Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASUNCION67
2009-02-04 22:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asuncion
Cable title:  

DEFENSE MINISTER ON U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION AND

Tags:  PGOV MARR PREL MOPS PA 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAC #0067/01 0352204
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 042204Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7568
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNCS/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000067 

SIPDIS

WHA/FO CMCMULLEN, WHA/BSC MDRUCKER, BFRIEDMAN, MDASCHBACH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2029
TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL MOPS PA
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ON U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION AND
ONGOING OPERATIONS

REF: A. ASUNCION 0039

B. ASUNCION 0014

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michael J. Fitzpatrick; reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000067

SIPDIS

WHA/FO CMCMULLEN, WHA/BSC MDRUCKER, BFRIEDMAN, MDASCHBACH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2029
TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL MOPS PA
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER ON U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION AND
ONGOING OPERATIONS

REF: A. ASUNCION 0039

B. ASUNCION 0014

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michael J. Fitzpatrick; reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a January 30 meeting with Charge
d'Affaires, Paraguayan Defense Minister Bareiro assessed his
Government's response to the New Year's Eve attack on a small
army outpost in Tacuati (San Pedro Department) and shared his
thoughts regarding expanded security cooperation with the
United States. The MoD expressed his overall satisfaction
with the performance of the Paraguayan Armed Forces,
specifically highlighting the U.S.-trained and -equipped
Joint Immediate Response Detachment ("DCEI") and the First
Multirole/Peacekeeping Company ("CECOPAZ") for their lead
roles in stabilizing the security situation in San Pedro.
The MoD's outlook regarding the potential for expanded
security cooperation with the United States, however, was
mixed. He cited Paraguay's desire to pursue a regional
approach in meeting its security needs, an agenda that could
be influenced by a meeting of the South American Defense
Council (SADC) scheduled for June 2009 -- even as he insisted
Paraguay will not let its neighbors dictate its defense
arrangements. The MOD nonetheless agreed that post and MOD
staff should move forward now to finalize draft Memos of
Agreement for U.S. support for the DCEI and CECOPAZ units. He
also left the door open to pursuing a broader bilateral
security agreement thereafter. Post will now pursue the draft
MOAs, first and foremost to better gauge the depth of genuine
commitment to an enhanced security cooperation relationship.
But we cannot want this assistance more than they do; the USG
should remain willing to declare victory and signal the end
our support for these units well before June -- and then be
ready to do so in June, should it come to that. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Charge d'Affaires and the Chief of the Office of
Defense Cooperation (Notetaker) met with MoD Luis Bareiro
Spaini in his office on January 30 for approximately one hour

and ten minutes. The Charge requested the meeting as a
followup to a January 26 letter from the MoD regarding
Paraguayan intentions for continued U.S. support of the DCEI.
The encounter also provided an opportunity to place that
discussion in the context of ongoing real-world operations
being conducted by the DCEI: in Tacuati, San Pedro
Department, in response to attacks by the EPP nascent
guerrilla movement. The MoD was relaxed and upbeat, and
remained focused on the two primary topics throughout the
meeting.

--------------
TACUATI: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
--------------


3. (C) The MoD attributed the New Year's Eve attack in
Tacuati to a small, well-organized cadre of "criminals" who
took advantage of a permissive operating environment
facilitated by a combination of corrupt local police,
extensive marihuana cultivation and trafficking, and a lack
of legitimate governmental presence. Bareiro stated that
criminal elements in San Pedro underestimated both the speed
and commitment of the government's response. The MoD noted
that many assumed the military would remain in the field no
longer than 8 days, when in fact they have maintained an
active presence for more than thirty days that continues at
this time. The President demonstrated considerable resolve
stating the operation will continue indefinitely. This
sustained presence has created tremendous pressure on
traffickers who have lost revenue due to an inability to move
illicit product, are increasingly turning against one
another, and blaming those who led the attack against Tacuati
for their misfortune. Likewise, corrupt police are unable to
move with impunity, protect traffickers, or profit from
illicit activity with the ongoing presence of a well-equipped
and organized military force.


4. (C) The MoD went on to describe Paraguayan plans to create
a long-term presence in northern San Pedro Department. Within
the next 15 days, the Armed Forces intends to permanently
relocate an Engineering Battalion, currently based in the
Chaco, to northern San Pedro in the vicinity of Tacuati on
land donated by Cattleman Luis Lindstrom. (NOTE: Lindstrom
was taken hostage and released in August 2008 by members of
the Paraguayan People's Army. END NOTE). This engineering
battalion is to be augmented by civil affairs, intelligence,
security, and medical sections. In addition, facilities for
police and prosecutors, as well as other civilian government

entities, will be established on the compound.


5. (C) The MoD summarized the situation in Tacuati by
underscoring five key points: 1) There is no time limit on
the ongoing police-military operation; 2) An augmented
engineering battalion with police and prosecutor support will
provide sustained governmental presence in the future; 3) The
population is supportive of the government's response,
despite some foot-dragging from corrupt local police and
prosecutors; 4) Not a shot has been fired during the
operation; and 5) The military is disciplined and its forces
well trained. The MoD expressed his thanks for U.S. training
and equipment, noting that this operation would not have been
possible even one year ago. He closed by stating that
coordination with Minister of Interior Filizzola (his
co-chair of the national crisis committee formed to respond
to Tacuati) had been good, but that Filizzola faced a
daunting task in reforming the national police.

-------------- --------------
MOD REQUESTS U.S. SUPPORT FOR DCEI, AT LEAST THROUGH JUNE
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Turning to the subject of security cooperation, the
Charge acknowledged the MoD's January 26 letter requesting
continued U.S. support to the DCEI through at least June 30,

2009. (NOTE: In that letter, the MOD stated "In fulfillment
of the precise directives of the President of the Republic
and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Nation, I
communicate to you that the Government of Paraguay accepts
the cooperation and maintenance in place of the DCEI, under
current conditions, until 30 June 2009, the date after which
its continuation could be considered, via an agreement, of
this instrument of bilateral cooperation." END NOTE.) The
Charge inquired about the MoD's intent in mentioning a
precise June date; the MoD responded that it was Paraguay's
intent to participate in the South American Defense Council
in June. Bareiro was vague on the details, agenda, and
participants in the Council, but did mention Argentina,
Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Bareiro stated that the
Council would provide a forum to pursue regional solutions
for security needs, and that the MoD was not in a position to
initiate any new security cooperation agreements that would
limit Paraguayan options before the June Council. (COMMENT:
Unsure of himself as to exactly what would occur in June, the
Minister seemed to be falling back onto a prepared formal
talking point, one that he did not fully share. END COMMENT.)


7. (C) The Minister was then much more forward-leaning on
discussing the actual details of what he seeks in terms of
U.S. cooperation: He wants DoD's Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies (CHDS) to come help do a national security
strategy review ) something the previous Paraguayan
Government stiff-armed for years. Bareiro said his staff and
the Embassy should proceed right away to finalize the draft
texts of Memoranda of Agreement regarding both the DCEI and
the peacekeeping unit (CECOPAZ, funded under US GPOI
assistance, and also deployed in San Pedro). Bareiro agreed
readily with the Charge's suggestion that the DCEI and
CECOPAZ agreements be signed in tandem, so as to demonstrate
publicly balance in the U.S-Paraguay approach to security
cooperation. Bareiro said it was not clear to him whether
such agreements would need Congressional approval or not (an
ongoing debate here regarding recent accords with Venezuela),
but he was not phased by the prospect of defending either
with Congress or elsewhere.


8. (C) The Minister also said he was open to pursuing a more
general security cooperation agreement, including terms
regarding Status of Forces, especially in the context of the
possible 2010 deployment to Paraguay of a New Horizons
humanitarian assistance effort. The Minister agreed that any
future security agreements should be broad and flexible in
nature so as not to prevent the two parties, say, from
changing the exact dates of future missions under the
agreement (as had been the case with the last bilateral
security agreement signed in 2005). And, regarding the SADC,
the MOD was adamant when Charge asked him about ceding to
other regional players Paraguay,s decision regarding who it
would partner with on military and security issues: He will
not let others (be it Brazil, Venezuela, or anyone else)
dictate to Paraguay. Paraguay, he concluded, will pursue
Paraguay's national interests.



9. (C) COMMENT: Bareiro,s letter confirms in writing
President Lugo's recent oral statements to Charge (reftels)

of Paraguay,s continued interest in U.S. security
assistance. But it still leaves unanswered some questions
regarding next steps, while confirming that this remains a
divided government. Bareiro,s political advisor told Acting
DCM January 30 that the June date was inserted into the
letter (apparently after Lugo had told the MoD to provide an
unqualified "yes" to the Embassy) in order to placate
domestic political players suspicious of U.S. cooperation and
supportive of cooperation with Venezuela and other regional
actors. Despite this dilatory tactic, the MOD's aide was
optimistic about finding a way forward, and said that much of
the MoD,s hesitation could be attributed to political
inexperience. As a retired General Officer, the MoD is
indeed a bit out of his element in the backroom political
brawls that constitute inter-agency discussions here. But
he's learning -- just as President Lugo and others new to
government are learning just how critical USG-provided
training and assistance has been in providing them with any
response capability whatsoever. (Indeed, CECOPAZ and the DCEI
have already proven the ability to conduct sustained
deployments, albeit non-kinetic, in the absence of U.S.
trainers.) Post intends to press forward in coming days with
bilateral working-level discussions on the draft MOAs for
CECOPAZ and the DCEI -- and with continuing education and
relationship-building among those suspicious of U.S. motives
for engagement. This will allow us to better gauge the true
depth of commitment (and opposition). But in the end, we
cannot want this assistance more than the Paraguayans do.
And the USG should remain as we are now: Willing to declare
victory and signal well before June the end of our support
for the units -- and then do so in June, should it come to
that. END COMMENT.

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FITZPATRICK