Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASHGABAT1521
2009-11-25 13:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ashgabat
Cable title:  

IRAN/TURKMENISTAN: POLISH DIPLOMAT CALLS

Tags:  EPET PGOV PREL PINR IR TX 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8555
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH
RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAH #1521 3291339
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251339Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3802
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5925
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0126
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 4167
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L ASHGABAT 001521 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IR AND SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: EPET PGOV PREL PINR IR TX
SUBJECT: IRAN/TURKMENISTAN: POLISH DIPLOMAT CALLS
BERDIMUHAMEDOV'S TEHRAN VISIT "A CATHARSIS"

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Sylvia Reed Curran. Reasons 1.4(b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASHGABAT 001521

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IR AND SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: EPET PGOV PREL PINR IR TX
SUBJECT: IRAN/TURKMENISTAN: POLISH DIPLOMAT CALLS
BERDIMUHAMEDOV'S TEHRAN VISIT "A CATHARSIS"

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Sylvia Reed Curran. Reasons 1.4(b) and
(d).


1. (C) In a recent conversation with Iran Watcher, Polish
Charge d'Affaires Robert Rokicki said that major changes in
Turkmenistan's relations with Iran took place following
President Berdimuhamedov's visit to Tehran eight months ago.
Rokicki, who has been posted in Ashgabat since late last
year, knows several members of the president's staff
personally, including one FARSI-speaking member of the
protocol office who accompanied the president to Tehran in
March. That staffer told him that following a "very long"
meeting between Berdimuhamedov and Supreme Leader Khamenei,
during which the latter "berated" Berdimuhamedov, reportedly
calling him a "very bad Muslim" for disrupting gas shipments
to Turkmenistan's "Muslim brothers" in Iran two years ago and
his failure to adhere to the tenets of Islam, "something
spiritual" occurred and Berdimuhamedov emerged a changed man.
He said that the Turkmen president has come to see Iran (not
Russia or any other country) as the "major player" in the
region.

"MAJOR ANNOUNCEMENT" EXPECTED IN TEHRAN


2. (C) Rokicki credits the changes he cited as responsible
for Iran's more favorable energy relations with Turkmenistan,
including the recent agreement to sell Iran 20 bcm of gas a
year at USD 170 per tcm. More recently, at his Embassy's
national day reception two weeks ago, he said that Turkmen
Deputy FM Komekov and the Iranian ambassador were chatting
happily and alluded to the "new opening" in their countries'
relations, and said that a "major announcement" would be made
during the next round of demarcation talks between the five
Caspian Sea littoral states, scheduled to take place in
Tehran early next year. Rokicki conjectured that Turkmenistan
and Iran may announce an agreement for the shipment of gas
destined for Europe to Turkey via Iran, an arrangement that
would be "the end" of the planned Nabucco gas pipeline,
whereby Turkmen gas was to be shipped to Europe via
Azerbaijan and Turkey. (NOTE: A U.S.-based international
energy consultant who was in Ashgabat the same week for
TIOGE, the Turkemistan International Oil and Gas Exposition,
made a similar prediction to Iran Watcher, calling Nabucco
"highly improbable," because Russia and Iran will never
accept it. END NOTE.)


3. (C) Rokicki further believes that Turkmenistan's recent
decision to completely refurbish the aging, Soviet-era Seyidi
oil refinery, near the Turkmen/Uzbek border, was also a
result of Berdimuhamedov's changed view of Iran and his
country's relationship with it. He said that, with a threat
of new sanctions looming, including on fuel, Iran has been
seriously looking for other sources of refined fuel to
stockpile, which might explain Turkmenistan's decision to
rebuild Seyidi (i.e. in part to meet Iran's fuel needs).


4. (C) COMMENT: While Rokicki's interpretation of
motivations in Turkmen-Iranian relations is interesting, we
do not find it entirely plausible. While, no doubt,
Berdimuhamedov may have disliked being berated, if that is
indeed what happened, he did not undergo any type of
spiritual conversion. His public behavior has not changed
one iota. He continues to happily drink vodka at official
events. In addition, there are indications that one reason
he recently shuffled the official Muslim leadership here is
that they were unwilling to go along entirely with some of
his proposals. There are no visible signs of increased
devoutness on the part of the Turkmen leader. Business is a
more likely motivation for the Turkmen. The Turkmen are
looking for alternatives to Russia, which is unlikely to buy
as much gas as it did in the past, whenever a deal is finally
struck. The Iranians (when they pay) make good customers for
Turkmen gas. END COMMENT.
CURRAN