KAZAKHSTAN: PREPARATIONS FOR DFM UMAROV'S VISIT --

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002050

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, AND DEPT FOR NEA/IR, ISN
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY

E.O. 12958: 11/17/2029
TAGS: PARM PGOV PINR PREL KNNP START IR RS UP UZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PREPARATIONS FOR DFM UMAROV'S VISIT --
NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES

REFTELS: A. ASTANA 2000

B. ASTANA 2007

C. 08 ASTANA 1967

D. 08 ASTANA 2295

E. 08 ASTANA 2573

F. ASTANA 1541

G. STATE 83600

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b),
(d)


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 12.


2. (S) SUMMARY: At the request of Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA),PolOff met on November 13 with the Director of the
Multilateral Cooperation Department, Barlybai Sadykov, whose
Department is responsible for all non-proliferation, security and
disarmament issues. In preparation for Deputy Foreign Minister
Umarov's upcoming visit to Washington, Sadykov requested
clarification concerning U.S. positions on non-proliferation issues,
specifically Semipalatinsk, and the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). Sadykov provided a non-paper -- transmitted separately via
e-mail to SCA/CEN on November 16 -- on Kazakhstan's views on the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Sadykov also requested an
answer to Kazakhstan's proposal to recognize the participants of the
START-1 Treaty for completing their obligations. Sadykov's
high-level engagement highlights the importance the MFA attaches to
the U.S.-Kazakhstani non-proliferation and security relationship.
END SUMMARY.

ENSURING PHYSICAL SECURITY AT SEMIPALATINSK


3. (S) In preparation for Deputy Foreign Minister Umarov's November
18-20 visit to the United States, Sadykov told PolOff that Umarov
would like to discuss trilateral non-proliferation projects, which
the United States, Kazakhstan, and Russia currently are undertaking
at Semipalatinsk. According to Sadykov, during a telephone
conversation between President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Vice
President Joe Biden, Nazarbayev proposed a trilateral agreement on
work at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS). Emphasizing that
Nazarbayev proposed the concept "in order to optimize a
mutually-beneficial plan of work," the Director asked the U.S.
government to clarify its position on the President's proposal.
Sadykov also inquired if the United States believes the current
measures at Semipalatinsk are enough to fully guarantee STS'
protection. (NOTE: Sadykov confirmed that "protection of the STS,"
does not refer to remediation, or ecological protection, but rather
physical security of the site. END NOTE.) Finally, the Director
also asked about U.S. satisfaction with the pace of work at the STS.


4. (S) On November 10 and 12, the Ambassador met respectively with
Marat Tazhin, State Secretary of the National Security Council, and
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Sauat Mynbayev, to discuss
bilateral projects at Semipalatinsk (refs A-B). Since the U.S. and
Kazakhstani governments consider information on these projects very
sensitive, it was not clear the extent to which Sadykov, and the two
assistants who accompanied him to the meeting, are informed on
U.S.-Kazakhstani cooperation at Semipalatinsk.

KAZAKHSTAN INQUIRES ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION ROADBLOCKS


5. (C) Sadykov told PolOff that the government of Kazakhstan views
Semipalatinsk in the context of its commitment to maintain a
cooperative, bilateral non-proliferation relationship. He requested
information from the U.S. government about non-proliferation
projects, which require further cooperation from Kazakhstan, in order
to brief Umarov before his visit. According to Sadykov, a list of
"stumbling blocks" would be sufficient, and he specifically asked
about U.S. requests related to the BN-350 spent-fuel transfer and the
Central Reference Laboratory. "What are the United States'
priorities in relation to non-proliferation projects?" queried
Sadykov.

ASTANA 00002050 002 OF 003




6. (C) Sadykov has been running the Foreign Ministry's Multilateral
Cooperation Department for over a year. Previously, he served as
Kazakhstan's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in
New York and Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Americas Desk. As the
primary point of contact for all Post's non-proliferation related
issues, the Multilateral Cooperation Department plays an important
role in policymaking related to non-proliferation issues. Over the
last year, under both former Deputy Director of the Multilateral
Cooperation Department Sergey Savelyev and current Deputy Director
Anvar Baisuanov, the Multilateral Cooperation Department has
responded reasonably quickly -- and very cooperatively -- to all U.S.
non-proliferation-related requests, including upholding commitments
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835, which aims to
prevent Iran's acquisition of new supplies of uranium, and
designating additional Iranian entities and individuals under
Executive Order 13382 (refs C-F). Sadykov's two assistants, Anvar
Tanalinov, Chief of the Security Division, and specialist Azat
Makhmudov, who have worked very cooperatively with PolOff on a number
of sensitive issues, also participated in the November 13 meeting.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY


7. (C) In response to PolOff's inquiry about the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT),Sadykov responded concisely that Kazakhstan favors
strengthening the regime, but declined to elaborate further.
(COMMENT: Despite its overall strong cooperation on
non-proliferation and Post's repeated requests for more information
on Kazakhstan's NPT position, until this meeting, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had been reluctant to clearly define its position
(ref F-G). It appears Kazakhstan wants to consider the positions
taken by other states' at future conferences before it finalizes its
policy. END COMMENT.) Sadykov asserted that Kazakhstan would soon
provide its views on the NPT, and delivered a non-paper --
transmitted separately via e-mail to SCA/CEN on November 16 -- on
Kazakhstan's suggestions for an effective NPT.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME


8. (C) Sadykov expressed his government's hope that the United
States will support Kazakhstan's candidacy to join the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Director thanked the U.S.
government for financing, through an Export Control and Related
Border Security (EXBS) program, the translation into English of some
of Kazakhstan's export control-related national legislation. Sadykov
asked for U.S. assistance in arranging seminars to identify
Kazakhstani products subject to technical control under the MTCR.
(NOTE: According to Sadykov, Kazakhstan's lists are similar to those
of the European Union. END NOTE.)

KAZAKHSTAN ASKS FOR STATEMENT ABOUT COMPLETION OF START-1


9. (C) In relation to the START-1 Treaty, Sadykov asked about the
U.S. position on Kazakhstan's proposal, which he discussed with U.S.
officials during his last visit to Washington. , Specifically,
Kazakhstan has requested that the text of the new agreement, which
the United States and Russian Federation are negotiating, recognize
the contribution of START-1's five participants, because Kazakhstan
has fulfilled all obligations stipulated in the START-1 Treaty.
Sadykov told PolOff Kazakhstan had approached the Russian Federation,
who "responded positively" to this suggestion.


10. (C) Sadykov also inquired about U.S. plans to politically mark
START-1's completion -- especially on or before December 5. The
Director noted Belarus' suggestion that the Foreign Ministers of all
five START-1 participating states issue a joint statement. According
to Sadykov, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine "had agreed, in
principle, that this could be a good idea." Sadykov asked that the
United States inform Kazakhstan of its views on this position, as
soon as possible. Sadykov added quietly, "If the United States is
not on this team, it would send a negative message."


ASTANA 00002050 003 OF 003



11. (C) According to Sadykov, the MFA had requested a statement that
would affirm that Kazakhstan completed its START-1 obligations, is
not a party to the new agreement under negotiation by the United
States and Russian Federation, and that no further inspections of any
facilities located on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan
will occur. Sadykov told PolOff that he had previously received
verbal assurances that it should not be a problem for Kazakhstan to
receive some kind of statement about Kazakhstan's completion of its
START-1 obligations. (COMMENT: When asked Sadykov could not identify
the agency or individual who had given him the assurances, but he
clearly took it seriously and is expecting a response. END COMMENT.)


12. ACTION REQUESTS: Post requests guidance on how to respond to
Sadykov about STS issues, specifically, clarifying the U.S. position
on Nazarbayev's proposal, current site protection measures, and the
pace of work at the STS. In relation to overall cooperation on
non-proliferation, Post requests information on which projects
require further cooperation from Kazakhstan, and where the projects
rank in terms of U.S. priorities. Post also requests guidance on
Kazakhstan's request that the text of the new START-1 agreement,
which the United States and Russian Federation are negotiating, will
recognize the contribution of START-1's five participants. Post
requests guidance about whether the U.S. supports Belarus' suggestion
that the Foreign Ministers of all five START-1 participating states
issue a joint statement marking the agreement's completion. Finally,
Post also requests guidance on responding to Kazakhstan's request
that the United States make a statement that verifies Kazakhstan
completed its START-1 obligations, is not a party to the new
agreement under negotiation by the United States and Russian
Federation, and that no further inspections of any facilities located
on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan will occur.

SPRATLEN