KAZAKHSTAN: "MOSCOW WANTS YOU TO FAIL IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000478

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL PROP MARR IR RS AF KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: "MOSCOW WANTS YOU TO FAIL IN
AFGHANISTAN"

REF: A. ASTANA 0426

B. ASTANA 0376

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: A Kazakhstani foreign-policy insider told
the Ambassador Moscow strongly objects to Kazakhstan playing
any kind of military role in Afghanistan, but at the same
time Astana is striving to balance its interests and find the
best way to be helpful in Afghanistan. He said Kazakhstan
has little real influence with Iran, but is encouraged the
United States seems committed to real dialog with Tehran. He
revealed Iran's President Ahmadinejad will visit Astana on
April 6. END SUMMARY.

"MOSCOW WANTS YOU TO FAIL IN AFGHANISTAN"


2. (C) At the March 16 reception in honor of the 10th
anniversary of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic's
accession to NATO, Foreign Ministry Director for Asia and
Africa Rustam Kurmanguzhin pulled aside the Ambassador for a
long conversation. He said that Foreign Minister Marat
Tazhin was currently in Moscow, both to consult with Russian
authorities about possible roles Kazakhstan would like to
play in Afghanistan and to urge Moscow to be constructive and
not react reflexively against the United States. He
emphasized that Tazhin was acting in Kazakhstan's best
interests and was playing favorites for no one. When the
Ambassador noted the coincidence of FM Tazhin in Moscow and
Deputy Minister of Defense General Bulat Sembinov in
Washington, Kurmanguzhin replied, "It's no coincidence.
There are very strong forces in Moscow that want you to fail
in Afghanistan, believing you will then lose interest in
Central Asia. President Nazarbayev sent Tazhin to Moscow to
keep all doors open."


3. (C) Kurmanguzhin suggested it might, in the end, be
impossible for Kazakhstan to send troops, even
non-combatants, to Afghanistan to support the International
Security Assistance Force (ref A),because of Moscow's
vehement objection that it has already made perfectly clear
to Astana, but there could be other opportunities for
Kazakhstan to play a helpful role. He suggested the United
States could, for example, offer to send relatively small
numbers of Afghans -- "less than hundreds, or else we will
lose track of them" -- to Kazakhstan for specialized joint
U.S.-Kazakhstani training. "Although the United States would
have to pay for it, we are certain we could do that without
'special permission.'"


4. (C) The Ambassador emphasized to Kurmanguzhin that the
United States has not yet finished its comprehensive policy
reviews, but we clearly see Kazakhstan as a responsible
international player in general, and an increasingly key
player in the region, including for Afghanistan (ref B). We
respect Kazakhstan's special relationships with its other
partners, but at the same time we expect Kazakhstan to act in
its own best national interests, to the fullest extent
possible. Kurmanguzhin responded, "Believe me, we will do
everything we can, but there are certain red lines from
Moscow we cannot cross, and it could well be that our troops
in Afghanistan is one of those red lines, although that is
not yet a final decision. The question is still open, even
if Moscow has made its views clear to us. Even so, 'the
struggle continues,' and we want to find every possible way
to be helpful."

AHMEDINEJAD TO VISIT ASTANA


5. (C) The Ambassador asked what Kazakhstan is thinking
about Iran in the region, specifically in relation to
Afghanistan. Kurmanguzhin replied he doubted Astana could
have much influence with Tehran. He said, "We try to talk
reason to them, but they toss their heads and ignore us." He
recounted that President Nazarbayev had spent several hours

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talking sense to the "highest authorities" in Tehran, but
came away feeling he had been "talking to a brick wall."
Kurmanguzhin revealed President Ahmadinejad will visit Astana
on April 6. He added, "We don't know the details about what
you are doing, but we are encouraged that Washington seems
serious about finding way to engage with Tehran. That is an
essential first step to bring Tehran back into the family of
responsible states. Russia can't do it because of its
compromised interests. Only the United States can. Simply
put, we probably can't do much; but, even so, we want to be
helpful."


"IT IS NOW BETTER NOT TO BE FRIENDS WITH WASHINGTON"


6. (U) CONTEXT: The Russian mass media, which dominate
Central Asia's information space, continue their campaign to
limit U.S. influence in Central Asia. On March 13, RIA
Novosti posted an article by Dmitry Kosyrev headlined, "Will
Obama Repeat Bush's Mistakes in Central Asia?" Although
attempting to be even-handed, Kosyrev perpetuates Moscow's
standard black propaganda: "...The Bush administration
sincerely believed that 'spreading democracy' to Afghanistan
would win the war, that this was the true objective and
method of waging the war. This turned potential allies into
enemies, because the Central Asian states think the U.S.
started the Afghan war to change the regional regimes into
local analogues of Georgia's Saakashvili and Ukraine's
Yushchenko, and that it began with Afghan President Hamid
Karzai. Iran, China and Russia think the war could be
Washington's attempt to reduce their influence in Central
Asia to zero.... (T)he U.S. engineered a 'color revolution'
in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 by financing a host of its NGOs
there.... Kyrgyzstan closed the (Manas) base because of the
disastrous U.S. policy in Central Asia, which created a
situation in which it is now better not to be friends with
Washington." (COMMENT: If this is what appears in public,
it would be interesting to know what Moscow says behind
closed doors to Central Asian officials like Foreign Minister
Tazhin. END COMMENT.)


7. (C) COMMENT: Kurmanguzhin said he was previously a
special assistant to former Deputy Foreign Minister (now
Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser) Khairat Sarybay, when
Sarybay was responsible in the MFA for Europe and the
Americas. He said that he and Sarybay were the two principal
drafters of Kazakhstan's "Path to Europe" policy, and added,
with evident pride, President Nazarbayev had just given him a
high award for the achievement. German Ambassador Reiner
Schlageter told the Ambassador Kurmanguzhin is a "pro-Western
intellectual voice in Kazakhstan's foreign-policy
establishment. He seldom emerges above the radar, but when
he does it's for a specific purpose." We do not know if
Kurmanguzhin acted independently or was told to communicate
to us Kazakhstan's difficult position vis-a-vis Russia. If
Kurmanguzhin's message was accurate, Astana wants to find
ways to be helpful in Afghanistan even while fending off
Moscow's alleged demands not to help the United States. END
COMMENT.
HOAGLAND