ATHENS LAY OF THE LAND FOR PM A/S SHAPIRO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 001549

SIPDIS
FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHAPIRO
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/15
TAGS: PREL PHSA PGOV EWWT MARR MASS GR
SUBJECT: ATHENS LAY OF THE LAND FOR PM A/S SHAPIRO

REF: A.) ATHENS 1541, B.) ATHENS 1838, C.) ATHENS 1535, D.) ATHENS
1513, E.) ATHENS 875

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CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(C),
(D)


1. (C) Andrew: Welcome to Greece. Your visit comes at a time of
calm between two storms; the first being the recently concluded
Parliamentary elections in which PM Papandreou scored a decisive
victory over the moribund Karamanlis administration, and the second
being Greece's dismal economic situation which will limit
Papandreou's hand internationally, and create a tough domestic
political environment for him when his post-electoral "honeymoon"
is over. You will also be meeting with Ministers and officials new
to their portfolios and offices, and in some instances, working in
new hybrid ministries created through the mergers and combining of
responsibilities of existing ministries. Remember our bureaucratic
challenges in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security -
only now "a la Greece" immediately following a transition in power
- and you will have a picture of the unsettled nature of many
components of Papandreou's new government.




2. (C) That said, we have an excellent opportunity to ingrain our
piracy message early into the minds of our new interlocutors in the
government, and the AMVER Awards ceremony where you will speak
affords a prime venue to deliver that message to the illuminati of
the Greek shipping sector - a key player in ultimately moving any
Greek governmental policy on the issue. I believe you will find
that your interlocutors value their cooperation both with the U.S.
and the broader international community on counter-piracy, but will
respectfully disagree with you on thorny legal issues such as
prosecution and the relevance of the New York Declaration. If you
can help the Greeks understand where we want to be bilaterally and
multilaterally on piracy over the coming six months, gain some
traction on the Declaration, and launch a dialogue that we can
continue on the ground here, your visit will have been a success.



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Political Overview

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3. (C) The twelve months leading up to the October 4 Parliamentary
elections were marked by a succession of crises for the government
of Prime Minister Karamanlis, who had managed to hold onto his
one-seat majority in Parliament through a series of scandals, the
global financial crisis, widespread rioting following the police
shooting of a teenager, a resurgence in domestic terrorism, huge
numbers of illegal migrants entering Greece, an increase in Turkish
military overflights of Greek islands, and most recently the
serious forest fires on the outskirts of Athens. On September 2, a
somber Karamanlis, in the face of constant attack by the opposition
and plummeting approval ratings, issued a fateful call for new
elections. His New Democracy party lost by a decisive margin,
which left PM Papandreou's center-left Socialist PASOK party in
firm control of the government, and New Democracy in a state of
disarray.




4. (C) New PM (and Foreign Minister) Papandreou has an American
mother, and was born and has studied in the U.S. Having been
Foreign Minister under a previous PASOK administration, he has
developed a good reputation in the international community as a
thoughtful and constructive interlocutor. While he must use
careful rhetoric domestically to avoid the "Amerikanaki" (little
American) label by detractors, our recent engagements with him have
been very positive (reftel A).

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Piracy: Lots of Common Ground, but Some Significant Differences
Exist

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5. (C) We share many common views with the Greeks on piracy, and
it is an issue where we can maintain a robust and fruitful
dialogue. Greece is a staunch supporter of our position that
opposes the creation of an international tribunal to try suspected
pirates. They have stood up to the Germans, the Dutch, and others
on this issue. Our Greek interlocutors continue to express their
appreciation for our recent decision to expand participation in the
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) to Cyprus
in the face of a Turkish political block. Greece views positively
the recent creation of an International Trust Fund under the
auspices of the UN to help defray costs of piracy trials in
developing countries, and is considering a donation. The MFA has
urged Greek ship owners to send captains and crew to testify in
piracy trials in other countries. Greece served as the flagship
command of the EU's first ever naval operation, Atalanta, off of
Somalia last year, has a frigate now in Atalanta's current
rotation, and participates at present in NATO's Ocean Shield
through its rotational contribution to NATO's Standing Naval
Maritime Group 2.




6. (C) On the negative side, Greece declined to sign the New York
Declaration on the margins of the last CGPCS Plenary in September.
They cite concerns that the document added little value to existing
IMO guidelines, was not a negotiated, consensus-based text among
CGPCS participants, implied that merchant vessels should be armed,
and was provided to them too late to be staffed through their
interagency. They remain open to discussion, though. They also
disagree with us on the need to prosecute piracy suspects in Greek
courts. While Greece has the ability to try suspects in Greek
courts, the government has in practice taken the stance that the
flag nation of the vessel, not the nation from which the ship
owners come, should have primary responsibility for prosecuting any
piracy attacks against a vessel. This was demonstrated vividly in
the May hijacking of the Amira, a Greek beneficially-owned,
Egyptian-flagged vessel (ref E). The U.S. Navy captured 17
suspects, and we sought Greek assistance in prosecuting them in
Greece, yet the Greeks were adamant that Egypt must take
responsibility.




7. (C) In your meetings with governmental counterparts, I
recommend you:



-- Explain why we believe the New York Declaration adds value to
international counter-piracy efforts, and seek to address Greek
concerns noted above;



-- Encourage a Greek signature to the Declaration at the next CGPCS
plenary in January 2010;

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-- Raise the International Trust Fund, and encourage a Greek
donation;



-- Lay out U.S. views on prosecution, both in domestic courts and
in third countries such as Kenya, and encourage Greece to consider
prosecuting suspects in cases where the attacked vessel is either
Greek-flagged, or importantly, Greek-owned.



In media engagements, you should be aware that a misperception
exists in Greece that the U.S. approach to international affairs,
including piracy, is to "shoot first and ask questions later."
Your media outreach will enable you to set the record straight, and
explain our position that involves a sophisticated combination of
both law enforcement and military efforts, and our commitment to
working with other countries such as Greece.



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OTHER ISSUES

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8. (C) ISAF: At every opportunity, and at every level, we
encourage the Greeks to contribute more to efforts in Afghanistan.
Their caveat limiting Greek soldiers to Kabul was lifted in April

2009. However, even though planning with the Italian host force is
continuing, the Greek engineer battalion has not yet moved to
Herat, nor has its pledged OMLT deployed, because the Greeks are
now seeking to upgrade their force protection assets. They seek 32
MRAP-type vehicles, 52 anti-IED ECM devices, and a host of other
equipment from the U.S., including armored dump trucks and
bulldozers. Our ODC recently forwarded to U.S. Army planners the
detailed list of equipment the Greek military has told us they
needed to fulfill this deployment commitment, and which they seek
to procure from the U.S. (ref B). Greek participation in ISAF
remains unpopular with the Greek population at large, but largely
under the radar scope; any future casualties that can be attributed
to inadequate force protection measures could result in extreme
pressure on the Government to remove its forces from ISAF.




9. (C) OTHER MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS: Greek contributions to
other important initiatives are substantial and should not be
overlooked. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force rely heavily on Naval
Support Activity Souda Bay in Crete as a support hub for sea and
air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
(Comment: Although it is fine to thank them privately during
meetings, Greek public sentiment is generally anti-NATO, and
anti-American military, so the help Greece gives us at Souda Bay
and with frequent transshipments of ammunition are subjects they
would like to keep private avoiding any public acknowledgments.)
Greece allows over 24,000 over-flights of U.S. military aircraft a
year; participates in NATO's Operations Active Endeavour and Ocean
Shield, and in KFOR; the EU's counter-piracy mission off of Somalia
Operation Atalanta; and the UN's Lebanon mission, UNIFIL.




12. (C) U.S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND TRAINING: Greece is a large
purchaser of U.S. defense goods and stands poised to purchase more.

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We have over $8 billion in FMS cases and there is potential for
more than $6 billion coming up for international competition over
the next two years. As Greece tends to include political as well
as technical and market-based evaluations in its decision making,
your meeting will also provide an opportunity to show the value we
place in our strategic relationship. We have been able to deal
with the sharp cut in Greece's IMET budget to $100,000 but it is
critical to maintain at least this amount in order for the GoG to
continue to benefit from the reduced cost of training associated
with IMET recipients. Of course we would like more IMET, and the
additional training that goes with it, both for enhanced
interoperability and to send a signal to the new GoG (which is
looking to cut back Greek defense expenditures) that our defense
relationship remains important to us.




13. (C) IMMIGRATION: Greece has become an entry point of choice
for illegal immigrants into the European Union. The number of
illegal migrants detained by Greek authorities has increased
dramatically over the last two years, reaching 140,000 last year
(in a country with a population of only about 11 million). The
presence of these migrants - many of whom originated in conflict
zones in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East and entered
Greece via Turkey - has become a major political issue. It also
roils Greek-Turkish relations on occasion, with the Greeks leveling
accusations that Turkey does not do enough to stop the outflow to
Greece, and indeed, aids and abets the illegal immigrants. Greece
is making a strong push for the European Union to take this issue
on and to negotiate repatriation agreements with source countries
such as Afghanistan and Pakistan.




14. (S) TERRORISM: Greece has also been burdened with a
resurgence of domestic terrorism. Following several years of a
lull with the wrap-up of the November 17 group, attacks are again
on the rise. The U.S. Embassy suffered an RPG attack in January of
2007, and more recently we have seen the first detonation of an
ammonium nitrate car bomb at the Athens Stock Exchange on September
2, and the killing of a police officer in June. The U.S. has been
offering technical assistance and sharing intelligence through DHS,
FBI, and other agencies, but the Greeks are woefully unprepared for
any significant increase in terrorist activity. We are also
concerned that the rise of Greece as a migration path from troubled
spots to Western Europe and vice-versa opens the door to
international extremists making a foothold here or using Greece as
a "safe house" for planning nefarious activities.




15. (U) We look forward to seeing you. Dan
Speckhard