Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA373
2009-03-02 10:41:00
SECRET
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER SENTENCED TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL CASC KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHROV
DE RUEHTA #0373/01 0611041
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021041Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4781
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 1283
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0666
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1369
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 0844
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0760
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000373 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, CA/OCS
FRANKFURT FOR REGIONAL CONSULAR OFFICER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2034
TAGS: PGOV PREL CASC KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER SENTENCED TO
PRISON, BUT FM TAZHIN PROMISES SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION

REF: A. ASTANA 0175

B. ASTANA 0135

C. ASTANA 0055

D. 08 ASTANA 2576

E. 08 ASTANA 2410 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b),(d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000373

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, CA/OCS
FRANKFURT FOR REGIONAL CONSULAR OFFICER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2034
TAGS: PGOV PREL CASC KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER SENTENCED TO
PRISON, BUT FM TAZHIN PROMISES SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION

REF: A. ASTANA 0175

B. ASTANA 0135

C. ASTANA 0055

D. 08 ASTANA 2576

E. 08 ASTANA 2410 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Following the conclusion of his criminal
trial in Ridder on February 26, Peace Corps Volunteer Anthony
Sharp was sentenced to two years in prison on explosives
charges -- and taken away in handcuffs straight to jail. The
Ambassador immediately raised this development with senior
Kazakhstani officials, including Foreign Minister Tazhin,
explaining that Sharp's imprisonment violated the Kazakhstani
government's commitment to us that Sharp would be given a
suspended sentence and deported. On February 27, Tazhin
promised the Ambassador that through the judicial appeals
process, Kazakhstan would follow through on its original
commitment within 30 days, so long as we are able to keep the
case out of the media. Based on a written request from the
Ambassador, a Ridder judge ordered Sharp released from jail
on February 27, but denied our request that he be allowed to
leave Ridder and travel to Astana. Tazhin made clear to the
Ambassador on March 2 that he had had to push back very hard
against the Committee for National Security (KNB). He also
said the Ambassador should immediately request a meeting with
President Nazarbayev to apologize for the incident and
express our gratitude that Kazakhstan is resolving it. The
Ambassador has been in touch Sharp and with both of his
parents. They agreed to keep the case out of the press.
Sharp's lawyers are planning to file a formal appeal no later
than March 13. END SUMMARY.

SHARP SENTENCED TO PRISON TERM, TAKEN TO JAIL


2. (C) The trial of Peace Corp Volunteer Anthony Sharp
resumed in Ridder February 26. A Consular Officer and the
Peace Corps Country Director were both present. The
proceedings were completed that day, and the judge handed
down his verdict, sentencing Sharp to two years in prison on
explosives charges. He was taken away in handcuffs for
prison in-processing.


AMBASSADOR RAISES CASE WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS


3. (C) The Consular Officer immediately notified the DCM, who
in turn informed the Ambassador about the verdict. At that
time, the Ambassador was meeting in his office with
Presidential Advisor Yermukhamet Yertysbayev. The Ambassador
explained the situation to Yertsybayev, who offered to bring
it to the attention of other officials in the Presidential
Administration. Following the meeting, we drafted a
non-paper, translated it into Russian, and sent it to
Yertysbayev. The non-paper explained that (1) we consider
the case against Sharp to be a political provocation; (2) the
verdict violated our understanding with the Kazakhstani
government that Sharp would be given a suspended sentence and
deported; (3) we would try to keep the verdict out of the
U.S. media, but once it hit the press, the news would cause
serious damage to the bilateral relationship; and (4) we
expected the Kazakhstani government to take immediate steps
to rectify the situation and deport Sharp. Just before we
e-mailed Yertysbayev the non-paper, he called us to tell us
that he had spoken with Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor
Kairat Sarybay, who assured him that Sharp was not being sent
to prison, but rather was being deported. This turned out to
be incorrect, since Sharp was, in fact, taken to prison.


4. (C) The DCM phoned Talgat Kaliyev, who until recently was
head of the MFA Americas Department, and who had been tasked
by Sarybay to handle the Sharp case. Kaliyev had reassured
us repeatedly over the past several weeks that everything was
fine, and that Sharp would be given a suspended sentence and
deported. Kaliyev was surprised to learn of the verdict.
When we spoke with him several hours later, he claimed he had
"everyone together" in his office, and was working on the

ASTANA 00000373 002 OF 003


issue; however, he was not able to immediately offer an
explanation regarding what happened or how the situation
would be fixed.


5. (C) At the same time, the Ambassador tried to call
Sarybay, whose staff said he was unavailable to take the
Ambassador's call. The Ambassador then called State
Secretary Saudabayev's Chief of Staff, Roman Vassilenko (with
whom we have been in touch about the case since the end of
December),relayed the key points from the non-paper, and
asked him to inform Saudabayev. Vassilenko promised to speak
with Saudabayev as soon as Saudabayev was available.
Vassilenko also urged the Ambassador to get in touch with
Foreign Minister Tazhin immediately.


6. (C) The Ambassador subsequently managed to reach Tazhin,
who was suffering from a bad cold, and relayed to him all the
details. He asked Tazhin to call Sarybay immediately, which
Tazhin agreed to do. Tazhin also promised to "gather the
right people" the following morning and get back to the
Ambassador.

TAZHIN PROMISES EVERYTHING WILL BE FIXED


7. (C) Tazhin kept to his word, and called in the Ambassador
early afternoon February 27. He told the Ambassador that
Sharp would be released from prison as early as that day. He
promised the government would follow through on its original
commitment -- that Sharp receive a suspended sentence and be
deported -- within 30 days, so long as we keep the case out
the media. He explained that everything would be fixed
through the judicial appeals process, and assured the
Ambassador that the Supreme Court was already on board.


8. (S) During a one-on-one conversation, Tazhin explained to
the Ambassador that the hardest thing he had had to do in his
intergovernmental meeting earlier that day was to push back
against with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and "other
bodies" -- meaning the Committee for National Security (KNB)
-- not on the explosives charges against Sharp, but rather
regarding the fact that during a search of Sharp's apartment
after his initial detention, the authorities had found a "top
secret map, proving that Sharp is an American spy." The
Ambassador told Tazhin, simply for his own information, that
the map was a Soviet map from the 1960s that Sharp had bought
in the bazaar as a souvenir. In a follow-on conversation,
Talgat Kaliyev told us the lesson he had learned was "you
can't trust those guys (i.e., KNB) to keep their word." The
Ambassador subsequently contacted Roman Vassilenko, who
assured him that State Secretary Saudabayev had been involved
with the case the previous evening and had briefed President
Nazarabayev. (NOTE: We strongly suspect it was Nazarbayev
himself who reined in the KNB enough to allow Sharp to be
released from prison. END NOTE.)

SHARP RELEASED FROM JAIL, BUT CONFINED TO RIDDER


9. (C) Talgat Kaliyev then worked with us to get Sharp out of
jail, which, according to Kaliyev, included his phoning
Ridder City Court Chairman Bulat Zagiyev. Per Kaliyev's
instructions, the Ambassador wrote a letter to Zagiyev
requesting that Sharp be released into post's custody, and be
allowed to travel to Astana for a medical evaluation. We
faxed the letter to Ridder. Several hours later, a court
hearing was held to review our request, with Sharp's lawyers
and the prosecutors in attendance. The court ordered Sharp
released from jail, but denied the request to allow him to
travel in Astana, and instead insisted that he move back into
his former apartment in Ridder. (NOTE: Because Sharp's
landlord is not allowing him to return to the apartment,
Sharp's lawyers have filed a motion with the court requesting
that he be allowed to stay in the Ridder hotel where he has
been residing for the past several weeks. On March 2,
Sharp's lawyers appealed the denial of the request to allow
him to travel to Astana. Talgat Kaliyev indicated to us that
we should not press this latter issue too hard. END NOTE.)


ASTANA 00000373 003 OF 003


SHARP FAMILY AGREES CASE SHOULD STAY OUT OF MEDIA


10. (C) The Ambassador was in contact with Sharp and both of
his parents during February 28 and March 1. He assured them
that though he could not provide all the sensitive details,
the government had promised to satisfactorily resolve Sharp's
case within a month. Sharp and his parents agreed with the
necessity of keeping the case out of the media.

TAZHIN RECOMMENDS NAZARBAYEV MEETING


11. (S) Foreign Minister Tazhin called in the Ambassador
again on March 2, and reaffirmed that everything remained on
track in resolving the Sharp case. He also emphasized
several times how "difficult and irritating" his February 27
intra-governmental meeting had been, and recommended the
Ambassador request a meeting with President Nazarbayev to
discucss the issue. Tazhin explained, "I have my views based
on broader foreign relations and the bilateral relationship,
but 'others' have other views" -- thus making it clear that
Nazarbayev would be the ultimate arbiter. He did not try
very hard to hide whom he meant by "others," because he said
he understands "them" since he headed "that committee" --
meaning that KNB -- for a time. He also implied the KNB is
pushing back because of "the April incident last year."
(NOTE: "The April incident" was an ugly provocation against
an Embassy AmCit. END NOTE.) Tazhin recommended the
Ambassador approach's with Nazarbayev should be that we are
deeply sorry and sincerely apologize, and are grateful
Kazakhstan is finding a way to solve this problem -- since
the "situation gives a bad impression" and we understand that
it is in President Nazarbayev's hands to decide.

LAWYERS PLOT APPEAL


12. (SBU) The February 26 verdict has not yet been formally
handed down; that formal verdict is expected on March 4.
(NOTE: This delay of several days is standard practice for
Kazakhstan. END NOTE.) Sharp's lawyers are working the
appeal, which they will have to file by March 13. They
expect an appellate hearing to take place in the
Ust-Kamenogorsk oblast court approximately two weeks after
the filing. Appellate hearings in Kazakhstan typically
require just one court session.


13. (S) COMMENT: It appears to us that the KNB is pressing
back hard, painting Sharp as "one more American spy" they've
caught. On our side, it seems, are Tazhin, Saudabayev, and
Sarybay. If Nazarbayev agrees to a meeting, the Ambassador
will ask him to honor the agreement we have made that will
get Sharp out of the country. The Ambassador is scheduled to
meet with Presidential Administration head Aslan Musin to
discuss the case on March 3. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND