Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA2064
2009-11-19 10:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN:

Tags:  PGOV PREL OSCE KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002064 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:

REF: (A) ASTANA 2008
(B) USOSCE 0254
(C) ASTANA 2053

Classified By: Charge d' affaires, a. i., Pamela Spratlen: 1.4 (b),
(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002064

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN:

REF: (A) ASTANA 2008
(B) USOSCE 0254
(C) ASTANA 2053

Classified By: Charge d' affaires, a. i., Pamela Spratlen: 1.4 (b),
(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 18, deputy head of the Astana OSCE
Center further briefed the CDA on the November 12 visit to Astana of
the Secretary General of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Marc Perrin de Brichambaut. President
Nazarbayev is prepared to personally lobby the leaders of OSCE
participating states to garner their support for an OSCE summit in

2010. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively sought de
Brichambaut's advice on how to include mention of a 2010 summit into
the upcoming Athens Ministerial's final document. De Brichambaut
stressed the need for substance and highlighted the work required for
a summit. However, he underlined the OSCE Secretariat's
responsibility to implement the goals set by participating states and
the Chairman. Kloetzer said de Brichambaut "was not extremely happy"
with his meeting with the President, but generally pleased by his
interaction with the MFA. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On November 18, deputy head of the Astana OSCE Center
Jeannette Kloetzer outlined in more detail for the CDA the November
12 working visit to Astana by Secretary General of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),Marc Perrin de
Brichambaut (refs A and B). Kloetzer said that Kazakhstan's desire
to host an OSCE summit in 2010 dominated de Brichambaut's discussions
and was the sole topic of conversation with President Nazarbayev.
Nazarbayev declared his readiness to personally lobby the leaders of
participating states to obtain the needed consensus, she said.
Kloetzer believes that Nazarbayev will pitch ideas that are of
interest to everybody in order to achieve broad support --
Afghanistan to entice the United States, European security
architecture to interest the Russians, and reaffirmation of
commitment to the Helsinki principles to bring along all OSCE
members. The MFA also floated protracted conflicts, the effect of
the financial crisis on migration, and cooperation with other
regional organizations as possible topics. According to Kloetzer, de

Brichambaut stressed to President Nazarbayev, Foreign Minister-State
Secretary Saudabayev, and Deputy Foreign Minister Zhigalov that
"substance was important." He encouraged the Kazakhtanis to focus on
the Corfu process and broader discussions of European security, but
stressed that a summit must cover all three OSCE dimensions equally.


3. (C) The Kazakhstanis are determined to have the final declaration
of the Athens Ministerial in December mention the summit, said
Kloetzer, and Saudabayev actively sought de Brichambaut's advice on
how to accomplish this goal. When De Brichambaut tried to prepare
Saudabayev for the possibility that the final declaration will not
mention the summit, Saudabayev became "visibly upset" and asserted,
"We do not see, think, or envisage that possibility. It has to
work." "It is clear he has explicit orders from the top," said
Kloetzer. The Kazakhstanis maintain that France, Spain, Italy, the
Holy See, Serbia, Finland, Lithuania, Turkey, Romania, and the CIS
countries support the idea of the summit. (NOTE: Representatives
from the Embassies of Italy, Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands told
Pol/Econ Chief on November 16 that their governments will insist on
substance before they commit to a summit (ref C). END NOTE.)


4. (C) Kloetzer said both Saudabayev and Zhigalov actively sought de
Brichambaut's advice on how to garner the necessary support for the
summit and what topics to introduce. De Brichambaut stressed that
the Secretariat "serves the wishes of the participating states," and
it is the participating states that make the ultimate decision on the
timing and topics of the summit. He underlined that a summit needs a
great deal of preparation, but noted that his job as Secretary
General is to assist the Chairman in fulfilling whatever goals are
set. Zhigalov asked de Brichambaut about the possibility of
canceling the annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM)
during a summit year. De Brichambaut politely and firmly advised
against doing so.


5. (C) Asked for de Brichambaut's overall impressions of the visit,
Kloetzer said "he was not extremely happy." De Brichambaut
previously met Nazarbayev several times, the first time immediately
following the 2007 Madrid Ministerial. At that time, Nazarbayev and

ASTANA 00002064 002 OF 002


de Brichambaut had a "very constructive discussion as partners," said
Kloetzer. "This time, Nazarbayev acted like the big boss. The
Kazakhstanis are so confident now. They feel like they are in the
driver's seat." Kloetzer said that working-level MFA officials,
like Zhigalov and OSCE Task Force Coordinator Abdykarimov, are fully
aware of the amount of work the chairmanship year will bring.
However, the higher-ups, like Nazarbayev and Saudabayev, may not
understand the efforts required for a summit. Kloetzer believes the
Kazakhstanis will not agree to a high-level meeting instead of a
summit unless the summit idea becomes a complete non-starter.


6. (C) Kloetzer said the Secretary General generally was happy with
his interaction with the MFA. She noted that Saudabayev was "still a
bit uninformed on OSCE issues," but hastened to add that he performed
better than when he met the group of visiting OSCE Permanent
Representatives October 21-23. His apparent unpreparedness at that
time made the Russian Permanent Representative wonder out loud "why
his minions did not prepare a cheat sheet for him."


7. (C) COMMENT: It is clear from Kloetzer's comments that de
Brichambaut attempted to walk a careful line between the mood among
the delegations in Vienna and the strong wishes of the incoming
Chairman, Kazakhstan. It is hard to say whether the President and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs heard his message that substance must
come before participating states will commit to a summit. On this
topic, we believe the government of Kazakhstan prefers to see all
responses in the best possible light. END COMMENT.

SPRATLEN