki has the same
agency now in the Counter Terrorism Bureau (CTB). (Note: Many
Iraqis have criticized the lack of separation of powers and
accountability within security agencies - namely, the Office
of the Commander-in-Chief, the Baghdad Brigade, and the

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CounterTerrorism Bureau - which have their own judges and
jails, and report directly to the PM. End Note.)

Diyala
--------------


6. (C) Hashimi complained about the recent arrest of a
newly-seated Diyala Provincial Council (PC) member. He said
that it was highly unlikely that overnight a legitimately
elected official could suddenly became a terrorist. Hashimi
related that he had met with a cross-sectarian delegation
from the PC, and advised them not to suspend meetings because
the members still had a responsibility to their constituents.
He further advised them that their communities would hold
them responsible for any inaction. Hashimi claimed he wanted
to offer them a solution, but had nothing to offer. He said
the U.S. must intercede. The VP claimed that there were other
warrants in the pipeline, but PC members had no immunity and
there was no security in Diyala, since security was run from
Baghdad - counter to the (provincial powers) law. He
emphasized the need for U.S. engagement, noting that the
Diyala situation would discourage future political leaders
from running.

Detainees
--------------


7. (C) When Hashimi inquired about detainees, the CG reviewed
the ongoing release process, emphasizing the importance of a
safe, secure release process. The Vice President said he was
shocked by the continued detentions and re-arrests of
detainees. At the Ambassador's inquiry about the recidivism
rate, both Odierno and Hashimi concurred that it was between
five and 10 per cent, but Hashimi insisted that even this was
far below the expected rate. Dhafer al-Ani interjected that
the longer detentions increased the rate of recidivism.
Odierno confirmed that he expected roughly 5000 detainees to
remain in detention for crimes. Hashimi inquired why the
release rate went from 1500 detainees per month to 750, to
which the CG replied that more difficult cases were requiring
more time to resolve. Hashimi alleged that the GOI was
trying to provoke a response; Maliki considered all detainees
to be terrorists. He also claimed that all Iraqis, not just
Sunnis, were monitoring Maliki's actions. When the
Ambassador asked if Hashimi frequently dealt with detainee
issues, the VP responded that everyone does, and provided a
list of government groups and agencies that received requests
and inquiries from families.

SFA and Education
--------------


8. (C) On SFA implementation, Hashimi noted that there was
insufficient implementation, and that only of couple of the
committees have been established. He claimed the GOI is not
interested in follow-up. Hashimi referenced a conversation
with former Ambassador Crocker in which Crocker assured him
that there would be a special relationship and not
necessarily government to government. He claimed that there
were many letters and messages between him and the former
administration promising the same thing. Hashimi asked the
Ambassador to "give us something to offer our constituents,"
as a positive gesture to help reconcile those resistance
groups he claimed to be in contact with. The Ambassador
stressed that the SFA is the centerpiece of the U.S.-Iraqi
relationship, a framework on which the two countries must
build. The new administration wishes to pursue the SFA, but
requires concrete ideas.


9. (C) Mekki was more specific in his request for educational
assistance, saying that he was coordinating with GOI and KRG
leaders in a parliamentary effort to reform and
professionalize national education strategies. His plan
included developing a democratic curriculum and educational
strategy based on national identity, but he requested support
Qstrategy based on national identity, but he requested support
from the Cultural Affairs Office in the Embassy. The
Ambassador stated that Secretary Clinton was very interested
in such projects, but urged his Iraqi interlocutors to
provide concrete ideas on which the U.S. and Iraq could build
a strong bilateral relationship. When Hashimi's senior
advisor Saif Abdul Rahman noted that U.S. universities were
reluctant to come to Iraq, the Ambassador remarked that
models exist for post-conflict university engagement and said
DPM Rafi Essawi's upcoming visit might be a useful starting
point for pursuing ideas in this area.
HILL