GREEK LAW ENFORCEMENT FACES BIG HURDLES IN MEETING TERRORIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000683

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/04/28
TAGS: PTER ASEC ABLD PREL KCRM GR
SUBJECT: GREEK LAW ENFORCEMENT FACES BIG HURDLES IN MEETING TERRORIST
CHALLENGE

REF: ATHENS 214; ATHENS 114

CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) As domestic terrorist groups and violent anarchist gangs
continue the heightened level of activity that they initiated
following the December 2008 riots, Greek law enforcement is looking
for help. At the request of the Greek Ministry of Interior,
Scotland Yard recently conducted an assessment that identified
weaknesses ranging from the strategic (the lack of a Greek
interagency counterterrorism plan) to the logistical (poor sharing
of investigative resources between units) to the tactical
(inadequate use of surveillance cameras). Many of these
shortcomings can be explained by Greek legislation, which severely
constrains law enforcement, and by a political context in which
leaders have an ingrained reluctance to support tougher law
enforcement. While we have found Greek law enforcement officials
to be good partners in many cases, it is likely that their
weaknesses in capacity and coordination increase the security
threat faced by Embassy Athens and Americans in Greece. End
Summary.

Reaching Out, Getting Tough Messages Back
--------------


2. (C) As post laid out in ref B in January, Greek law enforcement
faces severe constraints in its ability to deal with the security
challenges it faces from domestic terrorist organizations,
increasingly violent anarchist gangs, and the huge and increasing
influx of illegal aliens who use Greece as an entry point into the
European Union. In our own work with Greek law enforcement
officers on specific cases, we have found them open to cooperation
and eager to adopt advanced international practices where they can.
There have been some success stories, most notably in the run-up to
the 2004 Olympics, when the USG and others supported a significant
training program that did increase the professional level of law
enforcement. But the riots late last year, which followed the
accidental police shooting of a teenage protester and which law
enforcement officers were unable (or not permitted) to contain,
demonstrated the continued gulf between the size of the threat and
the capacity of Greek law enforcement. Since January, the news has
not gotten any better. As post has reported, terrorist groups both
old and new have struck with increasing regularity, and
anarchist-aligned gangs have become bolder in carrying out
firebombings, daylight crowbar rampages in posh neighborhoods,
arson, and other violence. Banks, other businesses, and government
facilities are the most common targets, but the attacks have
recently branched out to include a number of churches in Athens and
Thessaloniki April 9. Law enforcement agencies, meanwhile, have
been subjected to one public embarrassment after another, including
leaked documents, prison escapes, and the February 4 shooting of a
contract security guard outside the U.S. Ambassador's residence by
an apparently deranged police officer.


3. (C) In response to growing concern over the level of violence,
Constantinos Bitsios was brought into the position of Secretary
General of the Ministry of Interior. Previously the diplomatic
advisor to Prime Minister Karamanlis, Bitsios is well-connected
both within the government and with the international community,
and he appears to have a mandate to improve the conduct of Greek
law enforcement. Bitsios has reached out to a number of Embassies
for recommendations and assistance. The most prominent response
thus far has been from the British, who brought in Scotland Yard
experts to conduct an assessment of Greece's counterterrorism
posture. The resulting report, shared with Bitsios and separately
with us in late March, identifies weaknesses at a variety of
levels. It concludes that Greece lacks a "coordinated government
CT strategy" and in particular lacks a media campaign to deliver
key messages. It notes that Greek legislation places far more
constraints on investigations than is typical for European law
enforcement agencies, including in the use of technical
surveillance, access to financial and communications data, and
biometric data. It also identifies the existence of three
different departments within the Greek police, who deal
individually with international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and
anarchist groups, without a plan for sharing of resources or
information, as a key weakness in terms of operational activity.


4. (C) In briefing us on the report, British Embassy law
enforcement liaison Kevin O'Shea said that although the British
wanted to help Greek law enforcement where they could, they did not
foresee Scotland Yard launching a long-term project as Greek press
reports had suggested. O'Shea said this was partly because of
British budgetary constraints, but also because in his view most of
the fundamental weaknesses in Greek law enforcement were grounded
in legislation and unlikely to change in the short term. Of the
areas assessed, O'Shea predicted the British were most likely to
end up working with the Greeks on an overall counterterrorism
strategy. The British have also stayed in close touch with us, the
Dutch, and other countries the Greeks have approached, making
practical suggestions such as encouraging the Dutch to look into
supporting public prosecutor training.

Lessons from the Past; Implications for the Future
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) We have a relatively good working relationship with Greek
law enforcement officials, and have found them open to new concepts
and to working with us on specific cases in which there are U.S.
interests. We have provided different kinds of training at
different times, although in many cases that training is now
getting old. The training before the 2004 Olympics, especially the
1,450 Greek officers trained by DS/ATA from 2002 to 2004, had a
significant impact, contributing to a substantial improvement in
public views of law enforcement. Even today, despite the ongoing
difficulties, most Greeks would admit (even if grudgingly) that
today's police force is better than that of a generation or two
ago. While we have not conducted police training on that scale
since the Olympics, Embassy LEGAT has provided training to nearly
200 police officers and 50 military personnel over the past 18
months, most of them specifically in counterterrorism-related
topics. In the last year, DHS/ICE trained 120 Greek police,
immigration, and customs officials in the areas of human
trafficking, counterfeit document detection, and cyber crime.
Since September 2008, DEA has trained about 300 Greek police, Coast
Guard, and Special Control Service officials on undercover
operations and related topics.


6. (C) Nevertheless, Greek law enforcement officials face legal,
political, and organizational challenges that limit their ability
to disrupt and roll up terrorist organizations. For example, they
have made no arrests of members of Revolutionary Struggle (RS),the
group that launched the RPG at the Embassy in January 2007, and RS
has been one of the leading participants in the latest round of
violence. These limitations have a number of consequences,
including one of special concern to us: an increased security risk
to the Mission. We have not been targeted in recent violence,
although some American companies (most notably Citibank) have been.
Given the deep-seated anti-Americanism of the Greek far left, and
these groups' past targeting of the U.S., the danger that they will
turn their sights to us is very real. The current generation of
Greek terrorists has thus far managed to avoid any significant
arrests; they may believe they can act with impunity. Unless Greek
law enforcement is able to break up some of these groups at this
stage, we and other potential targets in Greece will face a
continuously more skilled and extensive terrorist threat.


7. (SBU) As outlined in ref A, post recommends re-starting a DS/ATA
program, as was done prior to the 2004 Olympics, to strengthen the
capacity of Greek law enforcement bodies to deal with the
significant threats they faces and which also threaten U.S.
interests. It would begin with an assessment of Greece's
counterterrorism needs, and subsequent training would focus on such
areas as SWAT, explosive ordnance demolition (EOD),political
violence, hostage negotiations, and major case management.



SPECKHARD