Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ATHENS1649
2009-11-20 14:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

ASD/ISA VERSHBOW'S PARTICIPATION IN THE HIGH LEVEL

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR NATO GR TU MK AF ZL 
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VZCZCXRO0949
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #1649/01 3241452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201451Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1106
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ATHENS 001649 

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/20
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO GR TU MK AF ZL
SUBJECT: ASD/ISA VERSHBOW'S PARTICIPATION IN THE HIGH LEVEL
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN GREECE (U)

ATHENS 00001649 001.2 OF 005


CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ATHENS 001649

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/20
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO GR TU MK AF ZL
SUBJECT: ASD/ISA VERSHBOW'S PARTICIPATION IN THE HIGH LEVEL
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING IN GREECE (U)

ATHENS 00001649 001.2 OF 005


CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The desire for an upgraded and substantive
strategic partnership was a recurring theme of the Greek side when
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security
Affairs Alexander Vershbow met with Greek Alternate Minister of
Defense Panos Beglitis for the 14th U.S-Greece High Level
Consultative Committee (HLCC) meeting November 16 in Athens. ASD
Vershbow thanked Greece for its willingness to elevate the level of
discussions in the HLCC; voiced commitment to enhancing relations
with Greece; detailed the U.S. approach to missile defense; showed
disappointment at the change in Greece's ISAF plans, but thanked
Greece for other contributions to global stability; asked for Greek
support on NATO issues; and encouraged Greece to find solutions to
regional disputes. Minister Beglitis expressed interest in
building a stronger partnership with the U.S. and acknowledged the
role of the HLCC, highlighted Greek contributions and goals in the
Balkans, Afghanistan and NATO, expressed interest in learning more
about the U.S. approach to missile defense, and indicated that U.S.
assistance in resolving regional disputes with Macedonia and Turkey
would enhance Athens' ability to be a strong partner. END SUMMARY.




--------------

Bilateral Relationship

--------------




2. (C) Beglitis stated his objective was to further develop and

upgrade bilateral relations through new political approaches on
strategic issues. Minister Beglitis affirmed the U.S. and Greece
had the same strategic objectives, noting cooperation in
Afghanistan and the Balkans. ASD Vershbow expressed U.S.
appreciation for the partnership and our support for Greek
strategic goals, and noted U.S. interest in leveraging Greek
leadership in the Balkans and elsewhere. Beglitis said efforts to
upgrade the format of the HLCC demonstrated the political will to
enhance the bilateral approach to strategic issues and enrich the
strategic partnership. He agreed that the previous format was less
substantive and had limited the opportunity to build a healthy
dialogue. ASD Vershbow echoed Beglitis' comments on the
restructured HLCC, and expressed appreciation for Greece's support
for the U.S. proposal. Beglitis conveyed desire to work
substantively with the U.S. on common interests bilaterally and in
NATO, but implored the U.S. to find ways to help Greece politically
on certain issues so they would be better positioned to move in
that direction. Beglitis indicated Greece was committed to resolve
an issue tied to the upgrade of the refueling pipeline at the U.S.
facility at Souda Bay by the end of the year.



--------------

Afghanistan

--------------




3. (C) ASD Vershbow underlined that the U.S. remained committed to
the mission in Afghanistan and indicated that a final decision on
troop levels would be announced in the near future. He expected
that, whatever the decision on troop levels, the strategy would
call for increased engagement in training, partnering, civilian and
economic efforts. Beglitis outlined the new Greek government's
decision not to lift a geographical caveat and thus keep its
engineering battalion in Kabul rather than move it to Herat to
support Italy. He explained that under current economic

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conditions, Greece was not positioned to spend the almost 65
million Euro projected cost to enable the deployment. Ideas to
better utilize the Kabul-based engineering battalion were
discussed.




4. (C) Beglitis focused instead on increased Greek contributions
to economic assistance for Afghanistan. ASD Vershbow expressed
disappointment with the decision not to deploy its ISAF engineering
battalion out of Kabul, but was appreciative for Greek pledges to
deploy an OMLT, contribute 3 million Euros to the ANA Trust Fund,
provide two medical teams to RC-North, maintain commitment to take
over Kabul Airport security in 2010, and provide funds towards the
Hungarian PRT and the UK-France Helicopter initiative. ASD urged
Greece to stay engaged, and to look for additional opportunities to
contribute, noting that Greece's large military should enable a
larger military contribution to ISAF. He underscored that failure
in Afghanistan and an emboldened Taliban would have global
repercussions, and noted that general publics needed to have a
stronger understanding of the mission.




5. (C) Beglitis opined that Western strategies toward Afghanistan
and Pakistan were not comprehensive, and advocated a role for
India, as a regional actor, in the discussions. Beglitis raised
the issue of corruption in Afghan politics and inquired about views
on alternatives to Afghan President Karzai. ASD Vershbow agreed
that the recent Afghan elections had been flawed and that we needed
to raise the issue of corruption at the highest levels of
government. Beglitis commented on the challenge of imposing
Western standards on a tribal form of society.



--------------

Balkans

--------------




6. (C) Beglitis indicated that the situation in the Balkans was
worsening. He noted as a result, Greece's strategic objective to
bring all Balkan states into Euro-Atlantic institutions by 2014 --
including Macedonia, if the name issue was resolved appropriately.
He also said Greece did not have issues accepting Kosovo into
Euro-Atlantic institutions. ASD welcomed this comment, noting the
U.S. recently reversed its position on Serbian membership in the
Southeastern Defense Ministerial forum. ASD Vershbow commended
Greece's strong support of the Balkans. ASD Vershbow reaffirmed
the U.S.'s open door policy, saying that resolving unfinished
business in the Western Balkans was important for regional
stability.




7. (C) Beglitis relayed that Greek Prime Minister Papandreou met
his Macedonian counterpart recently in an effort to establish
goodwill. Beglitis urged the U.S. to help Greece politically by
pressing Macedonia on the name dispute, and conveyed Greek
commitment to resolving it. He noted the policy of the previous
Administration to recognize Macedonia by its constitutional name
was not helpful to bilateral relations and had created a negative
impression among the Greek public. ASD Vershbow said the U.S. and
Greece could agree to disagree on the past, and should focus on the
future. He and Ambassador Daniel Speckhard did voice concern
about mixed signals from Athens, given hard positions relayed to
the UN mediator and softer messages delivered to the U.S. Vershbow
warned Greece against backing Macedonia into a position where it

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could not compromise. (The ASD was later assured by the Prime
Minister's Diplomatic Advisor that this was a bargaining tactic
tied to maintaining support among the Greek public for the ongoing
negotiations.) ASD Vershbow encouraged Greece to continue
bilateral negotiations with Skopje but agreed to raise the issue
with the Macedonian Minister of Defense during that week's Adriatic
Charter Ministerial. He relayed that in previous meetings with
Minister of Defense Konjanovski, he had been blunt in urging
Macedonia to make a decision on the name so it could continue
progress toward Euro-Atlantic integration.




8. (C) Greece also indicated desire to take a command role in the
eastern sector of NATO's KFOR - a mission with more relevance for
the Greek public. Beglitis raised Bosnia, saying recent
developments had taken a negative turn. He noted a Croatian
official recently suggested the dissolution of Bosnia and
partitioning of territory to Croatia and Serbia as a solution to
current political problems. Beglitis said that Serbia was not the
sole problem, and the issue must be looked at from a broader
perspective. Vershbow expressed concern at the Croatian comment,
saying talk of partition of what was already a loose confederation
was a dangerous concept that could lead to a return to violence.



--------------

Missile Defense

--------------




9. (C) ASD Vershbow told his interlocutors the United States hoped
for Greek support over the coming year so that at the 2010 NATO
Lisbon Summit Allied leaders could embrace missile defense as a
NATO mission, and as a key aspect to the Article V collective
defense guarantee. He explained that the Phased Adaptive Approach
was more effective, responsive, and better able to evolve than
earlier U.S. missile defense plans. He stressed that the decision
was not based on Russian concerns, but changes in our assessment of
the threat and new breakthroughs in technology. He laid out the
four phases of implementation, explaining that Phase 1 will be sea
based on U.S. Navy Aegis ships in the Eastern Mediterranean, and
Phase 2 would include the first land-based site for the SM-3
missiles (aka, Aegis Ashore). For geographical and technical
reasons, this land-based site would need to be located somewhere in
southeastern Europe: Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, or Greece. He
stressed the U.S. was not making a proposal to Greece, but offered
to try and facilitate expert-level follow-on consultations if
Greece was interested in a potential role. Beglitis expressed
interest in gaining more clarity on the technical aspects of the
U.S. plan and the related costs, but did not express any firm
interest in participating. Vershbow noted the U.S. had discussed
missile defense plans with several Allies, who generally held
positive views of the new plans, but that no decisions had been
taken. Beglitis relayed his belief that Ankara is skeptical about
participation because of negative perceptions in Iran and Russia.



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Turkey

--------------




10. (C) Beglitis explained that Turkish overflights of inhabited

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Greek islands had increased by fifty percent, and were impeding
closer Greece-Turkey ties. He pointed out Greece has been a
long-time supporter of Turkish EU membership aspirations as a means
to creating a more peaceful environment, and that the new PM had
made a point to travel to Istanbul, where he met with PM Erdogan,
during his first days in office. Vershbow remarked that Greek
statistics on overflights were taken seriously. Vershbow stated
the U.S. recognized Greece and Turkey must resolve Aegean issues
bilaterally, and highlighted Turkish Chief of General Staff General
Ilker Basbug's previous offer to develop an Aegean code of conduct.
Vershbow raised the idea of establishing "rules of the road" for
the whole of NATO airspace as a way to defuse the issue of Turkish
and Greek overflights and intercepts in the Aegean. Beglitis was
open to considering a NATO role in helping to reduce tensions, but
suggested that any effort to establish "rules of the road" should
be on the precondition that it has a general NATO character and not
be limited only to the Aegean. Essentially, such a "code of
conduct" should be something that could be couched in general NATO
principles for any NATO airspace. He emphasized that the situation
in the Aegean was of serious concern and had a psychological impact
on the Greek public. He said a constructive U.S. approach to the
issue would build the credibility of Washington. On the other
hand, like the Macedonia name issue, a soft U.S. approach toward
Turkey on the issue would have a detrimental impact on the U.S.
image in Greece. ASD Vershbow affirmed that key international law
should be respected and suggested disputes should be dealt with by
international institutions. He indicated he had encouraged General
Basbug to continue the recent moratorium on overflights, and
assured him that other senior officials were engaged on the issue.
Beglitis expressed concern that pro-Islamic sentiments of the
government in Ankara are harmful to U.S. strategic interests,
noting Turkey's deteriorating relationship with Israel.



--------------

NATO Issues

--------------




11. (C) ASD Vershbow commented that the Strategic Concept document
should be concise, easy to understand, and resonate with the
general public that has grown skeptical of the Alliance in the
post-Cold War world. He stated it must achieve a balance between
new versus conventional threats, and between Article V versus
expeditionary operations. ASD Vershbow outlined U.S. goals for
NATO Reform: more efficient allocation of resources, more common
funding, greater development of "niche" capabilities whereby
smaller countries like Greece could bring specific capabilities to
missions, collective procurement such as the C-17 airlift
consortium, and streamline NATO civilian and command structures.
Beglitis supported the use of the Strategic Concept to redefine the
Alliance's raison d'etre, and called for inclusion of climate
change, energy security, and immigration in the threat assessment.
He cautioned against measures to limit consensus- based
decision-making even below the level of the North Atlantic Council
and the Military Committee. Beglitis noted Greece would lead a
rotation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) in 2012 at a projected
cost of $150 million. ASD agreed to explore Greek requests for
U.S. personnel for the NRF rotation and also for the NATO Maritime
Interdiction Operations Training Center at Souda Bay. The ASD
noted Greece's recent non paper on NATO-EU cooperation provided a
solid starting point for discussion, and inquired about Turkey's
reaction to it. Beglitis expressed pessimism on prospects for
NATO-EU cooperation, but disputed that it was due to bilateral
Greece-Turkey issues.

ATHENS 00001649 005.2 OF 005



12. (U) This cable has been cleared by ASD Vershbow.
Speckhard