KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR RECOMMENDS "BE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000443

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, CA/OCS
FRANKFURT FOR REGIONAL CONSULAR OFFICER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2034
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CASC IR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR RECOMMENDS "BE
STATESMAN-LIKE" WITH NAZARBAYEV TO RESOLVE PEACE CORPS CASE

REF: A. ASTANA 0381

B. ASTANA 0373

C. ASTANA 0175

D. ASTANA 0135

E. ASTANA 0055

F. 08 ASTANA 2576

G. 08 ASTANA 2410 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Kairat
Sarybay called in the Ambassador on March 12 to discuss the
criminal case against Peace Corps volunteer Anthony Sharp.
He advised the Ambassador it is not "constructive" to
describe the case as a "political provocation." He said he
would arrange a meeting for the Ambassador with President
Nazarbayev to discuss it. He recommended the Ambassador
should admit to Nazarbayev that Sharp violated Kazakhstani
law and explain that Sharp's action were "unthinking." This
approach with the president should ensure a positive
resolution of the case, Sarybay said. We believe the
fall-out from the Sharp case represents a powerful battle at
the top of Kazakhstan's leadership between progressive and
regressive forces. Sarybay also asked about the prospects
for a visit by Secretary Clinton to Kazakhstan, and floated
the idea of proposed a meeting by a senior U.S. official with
a senior Iranian official during the Eurasia Media Forum in
Almaty in April, which we gently shot down. END SUMMARY.

"UNCONSTRUCTIVE" TO CALL CASE A "PROVOCATION"


2. (S) Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Kairat Sarybay
called in the Ambassador on March 12 to discuss the criminal
case against Peace Corps volunteer Anthony Sharp. Magzhen
Iliyasov, the seemingly pro-Western director of the
Presidential Administration's Foreign Policy Center and
President Nazarbayev's personal interpreter, also attended
the meeting but did not speak up. Sarybay told the
Ambassador, "You asked for my advice, so I'll be very honest.
We're dealing with a very specific issue with the Sharp
case, but it's growing. My feeling is that any further
allegations of a 'political provocation' would not be
constructive." Sarybay said that both sides should put the
matter behind them, and that the Ambassador should tell
President Nazarbayev he regrets that Sharp violated the law
but that he did it unthinkingly. "This would create a good
environment for us to move forward in accordance with your
discussions with Foreign Minister Tazhin," he argued. (NOTE:
"Your discussions with Foreign Minister Tazhin" means the
understanding the Embassy has had since January that Sharp
would go to trial, be convicted, have his sentence suspended,
and be deported -- an agreement that broke down on February
26 when Sharp was convicted and sentenced to two years in
prison. END NOTE.)


3. (S) The Ambassador explained our view of "provocation" had
come from the clear and concrete facts of the case -- a bag
containing explosives given to Sharp by someone else as he
was about to exit the premises of the mine, guards waiting to
arrest him when he departed the mine, and false witnesses at
his trial. The point in using this term was not to criticize
Kazakhstan, and certainly not to imply the President's
complicity, but to make fully clear how the U.S. media,
Congress, and some in the Administration would view the case
if it became public. We have so far successfully persuaded
Sharp and his family to keep the case out of the media and to
refrain from contacting Members of Congress so that the
Kazakhstani government can resolve this case in accordance
with its commitments to us. Sarybay responded that the
Kazakhstani side is also keeping it out of the press. (NOTE:
In fact, this is true. The court case is widely known in
Ridder, the site of the original incident, but, remarkably,
nothing has appeared in any media outlet in Kazakhstan or in
Russia. END NOTE.)

PROMISE TO ARRANGE MEETING WITH NAZARBAYEV

ASTANA 00000443 002 OF 003




4. (S) The Ambassador said that in a meeting with Nazarbayev
to discuss the Sharp case, he would praise Foreign Minister
Tazhin for his constructive efforts, explain that he insists
all Americans in Kazakhstan must obey local law, admit that
we have some differences about the facts of the case but
acknowledge that Sharp unthinkingly did wrong in trespassing
in a restricted area, and stress that we respect the
Kazakhstani court system and wish to move forward with
Kazakhstan in the new Obama administration. Sarybay
responded, "This wording is good; these statements would not
cause any difficulties for us. We'll arrange a meeting with
my boss" -- meaning Nazarbayev -- "sooner is better than
later." Sarybay said a meeting the following day (March 13)
might even be possible. If that did not work, it would be
after Nazarbayev's ten-day trip abroad which begins on March

14.


5. (S) Sarybay added, "(Kazakhstani Ambassador to the United
States Yerlan) Idrissov, whom Nazarbayev respects, tells me
we have great plans and opportunities in the bilateral
relationship. President Nazarbayev's January meeting with
CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus was a big success. Let's
keep the Sharp case low-profile. Just say you regret that
the incident occurred and are committed to moving forward
with an enhanced bilateral relationship. You'll receive a
good response from the boss. I'm sure this kind of
conversation with the boss will resolve this matter." The
Ambassador responded he would willingly follow through
because he could do so with a clear conscience. Sarybay
promised to inform FM Tazhin and Presidential Administration
head Aslan Musin about his conversation with the Ambassador.
He thanked the Ambassador for his understanding and
flexibility. To rib Sarybay, the Ambassador responded, "See,
I'm not such a bad guy." Sarybay responded, "No, not at all
a bad guy, but you are very firm and strong."

PROSPECTS FOR A VISIT BY SECRETARY CLINTON


6. (S) During the less intense part of the meeting, Sarybay
asked about the prospects for a visit by Secretary Clinton to
Kazakhstan. The Ambassador explained that she had just
responded to Tazhin's invitation to attend the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council's Security Forum in Kazakhstan in June,
promising that the United States would be represented there.
He said it is too early to know about the Secretary's travel
schedule in coming months, but believes she would welcome the
opportunity to visit Kazakhstan.

"COULD WE PLAY A ROLE WITH IRAN?"


7. (S) Sarybay said that a journalist recently had suggested
to him using the Eurasia Media Forum in Almaty in April to
arrange a meeting between "a senior U.S. official, perhaps
Special Representative Holbrooke, and a senior Iranian
official. They could 'unexpectedly' meet in Almaty," Sarybay
explained. The Ambassador replied that when Tazhin travels
to Washington in May, he might want to raise Kazakhstan's
willingness to be helpful with Iran. The Ambassador took
pains to make clear that any early U.S. diplomacy with Iran,
should it occur, would likely be in very quiet channels.
While an "accidental meeting in Almaty at an international
event" would not be very realistic, the Ambassador recalled
that Henry Kissinger had sealed Nixon's opening to China at
secret meetings in Tashkent.


8. (S) COMMENT: From the beginning, we have double-tracked
the Sharp case with the Foreign Ministry and with several
Presidential advisers, most importantly (and quietly
back-channel) with State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev (former
Ambassador to the United States and long-standing Nazarbayev
confidante),through Saudabayev's Chief of Staff, Roman
Vassilenko. We know that for the "agreement" -- Sharp's
conviction, suspended sentence, and deportation -- Foreign
Minister Tazhin has gone far, far out on a limb for us to do
battle with the KNB, which he himself once briefly headed.

ASTANA 00000443 003 OF 003


However, the current KNB chief is President Nazarbayev's
former personal bodyguard, whom he is said to trust
implicitly. The current fire-storm over the word
"provocation" started only after the Ambassador met with
Presidential Chief of Staff Aslan Musin on March 3, at the
Saudabayev camp's urging. To read him into the issue, and to
ensure clarity, we provided him our two non-papers on the
Sharp case that had had strictly limited circulation in the
Foreign Ministry and at the Presidency. However, with Musin,
this was probably the first time we had gotten directly to
the President himself, whom, we speculate, probably went
ballistic, with the KNB egging him on, over the word
"provocation." But Nazarbayev is most certainly no dummy,
and he probably keyed in immediately to the fact, which we
clearly stated in the first non-paper, that we believe this
case has the potential to derail an enhanced U.S.-Kazakhstan
relationship in the early days of the Obama Administration.
If this case concludes as we desire, and as we have fought
for -- and we remain cautiously optimistic that it will --
then we have further evidence that President Nazarbayev
himself is fully committed to an enhanced relationship with
the United States. END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND