Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ATHENS727
2009-05-06 14:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

GREEK PRIVACY RULES THWART INVESTIGATIONS

Tags:  ASEC ABLD PREL PTER KCRM GR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7751
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #0727 1261402
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 061403Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0151
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000727 

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/05/06
TAGS: ASEC ABLD PREL PTER KCRM GR
SUBJECT: GREEK PRIVACY RULES THWART INVESTIGATIONS

REF: ATHENS 683

CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas S. Miller, Acting DCM; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000727

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/05/06
TAGS: ASEC ABLD PREL PTER KCRM GR
SUBJECT: GREEK PRIVACY RULES THWART INVESTIGATIONS

REF: ATHENS 683

CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas S. Miller, Acting DCM; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (SBU) According to a May 5 article in the newspaper Eleftheros
Typos, Greek police utilizing video evidence have "positively"
identified three hooded vandals who were among the forty who took
part in a midday rampage in the upscale Kolonaki Square area of
Athens on March 13. The attackers used sledge hammers and rocks to
smash shop windows and cars, and they escaped without arrests. In
the ensuing investigation police have reportedly used surveillance
footage and video volunteered by a local resident who captured
images of the gang as it prepared for the attack in a nearby
staging area. Despite this identification, under Greece's
"personal data protection" law, the police are not permitted to use
video surveillance evidence to arrest or charge the suspects, and
this evidence will not be used in Greek courts.


2. (C) Comment: This is a real-world example of the legal
restrictions that inhibit Greek law enforcement officials to a
greater extent than their counterparts elsewhere in Europe,
constraining their ability to deal with security threats, including
those posed by domestic and international terrorists (reftel). The
Greek government's Data Protection Authority, an independent
commission responsible for enforcing Greece's stringent data
privacy laws, has ruled that the use of cameras for any purpose
other than traffic control is unconstitutional. Despite this, the
government installed surveillance cameras prior to the 2004
Olympics, but the issue remained controversial and after the
Olympics the cameras were turned off. Some were reportedly
reactivated in April 2009 in response to increased security
concerns after the December 2008 riots and subsequent domestic
terrorist attacks, but their legality is disputed and the footage
they produce is not admissible in courts. Even private filming of
other individuals is prohibited, and it is not out of the realm of
possibility that some of the gang members in the Kolonaki incident
will sue the private individual who gave video to the police for
violating their privacy rights. As this case demonstrates, Greek
police do use video evidence when they have it as part of their
investigations - legally or not - but if they cannot find human
witnesses to testify to seeing the same things, no court will ever
hear of them.

SPECKHARD