Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ATHENS1445
2009-08-26 17:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Athens
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS KAIDANOW'S VISIT TO GREECE

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON OTRA GR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1777
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #1445/01 2381713
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 261712Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0606
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 001445 

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/08/26
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON OTRA GR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS KAIDANOW'S VISIT TO GREECE

REF: ATHENS 657

CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 001445

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/08/26
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON OTRA GR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS KAIDANOW'S VISIT TO GREECE

REF: ATHENS 657

CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (U) Dear Tina,




2. (SBU) It's my pleasure to welcome you to Greece. The last
twelve months have been marked by a succession of crises for the
government of Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, who has managed to
hold onto his one-seat majority in Parliament through the global
financial crisis and the ensuing downturn in the economy,
widespread rioting last December, a significant increase in
domestic terrorist attacks, a wave of illegal migrants, a
much-noticed increase in Turkish military overflights of Greek
islands, and most recently the serious forest fires on the
outskirts of Athens. Voters may soon be able to judge the
government's performance - the main opposition PASOK party has
indicated it will force parliamentary elections by March 2010 if
they do not happen earlier - but the underlying economic, security,
and political challenges will remain regardless of which party is
in power.




3. (C) While the government's focus is on confronting these
challenges, there is a strong interest in a more cooperative
approach on shared international challenges. Your visit is an
opportunity to reinforce the message of the new Administration's
desire to listen to our partners and put our relationship with
Greece on a new course. Foremost among our common global interests
is stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan, of special interest to
Greece as a frontline state for refugee flows from conflict zones
in south-central Asia. Another is European security, where Greece
has performed well in its first eight months at the helm of OSCE,
thanks in large part to Foreign Minister Bakoyannis's careful

coordination with the U.S. and other major Western countries
concerned about Russian efforts to dilute the mandate of OSCE and
other bodies. And of course, Greece is an important ally in our
efforts to keep Turkish accession into the EU on track.




4. (C) Across the range of issues there are more areas of
successful bilateral cooperation than many Greeks and Americans
realize, and certainly more than Greek politicians would want to
admit publicly. These areas of agreement should form the
foundation of an improved relationship, and the expected entry of
Greece into the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) later this year would
provide a major public boost to our efforts in this direction. At
the same time, Greeks care deeply about the long-running regional
issues and Greek officials will undoubtedly raise them with you,
the most pressing being the Turkish overflights in Aegean.




5. (C) We are generally on track with the U.S.-Greece Engagement
Strategy the Embassy proposed to Washington earlier this year
(reftel). The overall goal of this strategy is to dramatically
reshape the U.S.-Greece relationship in the face of the historic
shift in European public attitudes in response to the new U.S.
President and:

-- Solidify these new attitudes and translate them into positive
engagement with the United States;

-- Move Greece from a quiet and reluctant to a strong, reliable,
and pro-active partner;

-- Discourage comparisons with the level of U.S.-Turkish
engagement;

-- Focus on strategic challenges we have in common
(counterterrorism, Afghanistan, Turkey's European perspective,
energy security, economic recovery); and

-- Move away from a relationship centered on Aegean disputes,
Cyprus, Macedonia - while continuing strong, sustained support for
resolution of these issues.

ATHENS 00001445 002 OF 004


Greece Takes Arms against a Sea of Troubles

--------------


6. (C) Greek political life is usually tumultuous, but the last
year has been particularly unsettling for many Greeks. The global
recession has hit the Greek economy, causing a rise in unemployment
and economic uncertainty and compounding what had already been a
widespread sense among young people that their prospects are worse
than those of the previous generation. After years of strong
growth, the Greek economy is slipping, with GDP expected to slow to
between -1 to -2 percent in 2009. The slowdown has exposed
weaknesses in the Greek economy; ballooning budget deficits and
public debt constrain the GoG's ability to develop social or fiscal
stimulus programs. Over the last year unemployment has risen to
over 8 percent, with nearly one of every four young people
unemployed. Things are likely to only worsen in coming months as
the economy is heavily dependent on tourism and shipping, two
sectors particularly hard hit by the downturn.




7. (C) On an even more visceral level, Greeks have had their sense
of security shaken, especially by the widespread rioting that
followed the accidental shooting death of a teenager by police in
December. While many young people supported the protests, older
Greeks were dismayed by the police's seeming inability to stop the
destruction - or by the political leadership's unwillingness to
risk an escalation by ordering police to respond more aggressively.
Although Greece's "anarchist" community has employed vandalism and
Molotov cocktails on a regular basis for years, for most of the
last decade these attacks had been largely confined to certain
areas of Athens and Thessaloniki, and ordinary Greeks had begun to
forget the anxiety of the heyday of the 17 November terrorist group
in previous decades. December brought these emotions back, and
domestic terrorist groups - including Revolutionary Struggle, which
launched an RPG at the Embassy in January 2007 - have tried to
capitalize on the riots by significantly increasing their
activities in the months that followed, attacking police, banks,
and other symbols of global capitalism and the state. In June,
Sect of Revolutionaries (a new group that emerged after the riots)
carried out the execution-style killing of a member of the police
counterterrorism unit, the first such deadly attack in years.




8. (C) At the same time, Greece has become the entry point of
choice for illegal immigrants into the European Union. The number
of illegals detained by Greek authorities has increased
dramatically over the last two years, reaching 140,000 last year
(in a country with a population of only about 11 million). The
presence of these migrants - many of whom originated in conflict
zones in the Middle East and entered Greece via Turkey - has become
a major political issue. Shortly after the ruling New Democracy
(ND) party's second-place showing in the June European Parliament
elections, the government instituted a new, tougher policy intended
to deter illegal immigration and to win back ND voters who stayed
home in the Euro elections or voted for the extreme right LAOS
party, which scored its largest percentage ever in the June
elections. While LAOS and other small parties may have benefitted
from protest votes in June, there is no doubt that ND is in
trouble. In addition to its win in June, PASOK has been
consistently running about five percentage points ahead in public
opinion polls for the next Greek Parliamentary election. When that
election will take place is not clear, but most observers expect
PASOK to carry through on its threat to force elections by refusing
to agree to the election of a new President when current President
Papoulias's term expires in March. Some predict Karamanlis may
decide to hold the elections even earlier for tactical reasons.
PASOK will be favored to win, although other scenarios are being
bruited about, including a national unity government bringing
together the two major parties. Whatever government emerges is
likely to favor many of the same foreign policies - and operate
under many of the same constraints - as the current government.
PASOK leader Papandreou is a moderate and pragmatist who made
improved relations with Turkey a centerpiece of his tenure as
Foreign Minister under a previous PASOK government. Faced with the

ATHENS 00001445 003 OF 004


pressures of domestic politics, however, even he has taken popular
stands against the government for being too passive in dealing with
Turkish overflights and other hot-button issues.



Toward a More Positive Bilateral Relationship

--------------


9. (C) The enormously positive views in Greece toward the new U.S.
President have eroded the broad (but not so deep) anti-Americanism
that has characterized Greece for the last several decades. We are
seizing the opportunity to reshape our bilateral relationship in a
new positive direction, and are working with the Greek government
to broaden our dialogue beyond the perennial regional problem areas
to broader common strategic interests. Your visit will be an
excellent opportunity to reinforce this momentum - to encourage
Greece to step up its support in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to
continue to support Turkey's EU orientation as the government tries
to work through the bilateral differences confounding that
relationship, and to play a responsible role in support of European
energy diversification. The Greek government - and Foreign
Minister Bakoyannis in particular - is willing to do more on these
issues, but the Greeks would also like support from us in ways that
will give them political cover for expanding their efforts. They
may repeat requests for our help in obtaining and effectively
implementing migrant re-admission agreements with Afghanistan and
Pakistan, major source countries for migrants.




10. (C) On Turkey, Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign Minister
Bakoyannis are personally committed to supporting Turkey's EU
accession, something they see as the right thing for Greece, for
Turkey, and for the EU. They will continue to engage politically
and support EU accession, but in today's superheated political
environment they are finding it increasingly difficult to manage
this line. They have stressed to us in particular how Turkey's
overflights and its unwillingness to implement a 2001 bilateral
protocol on the re-admission of third-country illegal migrants has
made it harder for the Greeks to continue their visible support for
Turkey's EU accession. Embassies Athens and Ankara have been
working together to feed ideas into the current policy process on
reducing the tensions in the Aegean. We should encourage the
Greeks to maintain the high road on Turkey and to focus on what
Greece can do to help change the atmosphere and lower the dangers
of a serious incident. At the same time, your interlocutors will
want to be reassured that the U.S. is engaging with Turkey, as
well, on Aegean issues.




11. (C) The Greeks have consistently told us they are willing to
compromise on the Macedonia name issue as long as the formula is
consistent with the bipartisan agreement in Greece about how far
they can go. Greek red lines include an insistence on "ergo omnes"
use internationally of a new name with a geographic modifier and no
formal recognition of identity that would confer an unqualified
"Macedonian" label to their neighbors. This controversy remains
emotional and politically salient for many Greeks, more so than the
Cyprus issue, on which Greek officials tell us they would be
satisfied with any solution acceptable to the Greek Cypriots.
Especially given the precarious political balance in Greece, the
government is not in a position to offer any further significant
concessions.




12. (C) Deputy Secretary Steinberg signed two agreements with
Bakoyannis at the Corfu ministerial in June needed for the Visa
Waiver Program (VWP). We expect the Greek Parliament to complete
ratification of these agreements around the time of your visit,
which will be the final step we have asked of the Greeks for VWP.
Our own process is running somewhat behind the Greeks as DHS, DNI,
and others work to complete the package for final interagency
approval. The need for visas to travel to the U.S. has been a
perennial irritant to successive Greek governments, and removing it
would be noticed by many Greeks who otherwise may be cynical about

ATHENS 00001445 004 OF 004


U.S. policies, something that would create political space for more
visible bilateral cooperation.




13. (C) Your visit comes at a time when many Greeks feel the
country is at a turning point, although it is not yet clear exactly
what direction Greece will turn. For us this is a challenge but
also an opportunity - a chance to re-build a positive atmosphere
around our bilateral relationship by focusing on shared challenges
like counterterrorism, regional stability (both with Turkey and in
the Balkans),energy security, and stabilization in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. From all of us working at the Embassy at this important
time, we are pleased to welcome you and look forward to your visit.
SPECKHARD