KAZAKHSTAN: PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000521

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, ISN/WMDT, AND ISN/ECC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER MARR MNUC KNNP CH KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING
EXERCISE HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT

REF: STATE 05431

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The State Department's Preventing Nuclear
Smuggling Program conducted a table-top nuclear smuggling
exercise in Astana February 24-25. Almost 20 Kazakshtani
officials from eight government agencies attended the event.
Kazakhstan is currently finalizing a national nuclear
smuggling response plan, and the participants thanked the
U.S. government for its assistance in enhancing Kazakhstan,s
capabilities. However, the Kazakhstanis admitted that many
of their agencies lack the resources to effectively handle
nuclear and radiological materials. Securing orphan sources
within Kazakhstan,s territory poses a particularly serious
challenge. Moreover, the Kazakhstani government is focused
on keeping nuclear and radiological materials from entering
Kazakhstan, rather than on domestic seizures and
investigations. The Committee for National Security (KNB)
rejected the U.S. model of simultaneous national and local
responses, and expressed little interest in expanding
cooperation in prosecution and nuclear forensics. Post
recommends engaging working-level contacts on the importance
of countering nuclear smuggling and pursuing short-term
training opportunities for an expanded spectrum of
recipients, to be followed next year by another table-top
exercise. END SUMMARY.

EXERCISE EXCEEDS EXPECTATIONS


2. (SBU) On February 24-25, the State Department's
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program conducted a table-top
nuclear smuggling exercise in Astana. Almost 20 Kazakhstani
officials from eight government agencies, including the
Committee for National Security (KNB),Ministry of Energy and
Mineral Resources (MEMR),Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee
(KAEC),Ministry of the Interior (MVD),Ministry of Emergency
Situations (MES),Kazakhstan Customs Control Committee
(KCCC),the Ministry of Health (MOH),and Committee of State
Sanitary and Epidemiological Control (SEC) attended. The
Kazakhstani participants actively described the roles,
responsibilities, and capabilities of their agencies.

IT TAKES THE UNITED STATES TO BRING KAZAKHSTANIS TOGETHER


3. (C) The atmosphere of the event was very positive and
constructive. The Kazakhstanis said they had taken steps to
strengthen their ability to prevent nuclear smuggling,
including cataloging Kazakhstani radioactive sources,
implementing IAEA guidelines, and establishing inter-agency
protocols for dealing with nuclear smuggling. Various
agencies expressed appreciation for U.S. training programs,
technical assistance, and equipment provided through EXBS,
DOE, and the joint DOD/FBI International
Counter-proliferation Program (ICP). KAEC,s representatives
were particularly active participants and said they hoped to
incorporate lessons from the exercise into their national
nuclear smuggling response plan, which KAEC intends to
present to the Kazakhstani government for review and approval
within the next several months. The senior KAEC
representative, Tleu Dairbekov, thanked the U.S. government
"for bringing us together )- as we could not have done this
ourselves."

KNB UNWILLING TO SHARE INFORMATION


4. (C) The KNB officials attending the workshop acknowledged
that some of their KNB colleagues had received training
through the ICP Program, but they had not participated
themselves. (COMMENT: The KNB officials attending the
exercise appeared to be relatively junior within their
organizations. END COMMENT.) Although the KNB
representatives sometimes appeared uncomfortable with the
frank comments of Kazakhstani representatives from other

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agencies, they intervened only when discussions turned to law
enforcement issues, asserting "we would take care of that."
The KNB representatives did not provide any information on
nuclear forensics techniques or information-sharing with
other governments. The most active KNB participant, Yerbol
Talapov, privately complained to PolOff that, "sometimes
other agencies resent us, but we do operate according to the
laws of Kazakhstan and the guidelines of our organization."

OTHER AGENCIES DISCUSS RESOURCE AND FUNDING CONSTRAINTS


5. (C) Some Kazakhstani participants expressed frustration
when describing the difficulties their organizations face in
dealing with radioactive and nuclear material, especially
orphan sources. Vyacheslav Klingenberg, a medical doctor and
Chief of the Radiological Laboratory for the Astana Center of
Sanitary-Epidemiological Examination, said he has worked for
30 years in radiation safety. He called his invitation to
the exercise "a fortunate accident," since he had never
participated in such an event before. Klingenberg gave a
short presentation using photos of nuclear and radiological
materials that his team had been called in to secure. He
said that although most local SEC officials have no
protective gear and no radiation pagers, they are often
called in to investigate canisters with nuclear symbols that
may contain hazardous substances. Klingenberg and MVD
representative Targyn Smagulov were particularly interested
in the radiation pagers that U.S. local police carry. The
MOH's Zaure Akhmetova, a medical doctor who previously worked
in the Karaganda region, said that Soviet orphan source
materials are frequently found throughout Kazakhstan,s
territory, but few agencies possess the funding and equipment
to dispose of them properly.


6. (C) Participants raised concerns about poor public
awareness and lack of nuclear and radiological specialists.
Klingenberg maintained that many people confuse the nuclear
symbol with the Mitsubishi logo. Several participants
explained that after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Kazakhstan tried to create special academic programs and
institutions to train nuclear scientists, but such efforts
failed. (COMMENT: PolOff has not met any nuclear
specialists under 30 years old, and all of PolOff's
interlocutors from MEMR, KAEC, the National Nuclear Center,
SEC and Kazatomprom were trained under the Soviet system.
The absence of a new generation of specialists is of
particular concern in a country in which Soviet-era orphan
sources of radiation are prevalent. END COMMENT.)

PRIORITY NUMBER ONE: PREVENT SMUGGLING INTO KAZAKHSTAN


7. (C) Some Kazakhstani participants alleged that China has
attempted to ship radioactive and nuclear waste to
Kazakhstan, and indicated that preventing such shipments is a
top priority for them. However, they expressed doubt that
Kazakhstan itself would be the target of a nuclear terrorist
incident. As KAEC's Tleu Dairbekov put it, "I am not aware
of any threats of nuclear terrorism directed against
Kazakhstan." The Kazakhstanis acknowledged, however, the
need for the country to be ready to counter nuclear terrorism
directed at foreigners in Kazakhstan, especially during such
events as the upcoming 2011 Asian Winter Games in Kazakhstan.
The Kazakhstanis said that if Customs uncovers an attempt to
smuggle nuclear materials into Kazakhstan, they would simply
send the shipment back, rather than taking steps to secure
the materials and investigate the incident. Representatives
of most of the Kazakhstani agencies said that they would be
criminally liable if they allowed nuclear or radiological
materials into Kazakhstan, and claimed they do not have
enough resources to secure and store such hazardous material.

KNB REJECTS U.S. MODEL OF EARLY NATIONAL INVOLVEMENT


8. (C) The KNB representatives told the U.S. participants

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that in all matters relating to the national security and law
enforcement aspects of nuclear smuggling, the KNB is the lead
agency, and their organization "prefers to handle all
incidents at the local level" by convening a regional
taskforce, nominally led by a deputy akim (governor).
Representatives from the KNB declined to comment on which
state agencies would participate in a taskforce and how
responsibilities would be divided. When KAEC's Dairbekov
asked detailed questions about how the U.S. handles national
and local coordination, the KNB cut off the discussion. The
KNB also refused to discuss when they would refer incidents
to central authorities or other agencies for help.


9. (C) Although we had invited the Procurator General's
Office to participate in the event, they did not send a
representative. Moreover, although the Kazakhstani
participants had specifically requested FBI participation and
directed a number of detailed questions towards FBI
specialists during the exercise, the Kazakhstani
representatives admitted they do not prosecute individuals
that they cannot explicitly link to smuggling. The driver of
a truck bringing nuclear or radioactive materials into
Kazakhstan, for example, would not necessarily be prosecuted;
the first target of investigation would be the shipping
company.


10. (C) COMMENT: Kazakhstan's overall national system for
preventing nuclear smuggling remains one of the most advanced
in the region. The Kazakhstani participants in the exercise
expressed hope that they would receive more training from
U.S. experts and have the U.S. conduct similar events in
Kazakhstan again in the future. Post strongly encourages
supporting these requests with a three part-strategy. First,
U.S. specialists should enhance engagement with their
Kazakhstani counterparts. Specific goals could include
expanding Kazakhstani participation in the International
Technical Working Group, promoting the ICP program, and
providing training opportunities for MOH, MES, MVD, and
Customs. Second, Post suggests conducting a second table-top
exercise in 2010 to test the Kazakhstan,s national nuclear
smuggling response plan -) which should have been approved
by then -- and strengthen the interagency relationships
created through the February 2009 exercise. Post also
recommends greater engagement with the Kazakhstani government
on the importance of preventing and investigating nuclear
smuggling.


11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: If a second table-top exercise
is successful, Kazakhstan could hold a third exercise with
real materials. Post also recommends diversifying the target
audiences of its programs, to include not only the KNB, the
Ministry of Defense, MVD, and Customs, but also a full range
of Kazakhstani partners, including MES, MOH, and KAEC. In
the long-run Kazakhstan itself may be willing to use the
expertise it acquires to provide much needed assistance to
other Central Asian states, which would also further promote
its image as a leader in non-proliferation. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND