Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA2204
2009-12-23 09:37:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: TERRORISM AND SECURITY CONCERNS INFLUENCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR MARR AF RS UZ KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE 2283
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2936
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002204 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, PM
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY

E.O. 12958: 12/23/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR AF RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TERRORISM AND SECURITY CONCERNS INFLUENCE
DELIBERATION ON OVERFLIGHT AND NDN AMENDMENTS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (A),(B),(D)

REFTELS: A. STATE 128489

B. ASTANA 2000

C. ASTANA 2158

D. ASTANA 2198

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002204

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, S/SRAP, EUR/RUS, PM
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY

E.O. 12958: 12/23/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR AF RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: TERRORISM AND SECURITY CONCERNS INFLUENCE
DELIBERATION ON OVERFLIGHT AND NDN AMENDMENTS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (A),(B),(D)

REFTELS: A. STATE 128489

B. ASTANA 2000

C. ASTANA 2158

D. ASTANA 2198


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: On December 22, the Ambassador and Deputy
Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov met to discuss outstanding U.S.
requests to amend the 2001 overflight and 2009 Northern Distribution
Network (NDN) agreements (refs A, B). Umarov told the Ambassador
that 10 Kazakhstani government agencies are reviewing the U.S.
request to add a north-south route to the 2001 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on overflights in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom. He said he hoped to provide an initial response by December

31. Umarov noted that "times have changed since 2001," and
Kazakhstani concerns that terrorists will seek to disrupt supply
routes to Afghanistan have increased. Umarov said some Kazakhstanis
worry that the overflight and NDN will encourage terrorists to target
Kazakhstan, which seeks U.S. military advice on fortifying its
southern border. He told the Ambassador Kazakhstan's leaders owe it
to their people to consider thoroughly these agreements. Umarov, an
experienced and frank diplomat, suggested Kazakhstan might want to
use the July U.S.-Russia agreement on overflights as a model for any
new agreement. END SUMMARY.

KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS A NEW AGREEMENT


2. (S/NF) Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov said that he had
originally hoped to amend the original overflight agreement, but the
MFA's Legal Department determined Kazakhstan must conclude a new
agreement because the requested additions include a different route.
Umarov did not specify language needed in the agreement, or whether
the agreement could enter into force upon signature. Umarov said
several government agencies had asked about the July overflight
agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation.
Emphasizing that he still lacked firm instructions and was merely
"thinking outside of the box" in an effort to expedite the process,

Umarov suggested that Kazakhstan might agree to sign a document with
the same text as the July U.S.-Russian Federation agreement.

THAT WAS THEN, THIS IS NOW


3. (S/NF) Arguing "the times are different now than they were in
2001," when the September 11 attack on the United States and
instability in Kyrgyzstan dictated the need for immediate action,
Umarov emphasized that many Kazakhstani government agencies are
concerned about the transportation of lethal goods across
Kazakhstan's territory. According to Umarov, instability in
Afghanistan is "bringing the Taliban closer," and Kazakhstan fears it
will become a target for terrorists if it signs an agreement to
facilitate the transportation of lethal goods.

PARLIAMENT (AND OTHERS) MUST BE SATISFIED


4. (S/NF) Umarov quickly asserted that this does not mean that
Kazakhstan will not agree to add the north-south overflight path.
Rather, Kazakhstan's leaders must carefully scrutinize any agreement,
and must have the support of the Kazakhstani people, he said.
"Members of Parliament will be very inquisitive about an overflight
agreement; they are much more sophisticated now than they were in
2001," commented Umarov. He queried, "What is the legal basis for
this agreement and how will it be regulated?" Umarov mentioned that
other agencies might ask detailed questions about the potential
response to various hypothetical disaster scenarios, including a
crash or other incident along the route, which would require more
detailed answers than the text in paragraph 5 of the 2001 agreement.
Umarov promised to convey the Kazakhstani ministries' questions to
the Ambassador as soon as possible.

U.S.-RUSSIA AGREEMENT IRRITATES

ASTANA 00002204 002 OF 003




5. (S/NF) When the Ambassador reiterated the importance of adding
the new route to the overflight agreement, Umarov, looking
uncharacteristically frustrated, responded that the MFA is trying to
facilitate a speedy agreement. He argued that parallel negotiations
with Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation might have precluded this
situation. "Now you are just putting us up against the wall," Umarov
retorted. When the Ambassador directly asked if the agreement with
the Russian Federation created a political problem, Umarov denied
Kazakhstani leaders oppose amending the 2001 agreement because of
annoyance that the United States signed an agreement with Russia
first. However, his non-verbal behavior suggested otherwise. The
Ambassador pointed out that the United States and Kazakhstan, unlike
the United States and the Russian Federation, already had an
overflight MOU when the Russian agreement was signed, which seemed
somewhat to mollify Umarov. Further, the Ambassador explained to
Umarov, off the record, the history of the U.S.-Russia agreement as a
deliverable for the July 2009 Obama-Medvedev summit in Moscow.

HAZARDOUS OR LETHAL?


6. (S/NF) Echoing Foreign Minister Saudabayev's comments on the
overflight issue during Assistant Secretary for South and Central
Asian Affairs Robert Blake's visit (ref D),Umarov reiterated that
"the transit of lethal equipment is a particular problem for
Kazakhstan." The Ambassador pointed out that the 2001 overflight
agreement specifies that cargo might include "hazardous materials."
When Umarov countered that hazardous cargo does not necessarily imply
lethal cargo, the Ambassador replied that both sides in 2001 likely
understood that "hazardous materials" could imply "lethal."
(COMMENT: The MFA's Askar Tazhiyev raised the issue of lethal versus
non-lethal cargo for the first time on November 24 when he called the
Embassy to confirm that the overflight request pertained to both
lethal and non-lethal cargo, stating that different kinds of cargo
would raise different "technical issues." The Embassy's diplomatic
note requesting the addition of the new route, dated November 9,
referred directly to the 2001 agreement, and did not specify the type
of cargo. END COMMENT.)

BORDER SECURITY AND AN UNFULFILLED U.S. PROMISE


7. (S/NF) Returning to fears of terrorism, Umarov asserted that
"Kazakhstan is very concerned about fortifying its southern borders."
He welcome more information-sharing on counter-terrorism, and said
that a U.S. military survey team to advise on border security would
be welcome. The Ambassador replied he had recently met with the new
Chairman of the National Security Committee (KNB) (ref C) and
expressed U.S. willingness to move beyond information sharing to
broader cooperation. Umarov said that border fortification is a
military issue, as well as a border-security and intelligence-sharing
issue, and the military would be the most appropriate U.S. partner.
Umarov said Deputy Minister of Defense General Bulat Sembinov has
often raised, including with USCENTCOM Commander General David
Petraeus, the long delays in the U.S. Huey-II program for Kazakhstan,
which are negatively affecting Kazakhstan's ability to secure its
border against terrorists. Umarov noted that President Nazarbayev
had recently criticized Kazakhstan's Security Council, emphasizing
that Kazakhstan wants to avoid Kyrgyz instability from again creating
problems in Kazakhstan, as happened in 1999, especially given the
Taliban's focus on disrupting supply routes to Afghanistan.

OVERFLIGHT AND NDN ARE SECURITY, NOT POLITICAL, ISSUES


8. (S/NF) The Ambassador also raised the question of the Embassy's
October 20 dipnote on an amendment to the Northern Distribution
Network (NDN) to allow the surface transit of wheeled armored
vehicles for transporting troops (ref B). Umarov said that
Kazakhstan would prefer transportation of the vehicles inside
containers, but "you never know what kind of information may leak
out." Therefore, Kazakhstan must prepare for anything, which is why
lethal equipment is so problematic, he argued. According to Umarov,

ASTANA 00002204 003 OF 003


the overflight and NDN issues are not political, but are perceived as
security issues. Umarov told the Ambassador, "I understand we must
move as quickly as possible. Please believe me, I am not sitting on
these issues."

NEXT STEPS: COMPARING AGREEMENTS AND COMPILING ANSWERS


9. (S/NF) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry about ways to
positively and quickly reach an agreement on overflight, Umarov
asserted that Kazakhstan must first review the U.S. agreement with
the Russian Federation. He said he expected to receive the agreement
from Moscow within days, and would immediately distribute it to the
unspecified Kazakhstani ministries that had asked to see it. [NOTE:
In a later conversation the same day, Russian Ambassador Mikhail
Bocharnikov professed ignorance about Kazakhstan's request for a copy
of the U.S.-Russia overflight agreement and suggested Astana must be
working directly with Moscow on this issue. END NOTE.] According to
Umarov, the Russian Duma's ratification of this agreement might
resolve many Kazakhstani concerns. He reiterated that he hopes to
receive interagency guidance on the new route by December 31. Umarov
also asked the Ambassador for information on the U.S. NDN and
overflight agreements with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
The Ambassador said he would gather as much information as possible
to help speed Kazakhstan's decision making, especially since Foreign
Minister Saudabayev had told Assistant Secretary Blake that a
north-south overflight route is doable, but first many questions must
be answered in detail.


10. (S/NF) AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: Based on both Foreign Minister
Saudabayev and Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Sarybai telling
Assistant Secretary Blake that our requests are achievable, and based
on President Nazarbayev's continued support for U.S. policy in
Afghanistan, I believe that we will, eventually, succeed -- but it is
going to take considerable work and probably more time than we would
like. Embassy Astana is working to collect as quickly as possible
answers to all the questions the Kazakhstanis so far have posed. We
know from other sources that Kazakhstan is indeed concerned about its
own security, especially the security of its southern border, and
worries that a renewed international effort in Afghanistan could push
terrorists into Central Asia. We can usually rely on MFA Americas
Director Tazhiyev to blurt out the truth, and his comment in this
meeting might be telling -- that the United States not fulfilling its
commitment on the Huey-II program is affecting Kazakhstan's ability
to secure its border against terrorists. Likewise, I do not doubt
that some Kazakhstani noses are out of joint because the United
States concluded a lethal overflight agreement with Russia before
raising the same issue with Kazakhstan. For at least a year,
Kazakhstani officials have told me that they expect to be treated on
par with Russia and do not appreciate being "treated as an
afterthought," which they strongly believe happened in this case.
Embassy Astana will continue to place highest priority on achieving
our overflight and NDN goals; however, should this bog down for too
long, a high-level visit to Astana might be warranted to seal a deal.
END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND