Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA2273
2009-12-31 07:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN STRONGLY DENIES REPORT OF POTENTIAL URANIUM TRANSER TO IRAN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PARM MNUC KNNP IR JA KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #2273/01 3650744
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 310744Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7141
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0549
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1617
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0244
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2379
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0098
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2662
S E C R E T ASTANA 002273 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2029
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IR, JA, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN STRONGLY DENIES REPORT OF POTENTIAL URANIUM
TRANSER TO IRAN

REF: A. ASTANA 2257
B. SECSTATE 131723
C. ASTANA 2158

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)

S E C R E T ASTANA 002273

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2029
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IR, JA, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN STRONGLY DENIES REPORT OF POTENTIAL URANIUM
TRANSER TO IRAN

REF: A. ASTANA 2257
B. SECSTATE 131723
C. ASTANA 2158

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)

1. (S) SUMMARY: The government of Kazakhstan publicly and privately
denied allegations of negotiations between Iran and KazAtomProm for
the purchase of yellowcake uranium (refs A-B). During a December 31
meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kairat Umarov told the
Ambassador that an extensive interagency investigation found no
evidence of discussions with, or even a proposal from, Iran. He
stressed Kazakhstan's strong commitment to non-proliferation and
stringent export-control regime. Umarov requested further details to
assist the investigation and a public statement of support from the
United States (see suggestion in para 13). Umarov passed the
Ambassador the Foreign Ministry's December 30 press release and a
non-paper (see paragraphs 11-12). END SUMMARY.

"NO STONE UNTURNED"

2. (S) In response to the Ambassador's December 30 demarche
regarding possible negotiations between a Kazakhstani subsidiary of
KazAtomProm (KAP) and Iran for the sale of a large quantity of
yellowcake uranium, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kairat
Umarov requested an urgent December 31 meeting with the Ambassador.
Umarov first emphasized the Kazakhstani government's serious and
immediate response to the allegations, stating, "All agencies have
worked together to leave no stone unturned." He then passed the
Ambassador the Foreign Ministry's December 30 press release and a
non-paper on the government's investigation (see paragraphs 11-12).
Summarizing the non-paper, he thanked the U.S. government for
providing information about the allegations and underlined the
Kazakhstani government's strong commitment to non-proliferation.
Umarov further reaffirmed support for the prevention of uranium
exports to Iran, in accordance with UNSCR 1737. Highlighting U.S.
assistance, he stressed Kazakhstan's strong export-control regime,
which precludes the possibility of a uranium shipment to Iran.
Umarov asserted, "There are no negotiations on an uranium shipment.
We have quickly checked all questions and are taking additional
measures, but there a
re no leads to confirm the intention to transfer
uranium." Umarov concluded by requesting "documents and materials,
with names and data, on those conducting the negotiations."

NO CONTRACTS, NO CONTACT, AND NO NEGOTIATIONS

3. (S) Umarov then turned to his private report on the interagency
investigation, which concluded that KAP has neither contracts nor
contact with Iran on any possible uranium shipment. Furthermore, he
asserted, "No one has received a proposal from Iran, and a check of
all potential mediators has not shown any evidence of a request from
Iran." Turning to Baiken-U, owned jointly by KAP and Energy Asia
Limited, a consortium of Japanese power companies, Umarov underlined
its 95% Japanese ownership. "Even with that, KazAtomProm has no
information that negotiations are in process," he stated.

ONE-THIRD OF KAZAKHSTAN'S URANIUM PRODUCTION

4. (S) To emphasize the improbability of the sale, Umarov then
recited detailed information on Baiken-U's limited mining operations
and small stock of unprocessed uranium ore -- 70 tons. The volume of
yellowcake under alleged negotiations, he continued, equals one-third
of all Kazakhstan's production. "To ship that amount unaccounted is
crazy," he argued. Highlighting the regular inventory of stockpiles
by the competent Kazakhstani agencies, he revealed, "They have
checked half, nothing is missing, and no documents have been
distorted."

MANDATORY END-USE CERTIFICATES

5. (S) About transportation, Umarov told the Ambassador that all
uranium exports occur exclusively by railway, and that no shipments
have ever passed through Kazakhstani sea ports [on the Caspian Sea].
Kazakhstan's multi-layered, strict export controls would ensure
immediate identification of any shipment of any amount of uranium, he
argued. Furthermore, he said, "No Kazakhstani company has requested
a license to export uranium to Iran, and we never ship uranium to a
non-nuclear power without an end-use certificate."

REPUTATION AT STAKE

6. (S) "This investigation led to our statement, and now we have big
questions for you and Washington. Information is very important

because Kazakhstan's reputation has been put at stake," he asserted.
"If you consider us a strategic partner, as you say, you must share
information. We are working for one and the same goals, and we have
always been helpful on Iran. The appearance of this article and the
mention of intelligence leads to questions about trust." Umarov then
underlined the government's "disappointment" that the State
Department's statement (drawn from press guidance) did not more
firmly support Kazakhstan and underline Kazakhstan's staunch support
for non-proliferation. "Now, we are in a damage-control situation,"
he concluded with real chagrin.

INCIDENT ORCHESTRATED?

7. (S) Umarov relayed the Kazakhstani government's request to the
IAEA for the report. "The IAEA says that they do not have the
report, which leads us to the conclusion that it was orchestrated."
He then repeated his request for additional information in order to
continue the investigation in greater detail. "As partners, we must
work together constructively to stop activity confidentially. Our
previous experiences have shown the effectiveness of this approach.
You trusted us before with such sensitive projects as Operation
Sapphire."

STRONGER, BROADER INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WELCOMED

8. (S) After thanking the Ministry and government for its serious,
speedy response, the Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. government
is not accusing the Kazakhstani government of involvement in the
alleged negotiations. He asserted that he met with the Foreign
Minister in advance of the article, because the U.S. government sees
Kazakhstan as a strong partner. The Ambassador mentioned the U.S.
government's recognition and praise for Kazakhstan's long history of
positive cooperation, especially on non-proliferation. Recalling his
meeting with the new head of the National Security Committee (KNB)
(ref C),the Ambassador welcomed stronger, broader intelligence
cooperation.

PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT?

9. (S) Looking for a way to restore Kazakhstan's image, Umarov
concluded with a request that the U.S. government make a public
statement of support, "We have strenuously worked on our
non-proliferation reputation, and now it is being questioned, now the
word has gone out. We would appreciate strong support from our
partners." The Ambassador agreed to relay the request.

10. (S) In a private pull-aside, Umarov told the Ambassador that
Kazakhstan has some degree of suspicion that a third nation (unnamed)
might have fabricated the initial report and, for its own purposes,
leaked it to the Associated Press.

11. (U) BEGIN DECEMBER 30 PRESS STATEMENT:

STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically repudiates certain news
media reports alleging Kazakhstan's connection to a possible deal to
supply uranium to Iran and considers them groundless insinuations
damaging the reputation of our country.

As is known, Kazakhstan has voluntarily renounced the world's fourth
largest nuclear and missile arsenal, shut down the world's second
largest Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, and is one of the recognized
leaders of the global process of disarmament and nonproliferation.

Kazakhstan is firmly committed to the principles of nonproliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and tough control over the turnover of
dual use materials. As a non-nuclear weapon state, Kazakhstan has
been unwaveringly committed and remains committed to the principles
of the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, relevant
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the UN Convention
on physical protection of nuclear materials, as well as the
principles and rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

All the operations with nuclear materials in Kazakhstan, including
our cooperation regarding peaceful use of atomic energy with foreign
countries, are subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

In this connection, Kazakhstan expects the IAEA to give an
appropriate assessment of the information being disseminated by the
news media.

END STATEMENT.


12. (S) BEGIN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS NON-PAPER:

Thank you for providing the information on the attempts of Iranian
company Nur Afzar Gostar (NAG) to purchase uranium ore from
Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan unwaveringly fulfills its tight export-control obligations
with respect to nuclear materials and is committed to strengthen the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We fully support your efforts to prevent the export of nuclear
materials to the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with UN
Security Council resolution 1737. Kazakhstan's export-control system
excludes any possibility of illegal deliveries of uranium products to
that country. Kazakhstan's government agencies and private companies
are not conducting, nor have they ever conducted, official
negotiations for the delivery of uranium ore to the Islamic Republic
of Iran.

Based on your inquiry, the government conducted a thorough
investigation of the companies you identified and took additional
steps to prevent the illegal transfer of purified uranium ore,
including yellowcake. To date, no evidence of an illegal export of
significant amounts of uranium ore have been found.

From our side, we request that you provide copies of materials
containing further information on the companies and individuals
engaged in the negotiations to transfer uranium ore from Kazakhstan.

END NON-PAPER.

13. (S) COMMENT: We know from other sources that Kazakhstan's
initial investigation was indeed swift and relatively thorough.
Nonproliferation is one area where the United States and Kazakhstan
have consistently and successfully cooperated for nearly two decades,
and sensitive nonproliferation programs still continue. Given the
very strong disappointment, almost chagrin, that Umarov expressed, we
suggest it would not be remiss for the Department to issue a press
statement (or for Embassy Astana to be authorized to issue one) that
notes the government of Kazakhstan's full cooperation in the
investigation of this current allegation, as well as our long and
successful partnership to prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. Please advise. END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND