KAZAKHSTAN: NATO REP FOR CENTRAL ASIA BRIEFS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000494

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR NATO OSCE RS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NATO REP FOR CENTRAL ASIA BRIEFS ON
HIS ASTANA VISIT

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: NATO Special Representative for the
Caucasus and Central Asia Robert Simmons told NATO
Ambassadors in Astana on March 18 that the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) Security Forum is administratively
on track for June 24-25 in Astana, even though Kazakhstani
officials made an effort to limit the agenda. He estimated
that Kazakhstan's commitment to its Individual Partnership
Action Plan with NATO is "way down," and suggested this might
be the fault of Minister of Defense Danial Akhmetov under
Russian influence. Simmons reported that Security Council
Chairman Kairbek Suleymenov said Kazakhstan will be prepared
to sign the NATO Transit Agreement at the EAPC in June, "now
that NATO has restored its relations with Russia." Following
Simmons' briefing, NATO Ambassadors discussed whether his
experience during this visit portends Kazakhstani attitudes
during its 2010 OSCE Chairmanship. Most agreed on the need
for early and sustained highest-level engagement with
President Nazarbayev in the run-up to the 2010 Chairmanship
to ensure he receives the West's unvarnished views without
any intermediation. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus and
Central Asia Robert Simmons briefed NATO Ambassadors in
Astana on March 18 on his two-day visit to Kazakhstan. He
said his agenda included introducing the new NATO Information
Officer for Central Asia, AmCit Evan Tracz (who might
eventually be based in Tashkent or Bishkek); preparing for
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Security Forum
in Astana on June 24-25; reviewing next steps for
Kazakhstan's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with
NATO; pressing for conclusion of the NATO Transit Agreement
with Kazakhstan; and assessing Kazakhstan's interest in
future NATO cooperation, especially in Afghanistan.

JUNE 24-25 EAPC IN ASTANA ON TRACK


3. (C) Simmons reported that the EAPC, planned to take place
in Astana June 24-25, is administratively on track and will
be held in the Palace of Independence. The NATO
Secretary-General will arrive on June 23 for bilateral
NATO-Kazakhstan meetings. Simmons said NATO had already
presented Kazakhstan the agenda for the EAPC that includes
discussions on Central Asia and Afghanistan, the situation in
the Caucasus, and energy infrastructure security. He said
Minister of Defense Danial Akhmetov and other senior
officials pressed to have the Caucasus and energy
infrastructure security removed from the agenda. Simmons
noted that NATO sets the agenda, not Kazakhstan. In the
ensuing discussion, Simmons and a few others conjectured that
Kazakhstan was carrying Russia's water on the agenda. Others
speculated that Kazakhstan might feel the need to tell Moscow
with a straight face that it had made a good-faith effort,
but in the end would not seriously oppose the proposed agenda.

INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP ACTION PLAN


4. (C) Simmons reported "with some disappointment" that
Kazakhstan's cooperation with NATO is "way down" since Danial
Akhmetov became Minister of Defense. Simmons acknowledged
that Deputy Minister of Defense General Bulat Sembinov had
recently visited both Kabul and Washington to discuss
enhanced Kazakhstani military cooperation with NATO and the
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, but
he questioned whether Akhmetov is "simply allowing Sembinov
to do this." The Ambassador suggested that the final arbiter
is President Nazarbayev, who appears to want to keep his
options open, and has allowed the unusual situation where the
Deputy Minister of Defense at least appears to operate
independently from the Minister of Defense. Simmons noted
that the Ministry of Defense has blocked him for two years
from meeting with General Sembinov, even though both
established a good working relationship before Akhmetov
became Minister of Defense. Simmons judged that the Ministry

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of Defense seems to have dropped interoperability with NATO
as a goal. (NOTE: We have not seen any concrete evidence of
this. END NOTE.)


5. (C) According to Simmons, Akhmetov characterized
Kazakhstani military officers travelling to NATO-sponsored
information and training events as "military tourists" and
reportedly said he "will not permit it." Simmons said that
all of this seems to him to be "the negative influence of
Russia." However, the Kazakhstani Peace-keeping Brigade
(KazBrig),designated for international peace-keeping
operations, seems to be moving forward. Simmons also
reported that the best cooperation between NATO and
Kazakhstan is on Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) with Minister
of Emergency Situations Sergey Bozhko. NATO will conduct a
CEP exercise in Kazakhstan in September.

NATO TRANSIT AGREEMENT


6. (C) Simmons said that Security Council Chairman Kairbek
Suleymenov told him, "Now that you (NATO) have restored your
relations with Russia, we can sign the NATO Transit Agreement
at the EAPC in June." Simmons said NATO had provided
Kazakhstan the draft text of the agreement in September 2008,
but until now had not had "the courtesy of a reply." Simmons
said that during this visit he had a meeting at the Ministry
of Transport, but found it less than useful because the
ministry focused only on technocratic details. (NOTE: When
we were negotiating the Northern Distribution Network for the
commercial transit of non-lethal supplies for U.S. troops in
Afghanistan, which we concluded successfully in January, we
found the same situation at the Ministry of Transport, which
is not a policy decision-making ministry. The real
decision-maker, giving his recommendation to President
Nazarbayev, is Security Council Chairman Suleymenov. END
NOTE.) Simmons said that NATO wants a clause in the NATO
Transit Agreement that will provide "interim entry into force
upon signature," because experience shows that formal
Kazakhstani ratification can take "months, if not years." He
clarified that the agreement allows for the transit of
non-lethal military supplies (including trucks, jeeps, etc.)
but not troops.


7. (C) Simmons said he was struck by Suleymenov's "oblique
warning" that NATO should not get too close to Uzbekistan or
Tajikistan "because 'recent events' have shown there could be
big changes coming in those countries." Simmons said that
Suleymenov neither explained the sources of this judgment nor
elaborated on it.

QUO VADIS?


8. (C) During the lively discussion that followed Simmons'
briefing, Italian Ambassador Bruno Pasquino commented, "It
seems your visits follow a pattern -- one is upbeat, the next
is downbeat. Is that an accurate observation?" Simmons
responded that the Russia factor plays a role. He recounted
a recent discussion in Brussels with the DCM of Russia's
Mission to NATO, who had asked him, "How can you meet with
our colonies without Russia at the table?" Pasquino noted
that Russian Ambassador in Astana Mikhail Borcharnikov seems
to have latched onto him for detailed NATO information,
having told him, "You must understand our intense interest in
every single move NATO makes in our region of interest."


9. (C) Several Ambassadors wondered if Simmons' mixed
experience during this visit portends what the West can
expect during Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE Chairmanship. One
asserted we can expect Kazakhstan "to shill for the Kremlin."
Others judged that Kazakhstan will be a tough but honest
broker between Russia and the West. Those who advocated this
latter view emphasized the importance of early and sustained
highest-level engagement with Nazarbayev in the coming months
to ensure that he receives the West's unvarnished views
without any intermediation.

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10. (C) COMMENT: We would observe that the current NATO
Contact Embassy in Astana is the United Kingdom, which is
small and, necessarily, has relatively limited opportunities
for sustained contacts at high levels in the Government of
Kazakhstan -- not the least because the UK Ambassador is also
accredited to Kyrgyzstan and is frequently on the road. We
would note that the previous NATO Information Officer left
Kazakhstan late in 2008; and so, NATO and Simmons might not
have been as extensively briefed on the complicated,
multi-layer current realities of Kazakhstan's multi-vector
foreign policy as would have been desired. Further, at least
at this point, NATO seems to be a more hair-on-fire issue for
Russia than the OSCE. In our judgment, until we have
real-world proof otherwise, Kazakhstan is likely to continue
to play a hard-nosed but, in the end, honest broker between
the West and Russia in international fora. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND