Greece on Iran: Wants More Information on Additional

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SUBJECT: Greece on Iran: Wants More Information on Additional
Sanctions, Notes Iranian Regime Moves to Increase Control

REF: A)STATE 103218 B)STATE 102919 C)ATHENS 1511

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CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah A. McCarthy, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)

Summary


1. (C) In the latest in a series of meetings on Iran, PolCouns and
PolOff met 10/16 with representatives from the Greek Ministry of
Foreign Affairs A6 Middle East and D1 International Organization
directorates to give a readout of the P5+1 October 1 meeting,
underscore the need for vigilance in monitoring and enforcing
shipping sanctions and gauge potential Greek support for enhanced
sanctions against Iran as part of the dual-track process. Our
Greek interlocutors requested more details on an enhanced sanctions
regime, noting that the MFA would need time to assess potential
costs in coordination with other GoG ministries. They expressed
concern that energy sanctions would be a very tough sell for
Iranian-oil dependent Greece and cited an editorial run in a Greek
national daily newspaper where commentator Sir Basil Markezinis
argues that cutting off gasoline imports from Iran would be very
difficult(see paragraphs 8 and 9 for full details). Interlocutors
also assessed that "things are getting worse" in Iran as the regime
cracks down and the opposition becomes less visible on the streets.


Monitoring Progress with Interest


2. (C)PolCouns discussed outcome of P5 +1 meeting in Geneva October
per Ref. A, and called upon Greek partners to join in a united
front and press Iran to keep the commitments it made in Geneva.
Deputy Head of A6 George Dogoritis responded that the Iranian
ambassador to Greece has called upon his office several times and
that they have stressed the need for Iran to engage with the
international community in discussions about Iran's nuclear program
and urged Iranian representatives to cooperate in the IAEA and P5+1
forums. Dogoritis, along with A6 Counselor Gregory Karahalios and
D1 Counselor Loukas Tsokos noted that Greece would be watching the
next steps with interest, including an October 19 IAEA meeting with
Iran in Vienna and an October 25 visit to the newly discovered Qom
nuclear facility. Commenting on EU member state plans to walk out
on Ahmadinejad's September UNGA speech should certain redlines be
crossed, Dogoritis noted that there were several EU member state
representatives who were looking for a coordinated sign to walk out
but that the signal did not come. He expressed hope that
coordination would be better in the future.


3. (C)PolCouns reiterated interest in keeping channels of
communication with the GoG open and shared releasable points from
Ref. B with D1's Tsokos. Tsokos thanked officers for the
information on Iranian shipping and confirmed that he has been
following preparations for the MTCR Plenary in Rio in November, but
had not previously received this particular paper.


4. (C) Regarding the government transition, interlocutors said that
they had not yet been asked to brief the new leadership on Iran and
had not yet received any clear signals on GoG Iran policy.

GoG Wary of Additional Sanctions against Iran


5. (C) PolCouns also underscored the need for continued
international support for a two-track process, with the
international community prepared to ratchet up sanctions if Iran
does not meet its international obligations. Tsokos asked for more
information on the type of sanctions that the United States was
proposing, and noted that the MFA would need to consult with other
ministries and "weigh the costs" of sanctions when deciding if/how
to implement sanctions. He also noted that the E.U. agreed on
September 23 to an eighteen-month renewal of sanctions currently in
place and were currently in the process of reviewing the guidelines
for sanctions.


6. (C) Karahalios added that it would be a "very hard sell" to
impose energy sanctions given that Greece imports 35 percent of its
crude oil from Iran. Karahalios said Greece had tried to find
additional oil suppliers last year but had been unsuccessful.
[Note: Post is looking into this assertion. USG energy experts
indicate that Greece purchased approximately 118,000 b/d in 2006

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and 138,000 b/d in 2007 directly from Iran. This amount could very
likely be 35 percent of Greece's crude imports, about which we do
not have complete information. End Note.]


7. (C) Karahalios and Dogoritis also recommended reading an Oct. 11
editorial by Sir Basil Markezinis, which they said offered
"interesting ideas" on Iran.


8. (C) COMMENT: Basil Markezinis, the son of a former Greek
politician, is a lawyer and professor who has split his time
between Greece, England and the United States. Although Markezinis
is a rather recent arrival to all things public in Greece, the few
lectures that he has delivered in Athens have been well-attended
and there were unconfirmed rumors swirling that Papandreou advisors
had contacted him concerning a "key role" in the new
administration.


9. (C) Markezinis' October 11 editorial in Greek daily To Vima
(referenced by our contacts) argues that the real struggle
following recent elections in Iran is taking place within the
Iranian establishment, rather than on the streets with
demonstrators. Markezinis criticizes the United States for trying
to set deadlines for the Iranians to declare their willingness to
engage in discussions on uranium enrichment efforts and argues that
the U.S. must deal with relations with Russia before it can deal
with the Iranian nuclear issue. He argues that sanctions on Iran's
energy exports would have too great a cost for global consumers and
that sanctions should instead focus on Iranian imports. As for
Greece's role, Markezinis argues that Russia "remains a major
player in the international geopolitical game" and advises the
Greek government to "consider all this and follow a policy of equal
distances from both Moscow and Washington." END COMMENT


10. (C) Dogoritis added that he believed Russia was playing the
card of Iran and was well-placed to benefit from the current
situation. If oil prices go up due to additional sanctions, Russia
would stand to benefit and he wondered if the Russians had said
"no" to sanctions privately during Secretary Clinton's most recent
trip to Moscow.

Human Rights


11. (C) Shifting the focus toward human rights, Tsokos inquired
about the US position on a Canadian UN Third Committee resolution
on human rights in Iran. After checking with Washington, PolOff
confirmed that the U.S.co-sponsors the resolution and sees it as a
priority for the Third Committee's Fall Session. Tsokos noted that
Greece hasn't yet made a decision on its position on the resolution
but would likely follow EU consensus, which appears to be in favor
of the resolution.


12. (C) Karahalios added that the Baha'i community in Greece had
lobbied the MFA in support of the Canadian resolution. Karahalios
revealed that the Baha'i community in Greece has called on the MFA
3-4 times and that former Foreign Minister Bakoyannis met with
Baha'i leaders last year. (Note: The Baha'i community in Greece
numbers around three hundred, with approximately 50 percent holding
Greek citizenship and 50 percent holding citizenship from
elsewhere. End Note)

Assessment of Internal Politics in Iran


13. (C) When prompted for Greek observations on Iran's internal
climate, Karahalios said that he did not think there was any real
opposition in Iran anymore. He noted that there were people
protesting in the streets a few days ago, but the numbers were
small and organization less coherent than the weeks following the
elections. There are currently 3-4 protestors who have been
sentenced to death, with only twenty days to appeal. The EU is
preparing a demarche on behalf of several people involved in the
demonstrations who are currently being detained.


14. (C) Karahalios assessed that the lack of opposition does not
mean that things are getting better. The Iranian regime is becoming
more and more rigid, as evidenced by the creation of a

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counter-revolutionary agency focused on making sure the army stays
in lock-step. He noted that the regime also bought several large
telecommunications companies "overnight," in order to better
control internal communication and text messaging. (COMMENT: Per
Ref. C, the head of the Middle East directorate told us in
September that the Iranian regime was in a very weak state
following the elections. New moves seem to indicate that the regime
is trying to consolidate power and stifle counter-revolutionary
voices. END COMMENT)
Speckhard