ERITREA AND SOUTH SUDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000319


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS: PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: ERITREA AND SOUTH SUDAN

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for reason 1.4 (d)



1. (C) SUMMARY: Sudanese VP and SPLM chairman Salva Kiir,
accompanied by top Southern officials, concluded a two-day
visit to Eritrea September 15. President Isaias, reportedly
worried that the SPLM lacks strategy and cohesion, fears that
Sudan could tip into chaos in the context of the upcoming
election and referendum. Isaias encouraged Salva Kiir and
the SPLM to prepare and implement a sound strategy, warning
that time is short, according to a Sudanese source. Khartoum
purportedly tried to prevent Kiir and company from visiting
Asmara, but the SPLM chartered a plane and traveled from Juba
via Nairobi. SPLM delegates, including Pagan Amum and Malik
Agar, were pessimistic, this source continued, and agreed
that:

-- Darfur will "percolate" but cannot be solved in isolation
from the greater Sudan political dynamic;

-- War is very likely to come to the South again, either
before the referendum or after, as the National Congress
Party (NC) wants to control all of Sudan's oil wealth;

-- the NCP will rile the southern tribal militias and attempt
to create turmoil in the South;

-- the South is likely to secede, and if it does, the North
will become further destabilized.

-- If Salva Kiir were to die suddenly, SPLM procedures
indicate Riak Machar would succeed him, but Machar is seen as
a Nuer corrupted by the NCP and most of the SPLA leadership
is Dinka.

End Summary.


2. (C) A WARM WELCOME IN ASMARA
--------------

Dr. Taisier Ali, the pro-SPLM ethnic Nubian and Canadian
citizen who runs the Peacebuilding Center for the Horn of
Africa, provided an outbrief to the ambassador following the
Salva Kiir visit. Dr. Ali met with at least six of the
senior SPLM members accompanying Salva Kiir. They said the
visit was surprisingly cordial and typically frank.
Relations had chilled in recent months due to a public
scolding Isaias gave the SPLM for being inept. Isaias
strongly urged the SPLM to get its act together or Sudan will
face chaos during the election and referendum. After a
dinner at the presidential hall September 14, Isaias
suggested the group "get some exercise," and led the
surprised SPLM delegation for a lengthy walk down Asmara's
main street to a bar, where they popped in for several rounds
of postprandial drinks. "We couldn't even do that in Juba,"
one visitor said.


3. (C) PESSIMISM AMONG SPLM MEMBERS
--------------

SPLM officials asked Dr. Ali for his analysis of the Sudanese
situation. After he elaborated the main points (the first
four bullets of the summary),the SPLM officials said they
agreed entirely, and pressed Dr. Ali to come to Juba to help
craft a strategy for the SPLM. He refused. In another
conversation, the SPLM officials voiced their concern that
should the NCP assassinate Salva Kiir, Riak Machar would
succeed him, in keeping with party regulations. Machar is
seen as corrupt and in cahoots with rich NCP members.
Further, as he is an ethnic Nuer, his leadership of the party
would not sit well with the SPLA, which is dominated by Dinka
officers, Ali related. Ali lamented that the SPLM has not
provided good governance or development to the South and does
not even have well-conceived policies on many of the most
fundamental questions facing the South in the coming two
years.


4. (C) THE ODD LINK BETWEEN ERITREA AND THE SOUTH
-------------- --------------

In 1994, when Isaias' relations with Khartoum were frosty and
the SPLA was in full retreat across the South, Eritrea sent a
substantial number of advisors and fighters - crews for tanks
and other armored vehicles in particular - that helped
prevent the SPLA's collapse. The SPLA leadership remembers
fondly this Eritrean support in "their darkest hour."

Afterwards, the late John Garang often visited Asmara for
weeks on end, working in seclusion on strategy and policies.
According to Dr. Ali ("and Pagan knows this too"),Garang and
Isaias had a secret agreement. Once the SPLM signed the CPA
and went to Khartoum, if the NCP moved against the SPLM
leaders, Eritrea would attack and "attempt to be in Khartoum
within 24 hours." Thus, John Garang's SPLM purportedly saw
the Isaias regime as its last-ditch balance against NCP
treachery. Of course, as events played out, Eritrea was
unable to intervene to save Garang (here the fatal helicopter
crash is not viewed as accidental). Today Eritrea is
dependant on Sudan for all its petroleum supplies, so is
unlikely to do anything that would provoke a border closure.


5. (SBU) This message has been coordinated with Embassy
Khartoum, which comments that a number of the SPLM complaints
about NCP perfidy vis-a-vis the South are standard talking
points.

MCMULLEN