MADAGASCAR: TRYING TO AVOID THE WORST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANTANANARIVO 000850

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: TRYING TO AVOID THE WORST

REF: 09 ANTANANARIVO 846

Classified By: DCM ERIC STROMAYER FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) Summary: Madagascar's halting mediation and
transition process has derailed dramatically following
publication of Tuesday's "Maputo III" resolutions and
Rajoelina's immediate, extreme, and negative reaction to them
(reftel). Probably using the resolutions and the unfortunate
letters signed and sent by his opposition to Ban Ki-Moon and
the Danish Prime Minister as a pretext for walking away from
an increasingly unworkable cohabitation, Rajoelina declined
local ambassadors' appeal on December 10 to turn the other
cheek and resume discussions with his adversaries. They did,
however, apparently talk Rajoelina out of taking another
dangerous step back to unilateralism, at least for now.
Rajoelina proposed privately to ambassadors scrapping the
entire Maputo process and instead moving quickly to
legislative elections within three months, which all
ambassadors rejected as unwise, unilateral, non-consensual
and certain to provoke swift condemnation, sanctions, and
enhanced isolation from all quarters. Chissano had asked the
local ICG to "prevail" on Rajoelina to move forward with
discussions based on Maputo III, but not necessarily
accepting its resolutions. Chissano also advised that
Rajoelina had rejected his offer to engage in shuttle
diplomacy to try and break the impasse. On the other hand,
the prospect of the AU organizing a December 17 higher-level
ICG meeting here in Antananarivo, with Chissano and other
mediators present, has given a glimmer of new hope that a
further deterioration might be avoided, at least until then.
The local ICG released a statement on December 11 calling for
restraint and the avoidance of all unilateral actions.
Meanwhile, the ongoing stranding of Madagascar's opposition
political leaders in Maputo -- from which Malagasy airspace
remains closed by Rajoelina's order -- is another unfavorable
factor. While 'Tana remains outwardly calm, rumors are
swirling regarding the possible naming of a military Prime
Minister, the naming, by the military itself, of a new
military directorate or partial military government, etc. A
possible move to Mauritania-style early elections may be a
new solution, but only if consensus among the Malagasy can be
achieved first. Local ambassadors now are trying to "avoid
the worst", rather than any more ambitious solutions to
Madagascar's worsening political impasse. AGOA eligibility
is understood here to be (all but) dead, as the various
protagonists stubbornly continue to put their individual
interests ahead of the people's. End Summary


2. (C) In his December 9 evening address to the nation,
Rajoelina reiterated intransigent points he had made
previously to the press, categorically rejecting the Maputo
III resolutions and condemning the delegations who had
reached them as "traitorous". He refused to directly address
the issue of alleged pending arrest warrants for the
participants (denied to diplomats by all government contacts)
or the airspace closure to traffic from Mozambique (confirmed
by civil aviation authorities). Late on December 9, the
Foreign Minister invited Ambassador Marquardt to organize
local ICG ambassadors to meet Rajoelina at 1600 on December

10. Local ICG ambassadors (US, French, Russian, Chinese, EU
Presidency/German, Libyan, UNDP, and South African) met
beforehand to coordinate before seeing Rajoelina. There was
a consensus that the only way forward was via a cooling of
tempers, and a resumption of dialogue to move forward to a
transition government, including the safe return ASAP of the
movement leaders stranded in Maputo and the return of
Chissano and/or other mediator(s). The group released a
statement on December 11 calling for restraint and the
avoidance of all unilateral actions.


3. (C) The French Ambassador categorically stated that
Rajoelina will not declare unilaterally a military PM-led
government, but then said "the ICG must strongly dissuade him
from considering it." He also tabled the notion of Rajoelina
establishing a technocratic government while announcing that
he would not run for President himself, which the group
rejected as too little, too late. Similarly, his suggestion

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that the ICG formally reject Maputo III as out of line with
previous agreements gained no traction. Regarding the
possibility of mass popular street action in response to
current events, the prevailing view was that no political
faction has a mass following prepared to do so, and most
Malagasy are tired of this situation and simply want to move
forward with their lives -- and the approaching holidays.
The ICG agreed that if Rajoelina decided to create a
unilateral government, no country would be able to support
it, and it would probably be only be a matter of time before
the military took action, the possible consequences of which
remain unclear. Both the American and French Ambassadors
stressed to the group that they had strongly urged the
military leadership in recent meetings not to take any action
that would make matters worse, and felt their message had
been well understood.


4. (C) The South African Ambassador advised that he had
received materials on the course of the meetings in Maputo
from his government and had just completed a phone call with
President Chissano in London. Chissano said he had had
numerous phone conversations with Rajoelina over the last
week and had urged conciliation. Rajoelina had been included
via this means, not excluded as he claimed. In an effort to
break the impasse he had offered to engage in shuttle
diplomacy but Rajoelina had rejected his offer. Chissano had
called on the South African Ambassador to get the local ICG
to "prevail on Rajoelina" to compromise and walk back from
the extreme position he had taken. Chissano also wants the
ICG to pressure Zafy (when he returns) to give up designs on
the mining ministry, and said Zuma, Guebeza, and Kabila, as
SADC troika, will pressure Ravalomanana to drop his claim on
the decentralization ministry.


5. (C) The ICG ambassadors then met Rajoelina for over one
hour on December 10. He was accompanied by FM Andriamanjato,
Advisor Norbert Lala Rasirihonona, and S-G Resampa.
Rajoelina made no preliminary remarks, allowing the
ambassadors successively to make strong points on the need to
turn the other cheek, bring his interlocutors back, eschew
unilateralism, resume the Maputo process, take the Maputo III
resolutions as nothing more than discussion material rather
than as decisions, and find a way out of this continuing
crisis. The US ambassador advised him that time was almost
up for AGOA eligibility, just the first of a number of
deadlines that Madagascar will miss if they do not come
quickly to reason.


6. (C) Rajoelina responded after the tour de table that he
was finding the co-presidency/cohabitation "delicate and
difficult," and was considering scrapping it in favor of
moving quickly to legislative elections within three months.
For organizing those elections, he said he would want
international support, and stressed that the creation of the
independent electoral commission (CENI) which would run them
would be inclusive and consensual. He explained that the
elected deputies would then select a prime minister and a
government (without explaining how Madagascar would have
moved magically from a presidential to a parliamentary form
of government).


7. (C) The ambassadors then took turns reacting negatively
to his unexpected proposal, explaining that it would be seen
as unilateral and a massive step backwards after months of
collaborative efforts by the international community to move
toward a consensual resolution of the crisis. The US
ambassador categorically rejected any American support for
elections organized unilaterally, and said he doubted the UN
or anyone else would react differently. He advised that the
cohabitation, while manifestly imperfect and unwieldy, had
hardly been given a chance to succeed, given that it had
never even met (except twice in the presence of ambassadors,
at their request). The French ambassador called Maputo III
"a paper rag" that he could take inspiration from if he
wished, but whose "decisions" were not decisions at all and
were not binding on him or anyone else. Others implored
Rajoelina to turn the other cheek in response to the UN and
Danish letters and Maputo III, and to resume discussions in

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good faith. Norbert Lala responded at length that Maputo II
did indeed represent unacceptable decisions taken, and that
it - along with the UN and Danish letters -- was a major
affront to the Maputo process by having diluted the powers of
the presidency to an unacceptable degree. Rajoelina then
circulated a prepared, signed letter to ambassadors that
deplored the behavior of the other leaders, denounced the
letters they had signed, and rejected Maputo III in its
entirety. He did, however, agree to consider the
ambassadors' views before taking any next steps. The U.S.
ambassador asked the last questions of Rajoelina: when will
he allow the opposition and his own prime minister to return
from Maputo, and would he confirm the nonexistence of arrest
warrants against them? Rajoelina offered only a curious,
broad smile in reply. Norbert Lala said "they can return
when they so desire."


8. (C) Foreign Minister Andriamanjato, who had not spoken
at the meeting with Rajoelina, came alone to the CMR
afterwards. As usual, he portrayed himself as the moderate
in Rajoelina's camp, claiming that he alone had argued
against the closure of Malagasy airspace to traffic from
Mozambique and was still pressing for the return of those
stranded there (which he expects to occur quickly). He also
explained that he thinks that the cohabitation could lead to
civil war by having four uncooperative leaders all trying to
pull strings within the military beneath them, and that is
why they are now inclined to scrap it. Unity within the
military is essential to avoiding civil war, he said, and he
is not certain himself that they are united behind Rajoelina.
(Note: we are fairly certain that they are not united behind
anyone or anything.) Andriamanjato then admitted,
surprisingly, that the Maputo III resolutions had simply
provided a pretext for derailing a process that they no
longer support anyway. He said that the meeting nonetheless
had been effective in stopping Rajoelina from advancing his
proposal to move unilaterally to early legislative elections:
afterwards Rajoelina dropped a planned televised address
announcing his new approach. The difference, said
Andriamanjato, had been the strong solidarity among the
ambassadors, including what he called the "unexpected
firmness of the French" against early, unilateral elections.
The ambassador stressed that the key factor in moving ahead
is consensuality. If the Malagasy agree among themselves
that the wobbly cohabitation is not workable, then they need
to decide consensually on a different approach. Time,
however, is wasting, and the AGOA decision is now almost sure
to be negative given the course of recent -- and apparent
future -- events; Andriamanjato just nodded. He also said
that the AU's proposal for a December 17 ICG in 'Tana is
under consideration by the president. The ambassador
recommended that they agree to the meeting, invite Chissano
back as soon as possible to prepare it, start communicating
constructively among themselves about possible ways forward,
and not do anything stupid to derail the process further.


9. (C) Comment: The French Ambassador told Ambassador
Marquardt on December 11 that the French may be looking now
toward a Mauritania-style move to quick -- but necessarily
consensual -- elections in order to put this cohabitation
nightmare to rest. At today's meeting of the full diplomatic
corps, there was considerable resonance expressed for a
quicker -- but still consensual -- escape from the current
impasse via elections than the Maputo process would provide.
It was acknowledged that there would be a conscious trade-off
between quality of elections and speed, but many appeared
willing to entertain it. While the prospect of the December
17 ICG might keep matters calm until then (assumig Rajoelina
accepts the initiative),there appears to be a growing gap
between the evident drift to a completely new approach
(favored by many Malagasy, not just Rajoelina) and Chissano's
expressed intention to come back merely to put the finishing
touches on the Maputo process (i.e. implement the
co-presidency, finish the allocation of ministerial
portfolios, etc.). Overall, there has been a palpable shift
in diplomats' thinking here, away from more ambitious
solutions and toward simply "avoiding the worst." It seems
that, if the Malagasy can avoid a meltdown over the coming

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week, the holidays will then take over and allow more time
for solutions to emerge by early January. End comment.
MARQUARDT