ASD VERSHBOW'S GREEK BILATS: AEGEAN/TURKEY, NATO, ISAF,

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/20
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO GR TU MK ZL AF RS IR
SUBJECT: ASD VERSHBOW'S GREEK BILATS: AEGEAN/TURKEY, NATO, ISAF,
BALKANS, IRAN, MD

REF: ATHENS 1649

ATHENS 00001651 001.2 OF 005


CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate meetings November 16 with the Prime
Minister's Diplomatic Advisor Dimitris Paraskevopoulos and MFA
Secretary General Ioannis-Alexis Zepos following his participation
in the High Level Consultative Committee (reftel),Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Vershbow
explored possible routes for progress on Aegean sea issues;
discussed Greece's bilateral relations with Turkey; briefed
interlocutors on U.S. missile defense plans; urged the Greeks not
to re-up the "erga omnes" ante in Macedonia negotiations; exchanged
views on NATO Reform, Strategic Concept, and NATO-Russia; urged the
Greeks to do more in Afghanistan; and responded to their questions
about Iran. MFA officials took a hardline, legalistic approach on
Aegean issues, while the PM's advisor gave a thoughtful overview of
the Turkey relationship, and lamented that Turkish actions
complicated Greece's longstanding desire to support Turkey's EU
bid. On Macedonia, both interlocutors stressed Greece's support
for Macedonia's Euroatlantic aspirations, but noted Greece could
not support EU accession talks without resolution on the name
issue. They appreciated the missile defense brief, and focused on
Russia's views and the Iranian threat. With regard to the recent
decision not to deploy a Greek engineering unit out of Kabul to
RC-West, both stressed budgetary challenges, and stated that the
bulk of Greek forces must remain at home to defend against Turkey.
The PM's diplomatic advisor stressed that PM Papandreou desires a
strong, dynamic bilateral relationship with the U.S., and wants to
find ways to put substance behind the rhetoric. END SUMMARY.



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Aegean Sea and Turkey

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2. (C) ASD Vershbow told both Ambassador Dimitrios
Paraskevopoulos, the PM's Diplomatic Advisor and MFA Secretary
General Ioannis-Alexis Zepos that he and Alternate MOD Beglitis had
informally discussed earlier in the day the idea of establishing
airspace navigation "rules of the road" for the whole of NATO --
rather than just for the Aegean -- as an indirect way to defuse
Aegean tensions. He reiterated that the U.S. was concerned with
Turkish overflights of inhabited Greek islands in the Aegean, but
that both sides needed to work to reduce tensions. ASD Vershbow
commended PM Papandreou's trip to Istanbul shortly after taking
office, and stated that with the PM's openness, plus public Turkish
policy objectives of zero problems with Turkey's neighbors, an
opportunity existed for progress. He urged the Greeks to continue
their important support of Turkey's EU aspirations.




3. (C) Ambassador Paraskevopoulos pointed to progress between
Greece and Turkey on issues like business, tourism, and the
environment during Papandreou's time as Foreign Minister from 1999
to 2004, and noted that it is "high time" to start approaching the
tough, "core issues." He reiterated Greek support for Turkish EU
accession, yet looking ahead to the December EU Council meeting,
stated that Turkey has not delivered on EU prerequisites. He
outlined four key aspects of Greece's relationship with Turkey:



a.) Aegean: Problems with Turkish provocations "over and in" the
Aegean continue.

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b.) Cyprus: Greece has not yet seen a meaningful gesture from
Ankara on the Cyprus issue, which will complicate Greece's stance
at the December EU Council meeting;



c.) Minority rights and the Patriarchate: Greek leaders see many
Turkish promises, but no action. While pessimistic, he urged U.S.
influence on Turkey for progress by December, and to convince
Turkey that progress was in its interest.



d.) Immigration: The 2002 readmission protocol signed by then-FMs
Papandreou and Cem "irritated the Turkish establishment," he
asserted. He complained about the perceived failure by Turkey to
honor its end of the deal, stating that Turkish cooperation is
indispensable to solving Greece's illegal immigration crisis.



Paraskevopoulos stressed that Greece could not conduct "business as
usual" at the EU in December without some Turkish progress on the
above interrelated issues. We want to strengthen relations and
solve bilateral problems, he stated, but we need "something" from
Turkey by December.




4. (C) SecGen Zepos, accompanied by the NATO and IO Director
General (A/S-equivalent) Eystathios Lozos, took a hard-line,
legalistic approach on Aegean issues. Zepos defended then-NATO
SecGen de Hoop Scheffer's decision to proceed with Exercise Noble
Archer in summer 2008, in which NATO aircraft overflew the Greek
island of Agios Efstratios, an island which Turkey believes is
demilitarized according to treaty, and which Greece does not. In
any case, Zepos argued, the SYG had decided that high-altitude
overflight would not violate demilitarized status, irrespective of
the positions of either the Turkish or Greek side. Zepos urged the
U.S. and others not to apply principles of neutrality that he
characterized as unwittingly validating one side's position, and
stated that NATO had the right to fly anywhere in NATO territory.
DG Lozos failed to see any utility in a NATO-sponsored "rules of
the road," arguing that international treaties had already clearly
defined boundaries and sovereignty in the Aegean and that treaties
cannot be ignored for the sake of "expediency." Zepos, looking
toward the EU Council meeting in December, complained that Turkish
overflights of Greek Aegean islands create a sour mood among the
Greek public, and don't appear to be consistent with the actions of
a party that seeks progress.



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Missile Defense, Iran

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5. (C) ASD Vershbow told his interlocutors the United States hoped
for Greek support over the coming year so that at the 2010 NATO
Lisbon Summit Allied leaders could embrace missile defense as a
NATO mission, and as a key aspect to the Article V collective
defense guarantee. He explained that the U.S. Phased Adaptive
Approach was more effective, responsive, and better able to evolve
than earlier U.S. missile defense plans. He laid out the four
phases of implementation, noting that given geography vis-a-vis
Iran, the first land-based site for the SM-3 missiles (Phase 2)
would need to be located somewhere in southeastern Europe: Romania,
Bulgaria, Turkey, or Greece. He was clear that this was not a

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request to Greece, and that no decisions had been made. ASD
Vershbow noted that Greek Patriot missile systems could conceivably
link into an overall future NATO command and control architecture,
and expressed willingness to try to facilitate expert-level
follow-on consultations should the Greeks wish.




6. (S) Both Zepos and Paraskevopoulos appreciated the frank
information, but appeared more interested in Russian views and the
status of international efforts to thwart the Iranian nuclear
effort. ASD Vershbow stated that he had seen some positive signs
but some continuing skepticism from the Russians on missile
defense, and that the Russians have told us they agreed on our
assessments of Iranian capabilities, but still have doubts about
Iranian intentions to threaten Europe with ballistic missiles.
Vershbow reinforced with the Greeks that Iranian activities such as
support for Hezbollah and IED facilitation in Iraq and Afghanistan
leave little room for complacency about Iranian intentions. He
told Paraskevopoulos that if the Iranians had not changed their
position by the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, the
question of sanctions would have to be looked at more vigorously.
Both noted the French are leading proponents of the efficacy of
sanctions against the Iranian leadership, and that Russia's stance
in the UN Security Council would be key.



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Macedonia

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7. (C) Paraskevopoulos went to lengths to confirm the PM's support
for Macedonia's Euroatlantic integration. He described Greece's
significant economic ties to Macedonia, said that in 2005 Greece
was among the first EU states to support Macedonia's status as a
potential candidate, and noted the PM's direct overtures to Skopje.
Yet he was clear: "we cannot agree to (EU) talks without a
resolution of the name." He offered that based on Secretary
Clinton's recent meeting in Berlin with PM Papandreou, he believed
that she "understood the Greek approach." He asked for American
help in pushing the Macedonians to negotiate "on a civil basis."
Zepos, too, stressed Greek support for Macedonia's integration into
Euroatlantic structures; "it will be full speed ahead," he stated,
once the name issue is resolved. Yet he reiterated that Greece
needed to see some positive steps from Skopje.




8. (C) ASD Vershbow noted U.S. concern that Greece not harden its
position on the erga omnes use of a geographically modified name to
include insistence on the use of that name within the borders of
Macedonia, as Greek negotiator Vassilakis had recently implied in
New York. Don't push the Macedonians so far it becomes impossible
for them to move, he cautioned. ASD Vershbow noted he would see
the Macedonian MOD at a meeting of the Adriatic Charter MODs the
next day, and would urge him to work for constructive Macedonian
engagement on this issue. Paraskevopoulos reminded ASD Vershbow of
the bipartisan agreement between the two main Greek political
parties forged during the previous New Democracy administration
that significantly and only recently moved the Greek position to
one supporting the use of a geographically modified name that
contained the word "Macedonia." Characterizing this as an already
significant concession to the Macedonians, he noted that anything
that went beyond that would stand no chance of Parliamentary
approval, even if a government were so foolish as to attempt it.

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Afghanistan

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9. (C) While noting our disappointment with the recent Greek
decision not to deploy its ISAF engineering battalion out of Kabul
to RC-West, ASD Vershbow thanked both interlocutors for the
additional Greek pledges to the ANA Trust Fund, and the pledge to
return Greek medical teams (two teams, 16 pax total) to RC-North.
He urged them to stay engaged, and to look for additional
opportunities to contribute, noting that Greece's large military
should enable a larger military contribution to ISAF than Greece
presently maintains. Failure in Afghanistan and an emboldened
Taliban would have global repercussions, he underscored.




10. (C) Paraskevopoulos and Zepos stated that the bulk of Greek
forces must remain at home to defend against Turkey. They also
pointed to severe budgetary pressures and low public support for
the mission. Paraskevopoulos raised concerns about both the
military and political situations in Afghanistan. ASD Vershbow
acknowledged that the military situation was challenging, and that
at present, our forces were not able to partner as effectively with
Afghan police and soldiers as they have managed to do with their
Iraqi counterparts. He reinforced the need for a surge in the
international training effort, and the need to send a clear message
to President Karzai that governance must improve at both local and
national levels.



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NATO

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11. (C) ASD Vershbow focused on NATO issues with SecGen Zepos, who
in addition to having served as Greek Ambassador to NATO from
2004-2007, is also one of NATO SecGen Rasmussen's "wisepersons" who
are working under former Secretary Albright's leadership to assist
in the development of the new Strategic Concept that Allies plan to
adopt at the Lisbon Summit. Both agreed on the need to create a
visionary new document that speaks to Alliance publics, and makes
NATO's case to the generation that came of age following the Cold
War. Zepos noted that during his time as Ambassador in Cairo
(2007-2009),he discovered that most Egyptians still view NATO as
an outdated Cold War relic; a "user friendly" Strategic Concept can
help change that, he said. He cautioned that in the current global
economic environment, NATO must be careful in balancing its
ambition with reality. Those who wish for a more "activist"
Strategic Concept must think whether NATO really can do more in the
world at present if it is bogged down in Afghanistan. ASD Vershbow
commented that a good Strategic Concept will inspire members to
produce the resources to match the level of ambition, and will find
the right balance between new versus old threats, and between
Article V versus expeditionary operations. ASD Vershbow outlined
U.S. goals for NATO Reform: more efficient allocation of resources;
greater use of common funding; development of "niche" capabilities
whereby smaller countries like Greece could bring specific
capabilities to missions; collective procurement such as the C-17
airlift consortium; and streamlining NATO civilian and command
structures.

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12. (C) On Russia, ASD Vershbow and Zepos agreed the NATO-Russia
relationship needs work. Zepos expressed the belief based on the
interaction with his Polish "wiseman" counterpart that Baltic and
central European nations are more sanguine toward Russia now as
compared to three years ago. ASD Vershbow doubted that assertion.
On the CFE, ASD Vershbow and Zepos agreed on the need to think
about options given the ongoing Russian suspension. DG Lozos
stated that the Russians had recently asked for Greek support to
arrange a temporary Adapted CFE ratification, to which the Greeks
had said no. ASD Vershbow concurred that was a non-starter, and
posited the need to break the stalemate of the present situation
whereby neither the CFE nor the A/CFE are implemented.



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Souda Bay

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13. (C) Reinforcing an issue raised with Alternate MOD Beglitis
earlier in the day, ASD Vershbow told SecGen Zepos that it was his
understanding that the MFA was the last remaining obstacle to
providing the U.S. with written authorization to proceed with the
construction of a jet fuel pipeline and fuel storage tanks that
would maintain high-capacity refueling capabilities and protect the
environment at and around our Naval Support Activity at Souda Bay,
Crete. He stated that Alt/MOD Beglitis was optimistic the issue
could be resolved by the end of the year. Zepos asked the MFA's
North America Office Director, present at the meeting, if the issue
could be fixed by year's end, to which she replied affirmatively.
ASD Vershbow asked for continuing high-level engagement within the
MFA to ensure follow-through.




14. (U) This cable has been cleared by ASD Vershbow.
Speckhard