Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASUNCION426
2009-07-07 20:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Asuncion
Cable title:  

FOREIGN MINISTER ON HONDURAS AND US MILITARY

Tags:  PREL MASS PGOV PINS HO PA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAC #0426/01 1882023
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 072023Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7966
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNCS/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000426 

SIPDIS

WHA/FO CMCMULLEN, WHA/BSC MDRUCKER, BFRIEDMAN, MDASCHBACH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2029
TAGS: PREL MASS PGOV PINS HO PA
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON HONDURAS AND US MILITARY
COOPERATION

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael J. Fitzpatrick; reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000426

SIPDIS

WHA/FO CMCMULLEN, WHA/BSC MDRUCKER, BFRIEDMAN, MDASCHBACH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2029
TAGS: PREL MASS PGOV PINS HO PA
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON HONDURAS AND US MILITARY
COOPERATION

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael J. Fitzpatrick; reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Lacognata called in
Charge early July 7 to discuss Honduras and to lay out a
proposed way forward on U.S-Paraguayan military cooperation.
Lacognata stressed his overarching concern for OAS consensus;
he suggested Honduran President Zelaya ) and "vanguard
nations" such as Venezuela -- should never have tried to
force his return without having first worked out a domestic
agreement. He lauded quiet U.S. efforts to find such a
compromise solution. Lacognata stated the Lugo government
wished not to denigrate, but to deepen, military cooperation
with the United States. But he proposed the current Special
Forces training of the Rapid Reaction Force (DCEI) come to a
conclusion (as currently planned) by the end of September, so
as to provide some "space" between pre-Lugo government
training and subsequent training and assistance efforts. He
stated that other Special Forces in-country (e.g., MIST,
CMSE) are encouraged to remain in-country while our two
governments turn their attention to negotiating a broad
overarching military cooperation agreement. Lacognata stated
it was President Lugo's intention to conclude negotiations of
such an agreement by the end of the calendar year. Lacognata
committed to ensure that the Embassy would soon receive a
formal letter from the Defense Minister to this effect. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) Charge was called in to meet one-on-one with Foreign
Minister Hector Lacognata in his office early July 7 to
discuss the way forward on US-Paraguay security cooperation.
(NOTE: The request came in response to Ambassador Ayalde's
June 30 letter to Minister of Defense (MOD) Bareiro seeking
clarity on the government's intentions. END NOTE.) As the
meeting had been postponed one day due to President Lugo's
travels (with Lacognata) in support of the attempted return
of President Zelaya to Honduras, the conversation opened with
Honduras.

HONDURAS

==========

3. (C) Calling it both risky and a "fools' errand,"
Lacognata stated that he had counseled President Lugo against
going to support Zelaya's (now failed) effort to return to
Honduras July 4-5. Lacognata's reasons: 1. Even more
important than the return of Zelaya to Honduras is the
maintenance of unity and consensus among the OAS. If the
OAS tries to push at the speed of those "vanguard nations"
(read: Venezuela, Ecuador, et al.) and not at the slower
speed of Canada and the Caribbeans, Zelaya would not be
reinstated AND the OAS would be damaged in the process. 2. If
Zelaya returned without a deal having been worked out, he
would be arrested upon arrival. The international community
would then shift focus to one of "Free Zelaya" instead of
"Restore Democracy." 3. If Zelaya's plane was fired on, the
social fabric of Honduras would be torn, with much violence
possible ) making a peaceful exit even less likely. 4. The
Paraguayan Constitution speaks to the non-interference in the
internal affairs of other countries. No matter the salon
debates on finer points of international law, having the
President of Paraguay land in a foreign nation in a plane not
authorized to land in that country (even if it is to reassert
the rule of law),cannot be seen as anything but interference
in the internal affairs of another country.


4. (C) Lacognata recognized the special relationship the
United States has maintained with Honduras, particularly on
the military side. He stated his and President Lugo's great
appreciation for the USG's approach thus far to the Honduran
situation, and hoped that quiet diplomacy would win the day.
He stated he was aware that there were unpublicized efforts
underway, with strong USG engagement, to find a compromise
solution, one that avoided bloodshed and secured a return to
institutional norms in Honduras. He expressed concern only
that the media attention to OAS and US efforts not to create
"a reverse Cuba," in which external efforts in support of
democracy only lead to the greater estrangement of Honduras
from the region. He relayed President Lugo's appreciation
for the personal involvement, public statements and private
efforts of both President Obama and Secretary Clinton.

US MILITARY COOPERATION
========================

5. (C) Lacognata said he asked Charge to come in to discuss
the way forward on US-Paraguay military cooperation after the
Ambassador's June 30 letter to the MOD seeking clarity on the

GOP,s intentions. Lacognata apologized that MOD Bareiro was
not also present for our meeting, as intended, due to a
last-minute scheduling conflict. Lacgonata stated he wanted
to share the President,s policy, the result of extensive
discussions June 2 among the President, the Defense Minister,
the Foreign Minister and presidential and ministerial
advisors. He committed to brief the President and the
Defense Minister after our meeting.


6. (C) Lacognata stated that Paraguay's military cooperation
was "historic," and that the Lugo government has absolutely
no intention of either denigrating or stigmatizing that
relationship. On the contrary; the government wishes to
deepen and extend that relationship. But, as in a number of
other areas of governance, certain steps were taken under the
previous Colorado Party governments that this government
wishes to rectify, if only to formalize. The government
wishes to bring clarity and formal definition to a number of
issues that the Colorados preferred to manage in the shadows.
He noted, for example, that the presence of eleven U.S.
Special Forces "ODA" (Operational Detachment Alpha) trainers
of the DCEI (Paraguay's new rapid reaction force) are here
based on the excellent working relations and mutual respect
and faith among the representatives of the two governments.
Lacognata stated that, given the changes in administration in
both Washington and Asuncion, and the forthcoming conclusion
of the training of the DCEI, this is the time for definition.
(Charge readily agreed.)


7. (C) Lacognata proposed that the current Special Forces
ODA draw down from 11 persons to six as planned this month,
and that the training of the DCEI by those six conclude as
planned by the end of September 2009. He underscored
repeatedly the need for a short break ("un pequeno descanso")
between the successful standing up and training of the DCEI
under the old (Colorado) rules, and any future assistance
that the USG might provide the unit under a new agreement
with the current government. He suggested, without adding
details, that any subsequent assistance to the DCEI might
contain explicit new conditions. The government, he added,
had no objection to concluding the current training and
phase-out (as previously discussed with post) by the end of
September, perhaps to include an official event marking the
successful conclusion of the standing up and training of the
DCEI.


8. (C) The Minister suggested, as a sign of continued desire
for U.S. engagement, that "the Embassy" maintain control of
the keys accessing the DCEI's "1208 equipment" while the two
governments negotiate a broad, overarching agreement on
defense cooperation. (NOTE: The 1208 equipment is currently
proposed to be turned over to the DCEI's formal control in
three phases over six months (as soon as the Chief of Defense
Forces signs the draft Letter of Agreement now before him;
until turned over, in fact, the equipment will indeed remain
under U.S. key -- controlled by the SOCFWD-PRY Headquarters
component commander, a member of the Country Team. END
NOTE.) Such an agreement, the Minister suggested, would
cover the entire range of engagements and cooperation between
the two militaries. He also stated that it is the Lugo
government's desire and intention to successfully conclude
negotiation of such a security cooperation agreement with the
USG no later than the end of December 2009.


9. (C) Lacognata stated he thought it neither in the U.S. nor
Paraguayan government's interest that there is any lack of
clarity on the extent and nature of the military cooperation.
Harking back to his days in Congress and the "delirium" over
supposed secret U.S. bases in Paraguay, Lacognata asserted
that clarity and transparency should guide the bilateral
engagement. The Minister noted, for example, that the absence
of "administrative and technical" status for the ODA team
presented risks to both governments should "crazies" seek to
make an issue of their presence or any incident. He and
Charge also discussed the somewhat confused/conflicting
constitutional requirements for congressional approval of the
presence of foreign military personnel in Paraguay.
Lacgonata stressed that if and when the agreement or
deployments or the like required congressional engagement,
notification or approval, he would personally lead the
Executive Branch,s lobbying of the Paraguayan Congress.


10. (C) Charge asked for clarification as to the continued
presence of the other Special Forces elements in-country: the
six-person Civil-Military Support Element and the 4-person
MIST team and the SOCFWD-PRY Headquarters team working out of


the Embassy (NOTE: All unarmed. END NOTE). Lacognata stated
that these personnel are welcome, indeed encouraged, to stay
on; just the ODA should wrap up before the end of September
even as the two governments begin work on a new overarching
security cooperation agreement.


11. (C) Charge suggested that, in pursuit of clarity and
transparency as well, that the MOD's letter be explicit in:
Recognizing the successful conclusion of DCEI stand-up and
training by the end of September; Requesting the continued
presence of the MIST and CMSE personnel; and, Stating the
Paraguayan government's desire to seek to conclude the
negotiation of an overarching bilateral agreement on security
cooperation by the end of December. Lacognata agreed, and
committed again to brief both the MOD and the President today
on the outcome of our meeting. Charge reminded the Foreign
Minister that the formal decree re-christening the DCEI with
a new name and making it directly responsive to the
Commanding General of the Military Forces remained unsigned
on the Defense Minister's desk. Asked if he perhaps wished
to advise us now of any of the possible conditions the
government might desire to put in place on future support for
the DCEI, the Foreign Minister declined, stating it was a
presidential prerogative, and not yet developed in any
detailed way.

COMMENT
=========

12. (C) COMMENT: As he concludes his second month in
office, Foreign Minister Lacognata continues to impress us
with his methodical, decisive approach to getting things done
) a marked contrast to his empty-suit predecessor. His
emphasis on obtaining clarity, transparency and a shared
roadmap for a way forward on military cooperation is music to
our ears. The devil, of course, will be in the details of
any future cooperation agreement to be negotiated. Charge
also used the opportunity of a latenight July 6 dinner to
brief the new President of the Congress (reformist/modernist
Miguel Carrisoza of Beloved Fatherland Party) on a range of
U.S. activities, including the DCEI and military cooperation
issues. Given Carrisoza's leadership and post's own constant
pulse-taking in Congress, we expect there to be widespread
Congressional support for an eventual military cooperation
ageeement, as well as some vocal (though not so numerous)
opposition. Post suspects that, in the end, the most intense
negotiations likely will be not with the Congress nor with
the USG -- but within President Lugo's own ruling coalition.
END COMMENT.
Fitzpatrick