NATO: GREEK UNEASE AT UPCOMING NATO CAOC AND CC-AIR COMMAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001673

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/04
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR GR TU
SUBJECT: NATO: GREEK UNEASE AT UPCOMING NATO CAOC AND CC-AIR COMMAND
ARRANGEMENTS

REF: ATHENS 1605

CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Greek interlocutors, including Minister of
Defense Venizelos and Chief of Defense Giagkos, have increasingly
and more stridently expressed to us that NATO's new
"Flags-to-Posts" (FTP) arrangement agreed by CHODs in May 2009 is
not acceptable to the new Papandreou government, citing the
imbalance of "stars" -- i.e. general officer positions -- divided
between Greece and Turkey in the Command Groups at NATO's Combined
Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Larissa, Greece ("CAOC 4"),and
NATO's Component Command Air (CC Air) in Izmir, Turkey. The Greeks
have not explicitly threatened a NAC veto, but have pointed to an
upcoming Council decision on NATO's End State Peacetime
Establishments (ESPEs) -- of which we understand the FTP is a part
-- as the means by which they could force a reconsideration of the
CAOC and CC-Air command arrangements. Despite Greece's then-CHOD
Grapsas formally joining consensus on the FTP earlier this year
with his colleagues in NATO's Military Committee (MC),our Greek
interlocutors remain suspicious and dismayed at what they tell us
was, in their view, a "last-minute deal" between the U.S. and
Turkey that tilted the regional NATO balance in Turkey's favor. We
have told the Greeks to engage the Chairman of the Military
Committee (CMC) and the U.S. Military Representative in Brussels.
While it is too early to tell whether the Greeks would block
consensus in the NAC, all signs in Athens are indicating that the
Greeks are growing increasingly concerned with the status quo as
the decision on the ESPEs approaches. END SUMMARY.



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The Command Arrangements

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2. (C) We understand that in May 2009, NATO's Military Committee,
meeting at the level of Chiefs of Defense, approved by consensus
the Flags-to-Post for the New NATO Command Structure, which will be
incorporated into the End State Peacetime Establishments, and
submitted to the North Atlantic Council for approval in late 2009
or early 2010. While this FTP arrangement covers the whole of
NATO's command structure in Europe and North America, the following
arrangements were agreed for NATO's CAOC Larissa and CC Air Izmir:



CAOC 4 (LARISSA)

--COMMANDER: GR/TU Rotational (Major General)

--DEPUTY COMMANDER: TU/GR Rotational (Brigadier General)



--There will always be a Greek and Turk flag in the command group
in Larisa CAOC 4.





CC AIR (IZMIR)



--COMMANDER: Always US (non-rotational) (Lieutenant General)



--DEPUTY COMMANDER: TU/FR (Rotational) (Major General)

--CHIEF OF STAFF: GR/TU (Rotational) (Major General)

--There will always be Turk flag in command group in CC Air, but
there will be periods when there is no Greek flag in this command
group.


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What the Greeks Tell Us

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3. (C) Greek interlocutors point to the period where there will be
no Greek in the CC Air command group, but there will be a Turk in
both Larissa and Izmir, as an unacceptable "imbalance." They have
told us in a variety of settings, and at a variety of levels, that
they resent what they characterize as a last minute, "11th-hour
deal" between the U.S. and Turkey that saw the U.S. give up its
longstanding position as the Deputy Commander of CAOC Larissa to a
Turkish general, which "created" this imbalance. According to
them, their CHOD only learned of the alleged deal while at the
table during the MC meeting, when he saw a Turkish flag for DCOM
Larissa on the PowerPoint display where he had always expected to
see a U.S. flag. Not wanting to derail the overall FTP decision,
details of which had taken months to negotiate to the point where
CHODs could approve it, he joined consensus but, the Greeks tell
us, on the understanding the issue would be revisited. (Note: We
do not have details of what, if anything, was said during or after
the session.)




4. (C) These concerns were raised most prominently in the
Ambassador's initial meeting with MOD Venizelos on November 4
(reftel). In response to the Ambassador's suggestion on a
seemingly unrelated issue, Venizelos stated he would only act in
connection with resolution of the "CAOC problem," and asked for
U.S. help. In a recent meeting between Embassy Athens Defense
Attache and CHOD Giagkos, Giagkos asked for an explanation as to
why the U.S. dropped out of the CAOC 4 Deputy Commander position,
and why Turkey was selected for replacement. At the working group
level of the November 16 High Level Consultative Committee
bilateral defense meetings in Athens, senior Greek officers from
the Hellenic National Defense General Staff raised identical
concerns, and pointed to the NAC as the final option to address
Greek concerns when we stated that their CHOD had joined consensus
on the FTP. Recently at the MFA, NATO desk officers told us that
the MFA was looking at the upcoming NAC decision on the ESPEs as a
means of forcing Greek concerns to be addressed, though did not
specifically threaten a veto.



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What We Tell the Greeks

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5. (C) We continue to deflect Greek efforts to make this a
U.S-Greek bilateral issue, and have pointed them to include
Brussels in the discussion at every opportunity. We have counseled
them to raise their concerns with the Chairman of the Military
Committee, under whose chairmanship the FTP arrangement was agreed
in May 2009, and suggested that if they seek to learn more about
the FTP negotiations, to engage with the U.S. Military
Representative at NATO HQ.



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Comment

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6. (C) Embassy Athens Defense Attache has been told that the U.S.
wanted an O-6 level Deputy Chief of Staff Operations billet in CAOC
4 on a permanent, non-rotational basis, and negotiated to give up
the rotational O-7 level Deputy Commander rotational billet at CAOC
4 in return for the O-6 level permanent DCOS Operations billet.
Since NATO CMC DiPaola brokered the framework of the overall


flags-to-post arrangement, we do not have any insight into the
negotiating process that led to the FTP decision to place a Turkish
Flag Officer into the CAOC 4 Deputy Commander rotation during that
MC session at CHODs level, or the role of the CMC in brokering a
final deal. Yet clearly, the fact is that at the end of the day,
the Greek CHOD at the time joined consensus. Equally clear,
however, is that the new Papandreou government is currently
weighing options for redressing it. Our judgment at present is
that the GoG is trying to press the United States into reexamining
our interest in the CAOC 4 Deputy Commander rotation, and hoping to
support our lead should we quietly ask for that position back.
This relieves them of the burden of facing up to the embarrassing
"mistake" of joining MC consensus in May 2009, and of drawing the
ire of Allies in the NAC should they back away from a previous
commitment and send the ESPEs back to the drawing board. While it
is too early to call whether the Greeks will pursue this veto
option in the NAC, all signs in Athens areQndicating the Greeks
are growing increasingly concerned with the status quo as the NAC
decision approaches. END SUMMARY.
Speckhard