KAZAKHSTAN: PARTY POLITICS INSIDE AND OUT: TWO POLITICIANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002148

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2009
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR KDEM KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PARTY POLITICS INSIDE AND OUT: TWO POLITICIANS
VIEWS

Classified By: DCM Pamela Spratlen: 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Charge met on December 5 with the Secretary of
the Nur Otan party, Yerlan Karin. In the surprisingly frank
three-hour meeting, Karin readily admitted that Nur Otan's monopoly
on power tarnishes Kazakhstan's democratic credentials. In his view,
single-party rule is not sustainable, and Nur Otan will eventually
split into several parties. Karin wants Nur Otan to develop a solid
party platform and resolve citizens' concerns, rather than simply
serve as President Nazarbayev's "propaganda machine." Karin
acknowledged that the Presidential Administration sets policy, but
asserted President Nazarbayev's openness to suggestions from his
liberal advisors. The leader of the opposition Ak Zhol party, by
contrast, sees little opportunity for input on the policy process.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On December 5, the CDA met with Nur Otan party Secretary
Yerlan Karin on his invitation. The 33-year-old Karin, a political
scientist by training, came to the President's Nur Otan party in
November 2008 from the Internal Policy department of the Presidential
Administration. In Nur Otan's hierarchy, he is one of two
secretaries reporting to the party's deputy chairman, who in turn
reports to President Nazarbayev. Although he usually keeps a low
public profile, Karin is believed to be the party's policy strategist
and is credited with Nur Otan's recent push to cement its credentials
as a bona fide political party. Further bio details reported septel.

NUR OTAN DEVELOPING TIES TO CIVIL SOCIETY


3. (C) During a three-hour meeting and lunch, Karin freely and
frankly discussed his views of the Nur Otan party, decision-making in
the Presidential Administration, and the future of democratic reform
in the country. Karin readily admitted that Nur Otan's monopoly on
power tarnishes Kazakhstan's democratic credentials, but "it is a
fact of life for the moment." He aims to compensate through the
creation of greater democracy within the party itself and increased
responsiveness to citizens' concerns. Karin described his initiative
for Nur Otan to establish consultative councils with pro-government
opposition parties and leading NGOs. The "radical" opposition
parties declined to participate, because they feared being seen as
abandoning their principles, he said.

PARTY AS A "DEMOCRACY SCHOOL"?


4. (C) In his relaxed and frank way, Karin told us that he does not
consider single-party rule sustainable, and that Nur Otan will
eventually split into separate parties -- "It's a question of time."
Nur Otan's weakness is that "it's trying to be all things to all
people" and avoiding taking a committed stance on tougher issues,
like the question of Kazakhstan's identity as a multi-ethnic state
versus Kazakh nationalism. At the same time, he sees the party as
"good democracy training. The government (executive branch) works in
isolation. It sets its own priorities without consulting" with civil
society or the electorate. "As a party, you are constantly exposed
to criticism, forced to defend your policies," he said. He conveyed
his initial ambivalence when "asked" to leave the administration for
the party. However, he now believes he can "still make a
difference." He believes Nur Otan must evolve from a "propaganda
machine" for President Nazarbayev to a party that uses its political
power to resolve "real issues. You cannot wait for the system to
reform itself," he asserted, "you must push it forward." At the same
time, he readily acknowledged that "policy is set at the Ak Orda (the
presidential administration)" and not by the parliament or political
parties.

PRESIDENT OPEN TO LIBERAL IDEAS ...


5. (C) The CDA asked whether others in the Nur Otan establishment
share Karin's liberal-leaning views. Karin joked that convincing
others in the party leadership is "extremely delicate work." He
underlined the comparative openness of regional party leaders to
Karin's ideas, specifically because "they hear the criticism" from
the population. However, according to Karin, President Nazarbayev is
willing to hear such views. He highlighted a two-hour audience with
the President during his tenure at the Presidential Administration
when Nazarbayev explicitly solicited his views. Karin apparently
told Nazarbayev that Nur Otan would benefit from greater openness,
transparency, and accountability. He suggested that Nazarbayev give

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up his position as the head of Nur Otan, as a sitting President, and
serve instead as the arbitrator of the whole political process.
Karin said he was elated after the meeting, because "the President
really listened." He admitted, however, that one "must be around the
President all the time" to translate ideas into policy. When he
moved to Nur Otan, Karin lost that access. (NOTE: Karin did not
indicate that a connection existed between his frankness with the
President and his subsequent move away from Ak Orda to Nur Otan. END
NOTE.)

... BUT OPPOSITION SEES FEW OPPORTUNITIES


6. (C) On December 7, the CDA met with the Alikhan Baimenov, leader
of the Ak Zhol opposition party. In contrast with the free-flowing
conversation with Karin, Baimenov was reserved and careful in his
comments. He told the CDA that President Nazarbayev and his Nur Otan
party tightly control the political space in Kazakhstan, leaving
little room for input from opposition parties. Asked about potential
avenues of influence in such a constricted political environment,
Baimenov did not have an answer readily available. He said, however,
that Ak Zhol is focusing on the issue of Kazakh language and identity
due to the growing frustration among some Kazakhs at the government's
perceived slow progress in elevation of the use of Kazakh language.
He noted opposition to the recently-announced Doctrine of National
Unity, which calls for a development of a "civil" -- rather than
ethnic -- Kazakhstani identity. Baimenov asserted that many Kazakhs
consider this policy a threat to the future of their language and
culture. Ak Zhol supported an open letter to President Nazarbayev
from approximately 200 Kazakh leaders and intellectuals, which asked
him to reconsider the doctrine and threatened an Independence Day
(December 17) hunger strike unless he changes course.


7. (C) COMMENT: The difference between these two politicians'
perception of Kazakhstani politics and the role of political parties
is striking. Those on the outside, like Baimenov, see a monolithic,
top-down process, in which President Nazarbayev unilaterally sets
policy with little outside input. However, the conversation with
Karin shows the variety of views within the Nur Otan party itself,
some of which are quite liberal. Karin impressed us with his
frankness, openness, and liberal mindset, especially if one considers
that he is one of the chief strategists of the President's ruling
party. END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND