OSCE CiO S/R Discusses Tbilisi Bureau, Seeks Guidance on

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001365

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/07/30
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE GR RS GG
SUBJECT: OSCE CiO S/R Discusses Tbilisi Bureau, Seeks Guidance on
OSCE Presence in Georgia

REF: 09 USOSCE 178

CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary: OSCE CiO Special Representative for Protracted
Conflicts Charalampos Christopoulos met with Ambassador Speckhard
July 28 to discuss intentions to open a CiO Special Representative
Bureau in Tbilisi, the OSCE's role in Georgia and developments in
Moldova. S/R Christopoulos gave Ambassador Speckhard a copy of a
letter recently passed to Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Grigol Vashadze, requesting Georgian support for the establishment
of a Bureau of the CiO Special Representative in Tbilisi. In a July
30 follow on call, S/R Christopoulos asked the U.S. to approach the
Georgians and Russians in support of the CiO's plans. End Summary

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Re-establishing a (More Limited) OSCE Presence in Georgia

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2. (C) The idea for opening the CiO Special Representative's bureau
in Tbilisi came about following the June 30 expiration of the
mandate for the OSCE Mission to Georgia. S/R Christopoulos
reiterated that the offer to renew the OSCE mandate was still on
the table for Russia, but that the Tbilisi bureau would function as
an alternative in the meantime. Ambassador Speckhard praised the
Chairman for her efforts to reach agreement on renewal of the OSCE
Monitoring Mission mandate while also maintaining the need for an
agreement that did not undermine the territorial integrity of
Georgia. In the absence of such an agreement, he commended efforts
to develop an interim fix.


3. (C) According to S/R Christopoulos the Tbilisi bureau would
undertake the following functions, as outlined in a letter from S/R
Christopoulos addressed to Georgian Foreign Minister Vashadze:

- Provide logistical support for the CiO Special Representative
during visits to the region;

- Represent the OSCE Chairmanship in the Incident and Prevention
and Response Mechanisms as mandated by the Geneva International
Discussions; and

- Inform the CiO Special Representative in the implementation of
projects discussed in the framework of the Second Geneva Working
Group.


4. (C) Stephen Young, the former head the OSCE monitoring mission,
has been tapped to head up the Tbilisi bureau. He is currently
residing in London and, according to S/R Christopoulos, would be
ready to travel to Tbilisi immediately. Although S/R Christopoulos
had not yet received a response from Tbilisi, he expressed hope
that a CiO bureau in Tbilisi could open on August 1 and said he
would travel to Tbilisi for the opening.


5. (C) If Georgia agrees, the Bureau would be in operation for an
initial period of August 1-December 31, 2009, until the end of the
Greek Chairmanship of the OSCE. Expenses would be funded by the
Greek CiO.


6. (C) Ambassador Speckhard asked if S/R Christopoulos had talked
to Kazakhstan, to gauge whether or not the Kazakhs would be
interested in supporting the continuation of a Tbilisi bureau
following their assumption of the OSCE Chairmanship on January 1,

2010. S/R Christopoulos agreed that this was a good idea but felt
that it was too early to talk to the Kazakhs. He suggested that we
coordinate our message to Kazakhstan on this issue after the bureau
is up and running. (Note: Reftel OSCE highlights cable reported
that the Greeks have in fact spoken to the Kazakhs about the plan,
and that the Kazakhs said that they would be willing to continue
this arrangement if the OSCE cannot reach a compromise on
re-opening a field mission. End Note)


7. (C) Initial reactions to the proposal in the region are still
unclear. S/R Christopoulos said that he has spoken with Georgia
Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Nabandov, who expressed initial


dissatisfaction with use of the phrase "to the region" noted in the
first point of the letter and instead preferred to say "to
Georgia." However, his office had not yet received a formal
response from the Georgians to the letter.


8. (C) S/R Christopoulos asked us to keep the letter confidential,
as he had not passed a copy to the Russians. However, he had
informed the Russian embassy in Athens of his office's intentions.
He also revealed that he will be traveling to Moscow next week and
may discuss his plans in more detail during that trip - his fourth
trip to Russian since assumption of his role as CiO Special
Representative.


9. (C) On July 30 S/R Christopoulos called Ambassador Speckhard to
inform us that he had been demarched by the Russian Charge d'
Affaires in Athens, with respect to the CiO plan to open an office
in Tbilisi. The Charge was under instruction to inform the CiO
that they did not oppose the opening of the office but that, for
the office to play any role in the Geneva process, it would have to
have to have the agreement of all the parties involved. (Comment:
This, in effect, means South Ossetia. End Comment) According to
the Special Representative, the U.S. could help by urging the
Georgians to formally respond to the CiO plan to open the office
and by encouraging the Russians to allow the CiO the opportunity to
operate freely inside Georgia. He said the EU and the Germans had
promised to talk to the Russians as well.

==================================

S/R Views on Next Steps in Georgia

==================================


10. (C) S/R Christopoulos recently made a trip to the United States
and spoke highly of the substantive meetings arranged on his
behalf, including time with the EUR Front Office, NSC and Congress.
He noted that the majority of his meetings focused on Georgia and
the OSCE's role in Georgia going forward. In particular, he
welcomed the creative thinking that characterized the discussion he
had with EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Bryza. He was anxious to
hear if there was any further development with respect to the U.S.
approach on how an actual role for the OSCE could be maintained in
Georgia.


11. (C) He also expressed interest in learning whether the OSCE was
discussed during Vice President Biden's recent trip to Georgia, and
hoped to find out more about U.S. economic and development aid
pledges to Georgia that were announced during that trip.


12. (C) On a broad scale, S/R Christopoulos inquired about what the
OSCE and the international community should "do about Georgia" in
practical terms. He shared his opinion that the Georgians should
work to demonstrate that Georgia is taking care of the break-away
regions, still views the people of these regions as Georgian
citizens, and treats them as part of Georgia. To this end, S/R
Christopoulos emphasized building bridges and encouraged the
Georgians, South Ossetians and Abkhazians to work together on gas
and energy issues. He suggested that they work together on natural
gas issues in Gori and also create a joint commission to discuss
issues such as potable water and missing persons.

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Moldova and Transnistria

========================


13. (C) S/R Christopoulos also spoke briefly about his work on the
protracted conflict between Moldova and Transnistria, noting that
the current goal was to organize a joint visit to the region before
September 22. In a sign of solidarity, the delegation would include
S/R Christopoulos, the U.S. Ambassador to Moldova and the EU
Special Representative for Moldova. In response to efforts to deny
the U.S. Ambassador to Moldova entry, he said that unless all were
welcome, the trip would not take place.









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Information Request

===================


14. (SBU) Post requests further information from Washington, USOSCE
and Embassy Tbilisi in response to the following questions posed by
S/R Christopoulos:

-What is the USG position on an OSCE presence in Georgia going
forward? Have we given future thought to the possibilities for an
OSCE presence in Georgia, beyond the CiO office? Does the U.S.
envision a mission, secretariat or some other type of institutional
presence (e.g. sub-institutions of the OSCE)?

- Does the USG have recommendations for practical next steps in
Georgia? What can the OSCE do to promote progress?
SPECKHARD