ALMATY AND ASTANA FRAUD SUMMARY SEPTEMBER 2008 - FEBRUARY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000540

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC KZ
SUBJECT: ALMATY AND ASTANA FRAUD SUMMARY SEPTEMBER 2008 - FEBRUARY
2009

DEPT FOR CA/FPP, POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS

REF: A) 08 STATE 74840 B) 08 ASTANA 1698 C) 07 BISHKEK 823



1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet.


2. (U) The following sections correspond to questions in Ref A.

--------------
COUNTRY CONDITIONS
--------------


3. (U) Kazakhstan is a single consular district with two consular
offices, Embassy Astana and Embassy Branch Office (EBO) Almaty. The
Astana consular section processes only NIVs and is staffed by one
officer and two Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs). EBO Almaty
maintains a consular section with two American officers, one
Consular Assistant and five FSNs. The Branch Office processes
nonimmigrant visas (NIVs) for residents of Kazakhstan and handles
Kazakhstani, Kyrgyz and Tajik immigrant visas (IVs) and adoptions.
The American Citizen Services workload is shared by both sections.
The Chief of the two Consular Sections is in Almaty.


4. (SBU) Kazakhstan is a very low fraud country. A B1/B2 validation
study conducted by post in August 2008 (Ref. B) found a non-return
rate of 0.9% for Astana issuances and 1.6% for Almaty issuances. The
total non-return numbers were too low to draw any meaningful
conclusions as to NIV fraud trends.


5. (SBU) Since independence in 1991, the economic situation in most
of Kazakhstan has improved. In the larger cities, such as Almaty,
Astana, and Atyrau, the oil and gas industry has provided an
economic boom. However, the improvement in living conditions is
uneven and in many rural areas there are still pockets of extreme
poverty and economic hardship. The worldwide economic slowdown has
reached Kazakhstan, however there is no evidence to date that visa
fraud has increased as a result. The overall economic situation is
aggravated by corruption, which motivates much of the visa fraud
encountered at post. The most significant factor in both visa
issuance and fraud rates is the economic situation in the
applicant's home region.


6. (SBU) Most pleasure (B2) visa applicants desire to travel to
Brooklyn, NY or the suburban Seattle, WA area to visit relatives.
Manhattan and Las Vegas are also becoming popular tourist
destinations as incomes rise. Houston, TX is the number one
destination for business (B1) travelers thanks to strong energy
industry ties. Students also like Houston; the University of
Houston Downtown and the Houston community college system are by far
the most popular starting points for Kazakhstani students, though
many transfer to other institutions after a few semesters. F1
applicants for post-secondary study tend to be very well qualified,
however applicants hoping to study English as a Second Language are
less consistent. The number of Kazakhstani immigrants to the United
States is relatively low.


7. (SBU) Fraudulent documents, especially invitation letters,
employment letters and other bona fides are available and easy to
come by. However, it is unusual to see fraudulent official
Kazakhstani documents such as passports and birth certificates. On
the other hand, fraudulent official documents from neighboring
countries are a concern.

--------------
NIV FRAUD
--------------


8. (SBU) Most consular fraud in Kazakhstan relates to B1/B2 NIV
applications. Document packs featuring false job and invitation
letters make up the vast majority of these cases. To combat this
problem, post maintains a list of suspicious notaries to help us
spot less-than-legitimate invitation letters. Most of the falsified
employment letters are also easy to spot: they almost all feature a
laser or ink-jet printed company stamp (an almost mandatory feature
for an employment letter in the region) instead of the real thing.



9. (SBU) Standard document pack cases are relatively easy to
identify. However, post often sees a more refined version of the
document pack which includes interview coaching and even a
'legitimate' group leader. In this case, the leader is usually an
established small business owner with several previous visits to the
U.S. Using these credentials, the leader will apply with two or
three previously unseen applicants, claiming a joint purpose of
travel in line with the leader's previous trips.


10. (SBU) Careful interviewing has proven the best way to spot and
hinder this type of NIV fraud. The applicants in the above and
similar cases all have 'legitimate' supporting documents and have

ASTANA 00000540 002 OF 004


received coaching for the interview. Asking detailed professional
questions helps identify cases for further investigation.
Entry/exit data for previous applicants related to a suspected
facilitator establishes patterns. Since the application documents
are designed to pass a basic fraud check, local investigations are
time consuming and have involved visits to suspect businesses and
residential addresses. We believe, however, that aggressively
pursuing this type of fraud is the most effective deterrent.



11. (SBU) The Summer Work and Travel (SWT) J1 program continues to
grow in popularity, from about 200 participants in 2000 to over 4000
in 2008. While not directly influencing visa eligibility, fake job
offer letters are a problem for SWT participants. Students purchase
job offers from local brokers or through the Internet for $50 -
$200. Many of these jobs do not exist at all. Of the rest, most are
sold to dozens or hundreds more students than the employer is
expecting. To better protect program participants, post would
welcome changes to the SWT program to better monitor the legitimacy
of job offers. In particular, we would support a requirement that
all first-time SWT participants travel with confirmed job offers
obtained directly from their American sponsoring organization.


12. (SBU) Post does not see significant fraud trends in
employment-based, student, or religious NIVs. A 100% validation
study of the 60 visa referral program cases processed in 2008
confirmed that all referral beneficiaries returned to Kazakhstan on
time.

--------------
IV FRAUD
--------------


13. (SBU) EBO Almaty processes immigrant visas (IVs) for Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Approximately 60% of post's IV cases,
not including adoptions, are from Kyrgyzstan. The level of IV fraud
is low but there is concern about the legitimacy of Kyrgyz and, in
particular, Tajik civil documents. Most can be bought inexpensively
and the potential for identity fraud is high, as is the potential
for an applicant to mask potential 212(a) ineligibilities.

--------------
DV FRAUD
--------------


14. (SBU) Diversity Visa (DV) visa fraud is low, but the same
concerns as above apply to our DV applicants, the majority of whom
are also from Kyrgyzstan. The number-one reason for refusing DV
applications is the failure of an applicant to include a
pre-existing spouse or child in their initial entry. This appears
to be mainly due to DV entry facilitators in the region which either
do not know program rules or do not care, rather than any deceptive
or willful action on the applicant's part.

--------------
ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD
--------------


15. (SBU) ACS fraud is extremely low in Kazakhstan. To date, post
has not had a pattern of mala fide applicants trying to obtain U.S.
passports or other benefits from the consular section.

--------------
ADOPTION FRAUD
--------------


16. (SBU) Almaty processes over 400 adoptions per year. Most of
these cases are IR3 visa class adoptions from Kazakhstan, where
international adoption is a high-profile issue. Kazakhstan has a
working system of checks-and-balances between the three government
agencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education and
Ministry of Justice) that makes international adoption fraud or
wrongdoing difficult. Furthermore, the attention the Kazakhstani
adoption system receives from the local media and legislators helps
to limit possibilities for abuse of the system. We have not seen
any Kazakhstani adoption cases that we suspect are fraudulent.


17. (SBU) EBO Almaty continues to work closely with Embassy Bishkek
to monitor the adoption situation in Kyrgyzstan. While Kyrgyz
adoptions have been on hold since late 2008, Almaty anticipates a
resumption of adoption processing in the future, including many IR4
cases. We are concerned about the potential for fraud and weak
controls in the Kyrgyz adoption system expressed by Bishkek in Ref

C.

--------------
USE OF DNA TESTING
--------------


18. (SBU) Post has had one case involving DNA testing in the last

ASTANA 00000540 003 OF 004


six months; fraud was not confirmed in that case. There are no
special issues or concerns with using DNA testing in Kazakhstan.

--------------
ASYLUM AND DHS BENEFIT FRAUD
--------------


19. (SBU) Embassy Astana and EBO Almaty assist DHS Moscow, the
Department and the BCIS district offices in the United States with
verifying documents for refugee and asylum cases. In most
instances, these documents turn out to be fraudulent. Post has
processed no Visas 92/93 cases nor have any lost or stolen I-551s
been reported to us.

-------------- ---
ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME
AND TERRORIST TRAVEL
-------------- ---


20. (SBU) Kazakhstan's geographic location makes it a transit point
for alien and drug smuggling, particularly from South Asia to
Western Europe. Known 'black' border crossings permit travel into
and out of Kazakhstan without inspection. Falsified Kazakhstani
travel documents are a minor problem. Tajik, Kyrgyz and Uzbek
documents are of greater concern. Contacts at other Western
missions report fraud patterns and concerns similar to those
detailed in paragraphs 5 to 8. Post is not aware of any cases in
which a fraudulent U.S. visa has been used to assist an EU visa
application.

--------------
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS
--------------


21. (SBU) In the last six months, Astana and Almaty have not
referred any cases to Diplomatic Security for investigation.

--------------
HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS,
AND CIVIL REGISTRY
--------------


22. (SBU) The Kazakhstani Ministry of Justice processes passport
applications at regional offices throughout the country, issuing a
machine-readable laminate passport. Passport validity can be up to
twenty years, but all passports must be replaced on the bearer's
25th and 45th birthday regardless of when they were issued.
Kazakhstan issues a national ID card which can be used for travel
within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Post has not
encountered any known cases of falsified Kazakhstani travel or
identity documents. Kazakhstani media reports have alleged that
well-connected Kazakhstanis have obtained passports issued with a
false identity. Birth certificates and other lower-level civil
documents, particularly those issued outside of major cities, are
not secure. A determined and resourceful person could obtain a
government-issued Kazakhstani passport with a false identity using
these documents.

-------------- --
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
-------------- --


23. (SBU) Cooperation with the Kazakhstani government authorities is
mixed. There is a noted lack of cooperation or organization among
Kazakhstan's ministries and regional departments. Despite this,
post is usually able to receive immediate assistance with unofficial
verification of documents. If an official, written answer is
necessary it can take several months, however.


24. (SBU) Post has developed strong relationships with adoption
processing authorities, including the Ministry of Education -- the
government agency that oversees the processing of dossiers. When
addressing adoption-related concerns, cooperation is generally very
good.

--------------
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
--------------


25. (SBU) Post is paying close attention to the rapid growth of the
Summer Work and Travel Program (para. 9) and Kazakhstan's status as
a drug- and alien- smuggling thoroughfare (para. 18).

--------------
STAFFING AND TRAINING
--------------


26. (SBU) Almaty Vice Consul James Waterman serves as Fraud
Prevention Manager, supervised by Consular Section Chief Chris
Beard. FSN Rustam Ushurov is the Fraud Prevention Assistant.

ASTANA 00000540 004 OF 004


Christopher Beard attended the Fraud Prevention for Consular
Managers course at FSI in October 2005. Rustam Ushurov attended the
FSN Fraud Prevention course at FSI in November 2008 and James
Waterman will attend the FPM course at the soonest available
opportunity. Post hosted FPP's Eliana Holmes for onsite
consultations in October 2008.


MILAS