TURKMENISTAN: SPECULATING ON A FUTURE SUCCESSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 000898

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PAR 3 CHANGE)

SIPDIS

SCA/CEN; EEB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: SPECULATING ON A FUTURE SUCCESSION
PROCESS

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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Ambassador Richard Miles for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Given the stove-piped sovereign power and authority
that seems to be the Turkmen president's alone, there is
frequently speculation about what would happen if the current
president suddenly died or was assassinated. Since the
sitting president is only the second president elected in
Turkmenistan since its independence in 1991, and the first
president was elected in the unique environment of the Soviet
collapse, the transition from former President Niyazov to
President Berdimuhammedov in December 2006 provides the best
picture of how the next presidential succession might unfold.
There are, however, two possible scenarios for the
succession process, and each is equally possible. If,
however, the dispersion of gas profits is a significant
factor, the second scenario would be more likely. Neither
scenario will be transparent.

PREVIOUS SUCCESSION A LITTLE MESSY


2. (C) In 2008, a new Constitution and other revised
legislation changed the national legal framework for
succession. Before Niyazov's death, the Constitution
stipulated that the Chairman of the Mejlis (parliament)
should be named acting president until an election could be
held. (NOTE: In reality, the State Security Council and
Cabinet of Ministers did not adhere to this, and arrested the
Mejlis chairman, then reportedly nominated Deputy Cabinet
Chairman Berdimuhammedov acting president during a joint
session. END NOTE.) Interestingly, at the December 26, 2006
Halk Maslahaty meeting where presidential candidates were
given final approval, the Constitution was also revised to
permit an acting president to run for presidential office,
but in 2008 the Constitution was again changed to exclude an
acting president from candidacy.

SCENARIO ONE: GOVERNMENT FOLLOWS LEGISLATION


3. (C) According to the current Constitution, in the event
the president can no longer perform his duties, the State
Security Council should name a deputy cabinet chairman as
acting president, and the state should organize an election
within two months after an acting president is named. It is
unclear who sits on the State Security Council--a body formed
in December 2006 for the purpose of smoothing the way for the
last succession--but membership seems to include the
following: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of
Defense, the Minister of National Security, the Minister of
Internal Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Chief of the
State Border Service, the Chief of the Customs Service, the
Chief of the Immigration Service, the Chief of the
Counternarcotics Service, the Prosecutor General and the
Chairman of the Supreme Court. (NOTE: It is unclear whether
members of the Security Council and the Cabinet of Ministers
actually selected Berdimuhammedov to be acting president on
December 21, 2006, as former President Niyazov's death was
announced on the same day, allowing little time for debate.
Post reporting suggests that Niyazov actually died on
December 19, 2006 (06 Ashgabat 1289),and the Security
Council did not emerge as a governmental entity or meet until
December 21 (06 Ashgabat 1289),which begs the question of
who nominated Berdimuhammedov and when. END NOTE.)


4. (C) In the current environment, any of the nine deputy
cabinet chairmen would potentially be tapped, but if current
legislation is respected, appointment as an acting president
would be a short-term experience that would then exclude the
person from presidential candidacy. It is more likely, then,
that someone would be selected who did not aspire to the
presidential office (such as Rashit Meredov) or a person with
little political support, to ensure an orderly departure from

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the temporary office when a president is elected. Deputy
chairmen such as Hydyr Saparlyev (Education and Health;
deputy chairman since March 2007 and senior bureaucrat since
2004),Maysa Yazmuhammedova (Culture; deputy chairman since
July 2007 and senior bureaucrat since 2005),or Myratgeldy
Akmammedov (Agriculture and Water; deputy chairman since July
2008 and senior bureaucrat since 2005) would be the most
likely choices, since they have all been indistinct senior
bureaucrats since 2005 and are members of the Mary Teke
tribe, which would preclude significant political support
from the Ahal Teke-dominated political society in Ashgabat.
If chosen as acting president, any of these individuals would
be most likely to quickly vacate the office upon the election
of a new president.


5. (C) As before, a murky process that ostensibly involves
government agencies, ministries, and organizations nominating
presidential candidates would unfold in the days following
the former president's death. Since a deputy cabinet
chairman won the last election, and deputy cabinet chairmen
hold the highest, most visibly influential positions in
Turkmen government aside from the president, it is probable
that the next president to be elected will also be a deputy
cabinet chairman. Aside from Cabinet Chairman and Minister
for Foreign Affairs Meredov, there are two current chairmen
that stand out as potential future successors: Hojamuhammet
Muhammedov, Cabinet Chairman for Trade and Textiles and
recently named Acting Chief Administrative Officer for the
Presidential Apparatus; and Deryageldy Orazov, Cabinet
Chairman for Energy, Industry, Construction and Transport.
Both are members of the Ahal Teke tribe, and both have
experienced meteoric rises to the top levels of government in
a fairly short time, which suggests they have the confidence
and support of top officials. Muhammedov, for example,
managed the Russian bazaar until 2005. He spent two years as
deputy and then chairman at the State Commodity Exchange and
just four months chairing the Supreme Audit Chamber before
his appointment as a deputy cabinet chairman. Deryageldy
Orazov also rocketed upward quickly, from his position as an
Ashgabat city district hakim in early 2007, to a three month
tenure as chairman of the State Tourism Committee. He spent
just one year as Ashgabat city hakim before his deputy
chairman appointment in August 2008.

SCENARIO TWO: INNER CIRCLE ELITES CHOOSE SUCCESSOR


6. (C) An alternative hypothesis is that succession will
unfold according to the priorities of a powerful inner circle
of elites who would together choose the next president, in an
effort to preserve the status quo as well as their own
personal wealth. There is evidence of such elites, and
reporting to support the notion that they would want to
control the succession process. In the halls of the
presidential palace, there were four people in powerful
positions at the highest level of government before former
President Niyazov died, who still haunt the corridors of
power here: Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, and three
members of the Presidential Apparatus who are invisible yet
seemingly powerful elites: Presidential Assistants Victor
Khramov and Vladimir Umnov, and First Deputy Administrative
Officer Aleksandr Zhadan.


7. (C) Meredov has long been considered by the diplomatic
community and local observers to be a long-time career
diplomat, free of corruption and largely excluded from
internal elite politics. However, local staff report that
the other three individuals have long been rumored to be
central players who channel money received through corrupt
activities to themselves and to the president. (NOTE:
Unlike the president, deputy cabinet chairmen, ministers and
other senior officials, these individuals have never been
seen in any government meeting or appeared in the newspaper,

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although they each hold official titles. END NOTE.) Based
on their historical role as powerful individuals connected
with high-level corruption and who likely played a part in
the last succession, they would probably be involved again,
as least in part to preserve their lucrative positions.


8. (C) Previous post reporting suggests that these three
men have long been amassing wealth for themselves and for the
president, through large-scale corruption at the national
level. A December 2007 opposition press article reported
that there were rumors that Khramov had organized a scheme to
extract a portion of the profits from the country's gas sales
to Russia for himself. The article further claimed that the
influential Khramov had been the primary proponent of
Berdimuhammedov's nomination as acting president. (NOTE: If
true, Khramov may have pledged to support Berdimuhammedov if
he would leave the gas profit diversion scheme in place. One
can also speculate that Berdimuhammedov now receives a cut
from the scheme, as Niyazov did. END NOTE.)


9. (C) In April 2009, a Turkmen ministry employee told a
local post employee that Khramov organized international
events in Turkmenistan with the goal of enabling the
Presidential Apparatus to take money from the national budget
to pay for them, while ordering other ministries to pay for
the events' actual costs (Ashgabat 0492). In 2007, an
opposition website claimed that Jadan was a "deputy director
for Niyazov's business affairs and putative controller of
Niyazov's personal fund." (07 Ashgabat 0907) (NOTE: If true,
Jadan could also potentially be the primary person managing
the state's and the president's personal bank accounts
abroad. END NOTE.) In March 2009, the EBRD representative
in Turkmenistan expressed the belief that Khramov, Umnov and
Jadan were Berdimuhammedov's "closest economic advisors"
(Ashgabat 0387).


10. (C) COMMENT: With only one presidential succession to
study, and that succession marked by the quick revision of
national legislation even as it was unfolding, it may be too
soon to predict with any confidence how the next succession
will occur or who will rise to the top during the process.
The one certainty, however, is that the process will be most
deeply affected by elite preferences regarding how energy
wealth will be dispersed. Therefore, regardless of the
scenario that plays out, little of the succession process
will likely be transparent. END COMMENT.
MILES