Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANTANANARIVO868
2009-12-17 13:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

MADAGASCAR'S TGV: MAPUTO PROCESS DEAD, EYES TURN

Tags:  PGOV MA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000868 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E MARIA BEYZEROV
PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN
LONDON FOR PETER LORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR'S TGV: MAPUTO PROCESS DEAD, EYES TURN
TO MILITARY

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 858

B. ANTANANARIVO 853

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000868

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E MARIA BEYZEROV
PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN
LONDON FOR PETER LORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR'S TGV: MAPUTO PROCESS DEAD, EYES TURN
TO MILITARY

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 858

B. ANTANANARIVO 853

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Madagascar's transition president Andry "TGV"
Rajoelina formally has ended the troubled mediation and
consensus-building process that has struggled haltingly
forward since international mediators first arrived here in
February. In a televised interview on December 16, he
outlined his plan to hold legislative elections on March 20,
stating that his current government would manage the country
in the interim. This follows a presidential communique
issued on December 15, in which he presented arguments on the
"impossibility of cohabitation", and is consistent with his
warning to ambassadors on December 9. The December 11
ministerial note barring the return of the participants in
the December 3 Maputo III conference remains in effect, but
he did offer hope that it would be lifted in the near future
(as well as an admonition for them to behave if they want
back). Whenever they do come back, the stranded politicians,
including the co-presidents, will not be returning to
government; whether transition Prime Minister Mangalaza is
also jobless is entirely unclear. In his address, TGV
attempted to paint the end of AGOA as a sanction that would
harm only the Malagasy people, again shrugging off any
responsibility for its termination.


2. (C) Over the coming weeks, the military will struggle to
reconcile the nation's desire for a calm holiday season with
their recognition that Rajoelina's latest unilateral position
has the strong potential to push the worsening political and
economic crisis to the boiling point; supporters of a
military intervention appear increasingly likely to prevail,
though their probable timing is unclear. Equally unclear is
how the so-far-mute opposition movements eventually will
react, as they balance the possibility of complete exclusion
from a shortened transition with the pervasive fatigue that
dominates public opinion; our guess is that they will react
strongly, at the time of their choosing, and that prospects
for consensus around TGV's latest proposal are nil. Now --
before the next escalation in January -- is the ideal time to

push the international community into applying more pressure
through further sanctions and assistance cuts, and beginning
the conversation on targeted sanctions against individual
members of TGV's movement. The status of the ICG-Madagascar
process is also now unclear, although the need for an
international consultation mechanism -- with or without the
Malagasy -- is now stronger than ever. END SUMMARY.

RAJOELINA: "COHABITATION IS IMPOSSIBLE"
--------------

3. (SBU) After a long day of rumors that the travel ban on
Maputo III participants would be lifted, and a week of
uncertainty over the long-term intentions of his fractious
administration, Rajoelina took to the airwaves on December 16
at 2000 for over an hour to definitively quell speculation.
He called for a "truce" over the holidays, and claimed that
was the reason the planned December 17 ICG meeting had been
postponed (or cancelled?). His version of a truce, however,
turned into a unilateral -- and seemingly final -- break from
the five-month long "Maputo process" that had resulted in
agreement on a plausible, if troubled, unity government in
Addis Ababa on November 7. Per the speech, Rajoelina's
current unilateral cabinet will remain in place until
legislative elections are held on March 20, 2010, at which
point the majority party will select a Prime Minister and
form a government. The re-entry ban remains in place at this
writing, until such a time as unspecified security conditions
are met, and when those stranded in South Africa "act
responsibly, wisely, and with respect to national
solidarity".


4. (SBU) Rajoelina requested that the international community
"not get too involved in Madagascar's problems", painting the
unsuccessful negotiations thus far as a failure of
international mediation and suggesting that the Malagsy
themselves can now take over from it. He stated that the

ANTANANARI 00000868 002 OF 003


March elections will be financed with GOM funds, and
announced that the National Independent Electoral Commission
(CENI) would be set up with the assistance of "politicians"
(representing perhaps the only salvaged part of the Maputo
accords),but refrained from elaborating on the extent to
which opposition parties would have a say in its design. On
AGOA, he asserted that its termination -- which he still
seems to think can be avoided -- would be a "reprisal"
against the Malagasy people, and requested that the U.S.
consider "the Malagasy people" who need the assistance most.

THE MILITARY: HAPPY HOLIDAYS?
--------------

5. (C) Rajoelina limited his commentary on the military to
simply saying that "it is not divided, and there is no war
here", glossing over an unauthorized December 15 press
conference by nine colonels in support of the Maputo process,
which has publicly raised fresh concerns of division in their
ranks. A potentially violent confrontation between them and
other colonels loyal to TGV was only narrowly averted in the
hotel where the conference occurred, and this required the
direct personal intervention of Army Chief General Andre.
The Ambassador met with the CHOD immediately after he
returned from this incident, at the CHOD's urgent request.
The CHOD was indirect and meandering in laying out his grim
perception of the current political landscape, repeating
several times the likelihood of a "social explosion" and
suggesting that he might have to get involved to stave it
off. Rumors to that effect are rampant, but there is still
no evidence of unmanageable divisions sizable enough to cause
a rupture in the armed forces such as seen in March 2009.
Calling the army "the last rampart," General Andre seems
willing to intervene only if he believes there is no other
alternative.


6. (C) However, two broad trends have emerged. First, the
military has no desire to disrupt the holiday season, and
will seek to avoid action as long as there is any plausible
reason to postpone. This dilatory principle has generally
guided their behavior through many months now of alleged
intervention plans. Second, however, is a concern that
Rajoelina grossly overplayed his hand with irresponsible
behavior over the last week, and a belief that intervention
now could forestall greater opposition unrest in the coming
weeks. If it turns out that Rajoelina did just cross a red
line sharply worsening the political and economic crisis (and
here the pending AGOA announcement may be key),supporters of
military intervention may prevail, regardless of the
holidays; some may also see tactical advantage in doing so.
While the CHOD and Minister of the Armed Forces fall into the
camp supporting a wait-and-see approach, this second option
appeals to some military and civilian leaders who have been
sidelined since March 2009. While this timing issue remains
unclear, what is clear is that the military is now the only
force capable of restoring order, now that TGV has ordered
the international community to butt out. Their intent in
restoring order would be to do so bloodlessly.

THE OPPOSITION: ANGRY, BUT IMPOTENT
--------------

7. (SBU) The shared exile of the Maputo III participants has
served only to boost their solidarity in the face of
Rajoelina's intransigence. There have been no large protests
or civil disobedience in recent weeks (aside from continuing
peaceful, daily meetings of some of Ravalomanana's
supporters),but supporters of Zafy in particular have been
traveling to Antananarivo to get better organized in the
absence of their leadership. A planned meeting of the three
movements opposing TGV was thwarted in Tamatave on December

16. After six months of relative calm in the capital,
however, it is not clear how much support they can rally for
renewed protests, particularly with the holidays approaching,
nor is it clear that they have any other leverage against
Rajoelina's regime.

A NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY
--------------

8. (C) COMMENT: With the Maputo process now formally dead, we

ANTANANARI 00000868 003 OF 003


will engage with the local international community in
Madagascar to examine possible ways forward. With AGOA all
but terminated, MCC gone since November, our non-humanitarian
programs suspended, and all IFI assistance frozen, the USG
has little further financial leverage in Madagascar. France,
however, has yet to freeze or terminate any of its extensive
programs, including military cooperation. Likewise, the
European Commission has stretched the Cotonou Article 96
process well beyond the original November 6 deadline; now
would be an ideal time for them to take a firm stance and
make cuts (which the German ambassador told us today will
happen in short order after the holidays). In addition, we
believe that it is now time to begin discussing targeted
travel and financial sanctions against Rajoelina and his
regime with SADC, the African Union, and our key partners.


9. (C) At time of writing, reaction to Rajoelina's rupture
has been limited to relatively bland press reports; we expect
more substantive commentary over the next 48 hours, but also
perceive an artificial restraint caused by the continuing
travel ban and the general desire not to upset the coming
holidays. We will meet December 18 with COMs from France,
Germany, Mauritius, South Africa, the EU, and the United
Nations to discuss their reactions. Here and in capitals, it
is important to maintain unity within the international
community, particularly if Rajoelina takes to fanning the
AGOA flame over the next two weeks; if he does, we must
demand solidarity from our partners in the form of strong
statements and additional consequences for TGV's new
approach. The messy ICG-Madagascar process that has existed
since April is now also in doubt, although the need for some
international consultation/soordination mechanism -- with or
without Malagasy assent and/or participation -- is now
greater than ever. END COMMENT.
MARQUARDT