Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA250
2009-02-12 01:06:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: POLITICAL ANALYST SEES INTRA-ELITE WARFARE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM ECON EFIN SOCI KDEM KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHTA #0250/01 0430106
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 120106Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000250 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB, DRL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON EFIN SOCI KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: POLITICAL ANALYST SEES INTRA-ELITE WARFARE
BEHIND BTA TAKE-OVER

REF: (A) ASTANA 0204
(B) ASTANA 0068
(C) 08 ASTANA 2398
(D) 08 ASTANA 2471

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000250

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EEB, DRL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON EFIN SOCI KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: POLITICAL ANALYST SEES INTRA-ELITE WARFARE
BEHIND BTA TAKE-OVER

REF: (A) ASTANA 0204
(B) ASTANA 0068
(C) 08 ASTANA 2398
(D) 08 ASTANA 2471


1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet.


2. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a February 5 meeting with the Ambassador in
Almaty, Kazakhstani political analyst Dosym Satpayev said that the
recent state take-over of two leading banks is part of a larger
trend of increased government control over strategic sectors of the
economy. The financial industry, the mass media sector, and the
hydrocarbon and mining industries, are increasingly under the direct
control of the state-owned Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund, what
he termed a "controlling structure." Satpayev sees similar
"controlling structures" in the political and social spheres. The
ousting of BTA bank Chairman Mukhtar Ablyazov was "inevitable," due
in part to the bank's vulnerability, but also because of an
intra-elite struggle over property and resources within President
Nazarbayev's inner circle. Satpayev sees Kazakhstan's political
opposition as "weak," although he believes the grass-roots social
movements emerging in the fall-out of the economic crisis have
potential as an opposition force. However, the real political
counterweight to the government, according to Satpayev, lies within
the "shadow opposition": political and business interests that are
vocally loyal to the government, but are "getting ready for the
post-Nazarbayev world." To assure a smooth transition, Nazarbayev
must clearly identify a successor; the alternative would bring on
vicious fighting within his inner circle, Satpayev believes. In his
view, the system of inter-dependence and interest politics around
the President has evolved to be quite complex, and at times
Nazarbayev has lost control over his system. Structures like
Samruk-Kazyna, in Satpayev's view, are the President's way of making
sure the system does not crack. END SUMMARY.

GOVERNMENT TIGHTENS CONTROL OF ECONOMY


3. (SBU) On February 5, the Ambassador met with Dosym Satpayev, a
well-known independent analyst whose articles frequently appear in

the Kazakhstani press. In his publications, Satpayev seldom
criticizes President Nazarbayev directly, offering instead centrist
assessments of Kazakhstan's political and economic situation.
Formerly associated with the Soros Foundation, he chairs his own
think-tank, the "Risk Assessment Group," which provides consulting
services on the political and investment climate in Kazakhstan and
Central Asia.


4. (SBU) Satpayev told the Ambassador that the recent take-over of
the country's two largest banks by the state-owned Samruk-Kazyna
National Welfare Fund (ref A) is part of a larger trend of increased
government control over strategic sectors of economy. In his view,
this campaign began in the early 2000s, when the government mandated
greater participation for state-owned KazMunaiGaz (KMG) in the oil
and gas sector. The mining industry was next, as evidenced by the
merger of several major mining companies and the plan to form a new
national mining company, Tau-Ken Samruk (ref B). The financial
sector was the natural next target, said Satpayev. He explained
that his Risk Assessment Group did a study of this trend in 2007 and
"warned" the banks of impeding government encroachment. Thus, three
major economic sectors are now under the direct control of one
government-owned "controlling structure," Samruk-Kazyna.

POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY NOT FAR BEHIND


5. (SBU) Satpayev maintained that the "trend of increasing state
control is not limited to the economy" and that similar "controlling
structures" can be seen in the political and social spheres. Media
giants ArnaMedia and NurMedia control a large share of the media
market and are funded directly by Samruk-Kazyna. The political
sphere is dominated by one party -- the President's Nur Otan party.
In the sphere of civil society, the government is pursuing what
Satpayev referred to as "a cunning strategy" of supporting the Civil

ASTANA 00000250 002 OF 003


Alliance, a confederation of pro-government NGOs, and leaving
"independent" NGOs wholly reliant on Western funds, a policy which
he believes has led to a marked decrease in "independents."
Satpayev sees a similar trend in the religious sphere -- the draft
law on religion aims to strengthen the influence of "traditional"
faiths like Islam and Orthodox Christianity, whose leaders are
generally pro-government, at the expense of smaller
"non-traditional" groups. In Satpayev's view, the overall goal is
to create "nomenclatura capitalism" -- a market economy with a
tightly-controlled political space, "something like Singapore."
"Except Singapore does not have our level of corruption," he
quipped.

IN INTER-ELITE STRUGGLE, BTA'S ABLYAZOV IS THE LOSER


6. (SBU) In Satpayev's view, the ousting of Mukhtar Ablyazov as
chairman of BTA bank should not have been a surprise -- "it would
have happened to any trend-setting bank eventually; the economic
crisis just speeded up the process." Another factor at play,
however, was the "personal dislike" between Ablyazov on the one
hand, and the Samruk-Kazyna Chairman Kairat Kelimbetov and Prime
Minister Karim Masimov on the other. According to Satpayev,
Ablyazov's conflict with Kelimbetov dates back to 2001, when
Kelimbetov first wanted to increase government control of the
financial sector. (NOTE: Satpayev told us this conflict was the
reason behind the Risk Assessment Group's 2007 report; leading
bankers commissioned the Group to analyze different ways to resolve
the conflict and how the society would react to each. END NOTE.)
Masimov did not get involved in the conflict until mid-2008, when
the global economic crisis fully hit the financial system and
"bankers got blamed for all the problems." When it became apparent
that foreign credit was not forthcoming, the leading banks asked for
an inflow of cash from the government, in exchange for a 25 percent
government stake and an agreement to submit to audits. BTA's audit
showed that its assets were "scattered across the CIS countries,"
with heavy investments in "politically unstable" countries like
Georgia and Ukraine. The government agreed to prop up the
vulnerable institution, said Satpayev, "on the condition that the
current management was removed." (NOTE: On the same day, an AmCit
senior official told the Ambassador BTA was doomed to take-over
because it had much too much debt to Western banks and because of
the unacceptably high percentage of bad debts in its portfolio. END
NOTE.)


7. (SBU) Satpayev believes that Ablyazov was also the losing party
to an intra-elite conflict over property and the control of
resources. Ablyazov's erstwhile "protector" in the Presidential
Administration was its management chief, Bulat Utemuratov, a
political insider and billionaire who left his post on December 15.
With Ablyazov's "cover" removed, Kelimbetov and Masimov were free to
use the moment of the financial crisis to gain control over his
bank. "It was a political conflict," said Satpayev, "but not one
based on ideology. This was a fight over property."

POLITICAL OPPOSITION "WEAK"


8. (SBU) Asked for his assessment of the opposition parties,
Satpayev said that Kazakhstan "is plagued by a weak political
opposition" whose primary occupation is "shadow playing among its
leaders." The continuous internal struggles within this "outside
opposition" suit the government -- "divide and conquer," as he put
it. The opposition parties increasingly blame the West for their
failure to gain a foothold on power and accuse it of "selling
democracy for oil" (ref C). In the meantime, the economic crisis
has created a "perfect moment" for new political leaders to emerge,
Satpayev argued. Several grass-roots movements that emerged in the
fall-out of the crisis are successfully engaging with the government
on their issues (ref. D); so far they are concentrated on
socio-economic questions, but, in Satpayev's view, political
engagement may not be far behind.

THE "SHADOW OPPOSITION"

ASTANA 00000250 003 OF 003




9. (SBU) In Satpayev's view, the real political counterweight to
the government lies within the "shadow opposition": political and
business interests that are vocally loyal to the government, but are
"getting ready for the post-Nazarbayev world." Satpayev named three
pressure groups he sees vying for influence with President
Nazarbayev. The first is what he termed "the old guard" -- people
within Nazarbayev's political circle who are "averse to publicity."
One old-guard clan revolves around Prime Minister Masimov,
Kelimbetov, and Timur Kulibayev, the President's son-in-law. The
latter two are at the top of Samruk-Kazyna. A second clan includes
Utemuratov and Almaty Akim (Mayor) Akhmetzhan Yesimov. A third
consists of Astana Akim Imangali Tasmagambetov and people in his
circle. These old-guard clans align together on particular issues
-- marriages of convenience -- but for the most part, they are in
"continuous conflict" for influence with the President. A second
pressure group, according to Satpayev, consists of the business
interests -- economic giants who have "extremely close ties" to
politicians. The third pressure group, one whose influence is on
the wane, is the circle around Dariga Nazarbayeva, the President's
oldest daughter and the former wife of Rakhat Aliyev. In Satpayev's
assessment, Nazarbayeva had all the makings of becoming a political
force -- a media conglomerate, her own party, and a powerful husband
-- but Aliyev's play for power "wrecked her plans." Satpayev
speculated that Nazarbayev gave his daughter two conditions:
"divorce Aliyev and stay out of politics," and she has complied with
both.

KAZAKHSTAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE -- "I AM A REALIST"


10. (SBU) Satpayev believes that if Nazarbayev dies unexpectedly
without leaving a clear successor, it would be "devastating" for
Kazakhstan. What would follow would be a vicious fight among
interest groups for control of property and power. This struggle
would be among those with "financial power," with the traditional
security forces falling behind "people with money." In contrast to
Russia, explained Satpayev, the Committee for National Security
(KNB) is not a strong force onto itself, but rather a tool for the
elite. "I am a realist," Satpayev said; "Kazakhstan is, and will
remain, an authoritarian regime." Nazarbayev picking a successor is
"the smoothest way forward," he stressed.

"NEW TOOLS" OF CONSERVATION


11. (SBU) Satpayev believes that, to a certain extent, Nazarbayev
is now hostage to the system he has created. Numerous interest
groups are dependent on him, and he in turn is dependent on them.
This system of inter-dependence has become quite complex, and there
have been times, in Satpayev's view, when Nazarbayev lost control.
He pointed to the 2001 break-away of political insiders to form the
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan party (which later split into
various opposition parties),and to the case of Rakhat Aliyev as
evidence of cracks in the system. In Satpayev's estimation,
"controlling structures" like Samruk-Kazyna were created
specifically to prevent further cracks from appearing. "This is not
evolution," underlined Satpayev, "this is conservation with new
tools."

HOAGLAND