Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASHGABAT65
2009-01-15 13:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ashgabat
Cable title:  

HOW THINGS WORK (OR DON'T) -- INSIGHTS INTO THE

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON EPET ETRD TX 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000065 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN
PLEASE PASS TO USTDA DAN STEIN
ENERGY FOR EKIMOFF/THOMPSON
COMMERCE FOR HUEPER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET ETRD TX
SUBJECT: HOW THINGS WORK (OR DON'T) -- INSIGHTS INTO THE
TURKMEN INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Classified By: Charge Richard Miles for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000065

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN
PLEASE PASS TO USTDA DAN STEIN
ENERGY FOR EKIMOFF/THOMPSON
COMMERCE FOR HUEPER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EPET ETRD TX
SUBJECT: HOW THINGS WORK (OR DON'T) -- INSIGHTS INTO THE
TURKMEN INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Classified By: Charge Richard Miles for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Churchill once described Russia as a riddle wrapped
in a mystery inside an enigma. Turkmenistan remains a black
box behind a translucent window. You kind of see something,
but you're not sure. You have your hand on something, but
what is it? All of this makes observing and working in
Turkmenistan sometimes frustrating and enervating.
Understanding how this place works is not easy.


2. (C) Recently, we gained some insight into how
Turkmenistan's incredibly bureaucratic inter-agency process
functions. We have long known that any request from us must
jump several hoops and get approval from several ministries
before a blessing by the Cabinet of Ministers. We've also
suspected that some, if not most, items of import need
presidential approval. According to contacts at the Ministry
of Economy and Development and the Supreme Council for
Science and Technology, a request or proposal first must be
cleared by all relevant ministries at the ministerial level.
If one ministry opposes, that is enough to kill it.
Proposals that pass this hurdle must then be approved by the
relevant Deputy Chairmen. This is the stage referred to by
Turkmen official contacts when they say approval is "with the
Cabinet of Ministers." At this stage, the Deputy Chairmen
negotiate among themselves. Personality issues between them
can also torpedo proposals. Personality problems between
ministers can also stop proposals at the ministerial-level as
well. (And this is a common problem.) Finally, once the
Deputy Chairmen have signed off, a proposal can go to the
President for final approval.


3. (C) Contacts told us that the best way to make sure a
proposal will be accepted is to keep it narrow. The more
ministries that are required for approval, the more likely it
will hit a speed bump or will involve two or more leaders who
hate each other and will say no for reasons that have nothing
to do with the merits of the project. Contacts have also
cautioned us not to use language that "widens the scope."
For example, a perfectly good proposal that deals with local
governance, might be approved by one entity (by the Institute
for Democracy and Human Rights, for example). However,
labeling something "local governance" means that the
parliament must also approve (regardless of whether it
involves the parliament or not.) If the heads of those two
bodies do not get along, then the project is doomed to
failure. It would be better to label the project something
else.


4. (C) COMMENT: An understanding of this process clarifies
many, many things. It explains, in part, why requests must
be sent by diplomatic note (which makes it easier to shop
around to various offices). It explains why although one
ministry says it supports a proposal to work with it, in the
end, permission is not granted. It clarifies why good
relations between a minister and the Deputy Chairman over his
ministry are essential (note former State Agency Executive
Director Muradov's departure after locking horns too many
times with Deputy Chairman Tagiyev). It also explains why
permission for anything takes so long. And while the
non-answer or "Turkmen no" is a cultural phenomenon, this
helps explain why it is so prevalent in dealing with the
government.


5. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: In many bureaucracies, ministries
are happy to seize issues that could be even remotely
construed as in the vicinity of their lane. That is not the
case, however, in Turkmenistan. There is unusual discipline
in refusing to be involved in issues that belong to another

ASHGABAT 00000065 002 OF 002


agency. Contacts have clearly stated that their ministries
have no role in deciding issues that we would assume they
would have some involvement in. Given that this is a society
where initiative has never been rewarded and the Turkmen
interagency process, there would be a benefit to avoiding
involvement in the approval process, especially one that
brings no monetary benefit. END COMMENT.
MILES