Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ATHENS1511
2009-09-25 14:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

Embassy Athens Engages with GoG on Iran

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNGA IAEA KPAL IR IS GR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0740
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
IRAN COLLECTIVE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001511 

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/IPA, IRAN WATCH, S/SEMP
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/25
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNGA IAEA KPAL IR IS GR
SUBJECT: Embassy Athens Engages with GoG on Iran

REF: A) ATHENS 1483; B) ATHENS 1479

CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001511

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/IPA, IRAN WATCH, S/SEMP
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/25
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNGA IAEA KPAL IR IS GR
SUBJECT: Embassy Athens Engages with GoG on Iran

REF: A) ATHENS 1483; B) ATHENS 1479

CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Embassy Athens' Front Office and Political Section
have engaged with our Greek partners from the highest levels to
the working level at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to
expand our dialogue on Iran. Characterizing the Iranian regime as
weak, Greek interlocutors maintain that they favor pushing Iran
first on nuclear issues before human rights issues, and favor
targeted and specific sanctions via the UNSC framework if talks
fail to produce results. The GoG continues to demarche Iran on
nuclear issues but officials seem skeptical about the possibility
of positive results. GoG interlocutors are also skeptical that
further UNSC sanctions will be approved, given indications by
Russia and China. They note that Greece would not break consensus
if the EU decides to impose further sanctions as a package deal.
END SUMMARY.



AMBASSADORIAL ENGAGEMENT




2. (C) In meetings with MFA Secretary General on September 14 and
again with Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis on September 16
Ambassador Speckhard encouraged the GoG to play a strong role
within the international community to encourage Iran to make the
right choices. He urged the Secretary General to make public and
private statements before the IAEA General Conference and UNGA on
the need for Iranian compliance. Katsoudas said that he would
follow up but was skeptical that such statements would have any
effect. As described in Ref. A, Ambassador Speckhard also
encouraged the Foreign Minister to make strong public and private

statements about Iran now and during her time at the UNGA. (Note:
Since this meeting the Foreign Minister's office announced that she
will not be travelling to UNGA, due to illness. End Note.)



DCM UNDERSCORES MESSAGE WITH MFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND
GEOGRAPHIC OFFICES




3. (C) DCM met with D1 Directorate for the UN and International
Organizations Acting Director Manolis Papadogiorgakis September 17
to discuss coordinated action in response to Iran at the IAEA
General Conference and UNGA. September 21 she met with A6 Middle
East Directorate Head Ambassador Themistoklis Dimidis to seek
Greece's perspective on Iran and opinion on prospects for the
upcoming P5+1 talks.




4. (C) In her discussion with Papadogiorgakis the DCM noted the
ongoing IAEA General Conference, pointed to our earlier demarche
(Ref B),thanked Greece for its positive role thus far, and
encouraged Greece to lobby for EU unity against the Arab League's
Israeli Nuclear Capabilities resolution. Turning to the UN General
Assembly, she urged the Greek delegation in New York to call
publicly on Iran to accept a diplomatic solution to the nuclear
issue and to fulfill its international responsibilities. While
keeping a focus on Iran's international obligations with regard to
its nuclear program, she highlighted the Iranian regime's terrible
human rights record, and noted that we must remain cognizant of
that, as well. She asked Papadogiorgakis for the Greeks' views on
Iranian ambitions.




5. (C) Papadogiorgakis shared his assessment that the Iranian
regime was in a weakened state following the elections, and
believed that the West needed to push, but at the same time give an
opportunity to the Iranian government to react positively. He
urged that Iran not be backed into a corner, believing that

ATHENS 00001511 002 OF 002


diplomacy with Iran had a better chance now, as cracks existed in
Iranian society. He urged that principal players find greater
"carrots" for Iran. He assured the DCM that bilaterally, in both
Tehran and Athens, Greece urges Iran to cooperate fully with the
international community.




6. (C) Later, Dimidis shared his assessment of the internal
political climate in Iran, commenting that the Iranian people do
not agree with the revolution anymore. Dimidis speculated that we
are "seeing the beginning of the end of the revolution in Iran" and
that the regime will collapse from the inside. He noted that the
Greek embassy in Tehran has been treading lightly in recent months,
as they do not want to indirectly support Iranian President
Ahmadinejad but also cannot openly assist the opposition for fear
of rousing the suspicious of the Iranian government. Regarding
nuclear negotiations Dimidis argued that Iran is trying to gain
more time through talking but does not think that Iran will
actually deliver and make concessions at talks such as the P5+1.




7. (C) Dimidis reiterated Greece's preference for sanctions that
are targeted and specific and lamented the difficulty of applying
sanctions that would target the right people and institutions and
actually produce favorable results. Dimidis noted that the British
government was thinking about imposing energy sanctions on Iranian
banks and oil exports but that Greece did not support these types
of sanctions. Keeping with the previous GoG position, as expressed
at the September GAERC, Dimidis said that Greece will follow if the
EU decides to impose more sanctions but would first like to see the
international community try to convince the Iranian side to come to
the table. He noted that UN sanctions would be preferable to EU
sanctions but was very skeptical that UN Security Council members
Russia and China would agree to this. Counselor Stelios Gavriil
added that any additional sanctions should be part of a package
deal.




8. (C) While acknowledging serious human rights issues in Iran,
Dimidis asserted that the international community must focus on one
issue at a time with Iran, in order to avoid Iran refusing to come
to the negotiating table at all. He noted that Greece sees the
Iranian nuclear issue as the most important issue to tackle at
present, rather than taking Iran to task for human rights offenses.
Dimidis also thought that the detention and intimidation of British
and French embassy staff in Tehran was calculated to distract
attention from the nuclear issue.




9. (C) Lastly, Dimidis and Gavriil raised the Middle East Peace
Process as the second issue of great interest to Greece in the
Middle East region. They asked for confirmation about a "meeting
of three" between the leaders of the United States, Israel and the
Palestinian Authority and expressed hope that Special Envoy
Mitchell could bring about concrete results. Gavriil expressed
desire to see negotiations get straight to the point and shared his
opinion that Hamas should be included in the negotiating process,
especially given that "many from the EU already talk to Hamas
directly or indirectly." DCM McCarthy expressed gratitude for GoG
support for the peace process and encouraging words about S/E
Mitchell and promised to keep A6 informed as new information on the
negotiations comes available.
Speckhard