KAZAKHSTAN SUGGESTS MULTILATERAL APPROACH ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000253

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AF KG KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN SUGGESTS MULTILATERAL APPROACH ON
MANAS, URGES BETTER U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS

REF: A. BISHKEK 0123

B. PARIS 0213

C. ASTANA 0095

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador called on Presidential
Foreign Policy Adviser Khairat Sarybay February 11 to seek
Kazakhstan's views on Kyrgyzstan's announced decision to
close Manas Air Base and Russia's intentions in Central Asia
and Afghanistan. Noting that Russia is Kazakhstan's
strategic ally and closest partner, Sarybay was generally
restrained in his responses. He suggested the United States
-- and its coalition partners -- might consider offering a
financial package to Kyrgyzstan to retain Manas. He
encouraged the United States to work to repair its
relationship with Russia, implying that on this issue
President Medvedev might be more flexible than Prime Minister
Putin. To help Kazakhstan maintain its foreign policy
balance, Sarybay urged early visits by Secretary Clinton and
President Obama. END SUMMARY.

KYRGYZSTAN'S DECISION TO CLOSE MANAS


2. (C) When asked for Kazakhstan's views and analysis of
President Bakiyev's decision to close Manas Air Base, Sarybay
initially responded it was Bakiyev's own decision, and
Kazakhstan respects the decisions of sovereign and
independent countries. He added it probably was not an easy
decision for Bakiyev, and the Kyrgyz "must understand the
difficult situation in Afghanistan and the need for the
international coalition to try to stabilize it." Then
Sarybay became more frank: "(Bakiyev) was promised a huge
amount of money. We know the situation in Kyrgyzstan is
dire, and in the end he 'accepted the proposal.'" Sarybay
elaborated on the situation in Kyrgyzstan: no jobs, labor
migrants returning in droves, no sources of credit, energy
sector collapsing. Sarybay hastened to add he has no proof
Russia conditioned its promised assistance to Bakiyev, but
said, in his personal view, it had to have been a quid pro
quo.


3. (C) Sarybay then added, "I'm not sure this (base closure)
is a final decision. It depends on a lot a factors." When
invited to elaborate the factors, Sarybay declined and
returned to his original formulation about the need to
respect the sovereignty and independence of Kyrgyzstan. Then
he wavered again and said, "If the United States and other
coalition partners could offer a strong financial package, it
might help" (see reftels A and B).

RUSSIA, CENTRAL ASIA, AFGHANISTAN


4. (C) Initially, Sarybay was not fully comfortable
responding to a question about Russia's policies and plans in
Central Asia and Afghanistan. He reaffirmed Kazakhstan's
special relationship with Russia, including strong political
and commercial relations. The Ambassador reiterated the
United States understands and respects this relationship,
asking only that Kazakhstan maintain its balance with other
important relationships. Sarybay replied, "That certainly is
our fundamental goal. You can help by pushing for early
visits by President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton,
because the image of a relationship is paramount in this
region. You can undo years of perceived neglect and
disinterest with one 24-hour visit. That should not be too
much to ask."


5. (C) Sarybay noted President Nazarbayev has "warm
relations" with both President Medvedev and Prime Minister
Putin. He suggested Russia's relations with Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, and "even Turkmenistan" are balanced, whereas
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are more subject to heavy pressure
from Moscow because of their poverty.


ASTANA 00000253 002 OF 002



6. (C) Broadening the conversation, Sarybay asked the
Ambassador to note the debate in the Russian press about
whether or not Moscow has the resources and authority to play
the role of "Big Brother." Becoming more candid, Sarybay
said, "Putin will not change," whereas Medvedev told
Nazarbayev he is ready to work with the United States -- if
the United States takes the first step. Sarybay said
Nazarbayev sees this as a "golden chance" -- but reiterated
the United States has to take the first step. Sarybay said
he thought the statements by all, including German Chancellor
Merkel, at the Munich security conference were "balanced and
useful," noting that Kazakhstan generally welcomed Vice
President Biden's comments.


7. (C) When asked for his views on Russia's interests in
Afghanistan, Sarybay smiled, "You'd better ask (Kremlin
Foreign Policy Adviser) Prihodko." Then he added, "They have
to be interested in the stability and security that would
come from defeating extremism, and anti-narcotics, at the
very least."

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES


8. (C) Sarybay urged the United States to listen to Russia
closely and take its views seriously (see reftel C, President
Nazarbayev's similar advice to CENTCOM CDR General Petraeus).
He confided that during Nazarbayev's most recent trip to
Moscow for the Collective Security Treaty Organization
Summit, Medvedev had told Nazarbayev, "I'm a representative
of the new generation. I wasn't poisoned by the past history
of anti-Americanism during the Cold War. I was really ready
to work with Washington, but I was crossed by the Missile
Defense and NATO issues." (COMMENT: Although Sarybay once
again declined to elbaorate, it would appear that Medvedev
could have meant he was crossed by hard-liners' views on
these issues, since neither issue simply popped up after
Medvedev's election. END COMMENT.)


9. (C) The Ambassador asked if Sarybay thought Putin would
allow a better relationship for Russia with the United
States. He responded, "Probably only on his own terms." He
expanded, "However, I personally find it interesting that
even in the Kremlin no one's sure 'who's Putin and who's
Medvedev,'" i.e., who's really in charge. Sarybay added,
"And some think Putin now regrets his decision to leave the
Kremlin."

KAZAKHSTAN AND THE UNITED STATES


10. (C) When asked if he had any bilateral issues to raise,
Sarybay took time to go through his file of tabbed issue
papers. He closed it and said, "Nope, we're on an even keel.
Only once again I ask that you urge early Obama and Clinton
visits."


11. (C) COMMENT: If Washington eventually decides to offer
to negotiate with Bishkek about Manas, we find intriguing the
suggestion that any offer should be multilateral from the
United States and its coalition partners (see reftel). This
kind of multilateral approach might possibly not be rejected
out of hand -- or at least might stimulate debate in Moscow.
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND