MADAGASCAR: LOBBYING FOR THE CABINET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000812

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STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV
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PARIS FOR WBAIN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV ETRD MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: LOBBYING FOR THE CABINET

Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR
REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) Summary: The announcement of the full transition
cabinet for the new power-sharing Government of Madagascar
has been delayed by continuing disagreements over the
allocation of several ministerial posts. The local
International Contact Group (ICG) issued a communique urging
prompt action Nov 23, and key ambassadors demarched the
president, co-presidents, and prime minister Nov 24 to
deliver the same message, noting the danger of losing AGOA
and EU benefits if action is not taken soon. The AU/UN/SADC
mediation team has broken down, and it appears that future
intervention by any member of the team other than possibly
President Chissano himself would not be productive. Members
of the Rajoelina and Ravalomanana movements have actively
lobbied the Ambassador this week to support them in the
cabinet negotiations; the Ambassador explained to them all
that the international community does not care how they
divide the seats amongst themselves as long as they agree and
they do it now, to avoid the disasters that will befall the
Malagasy economy and people if they fail in their mission.
End summary.


2. (C) The leaders of the power-sharing transition government
failed to announce the members of the new cabinet by their
self-imposed deadline of Nov 21 and remain deadlocked over
the question of which political tendency will control which
ministries. The local international contact group, upon the
instigation of the US Embassy, issued a communique, published
widely by local media Nov 23, expressing its concern about
the delay. The text of the communique follows:

The local International Contact Group on Madagascar is very
concerned about continuing delays in forming an inclusive,
consensual transition government. In accordance with the
Maputo Charter, the timely formation of this government
remains a key next step toward resolving Madagascar's
political impasse. Further delays in this fundamental first
step will only postpone the establishment of other important
transition institutions and further delay elections, national
reconciliation, and international re-engagement with
Madagascar.


3. (C) The Ambassadors of the U.S., France, Germany
(representing the Swedish EU Presidency),and South Africa
met with President Rajoelina, Co-Presidents Andrianirina and
Rakotovahiny, and PM Mangalaza Nov 24 for two hours to
implore them to organize their government within the coming
hours or days. Ambassador Marquardt told them that only
results will enable the international community to take
Madagascar's leaders seriously. His colleagues reinforced
that message by mentioning EU and AU deadlines that are soon
coming due, particularly the EU's decision on 630 million
Euros worth of frozen aid programs. The Ambassadors pressed
for the cabinet to be installed, the electoral commission and
other transition institutions to be put in place thereafter,
and an elections timetable to be formulated as soon as
feasible.


4. (C) The Ambassadors urged the quartet to fully take on
their new responsibilities for the good of the country,
rather than act on behalf of their political movements, and
to behave as statesmen in making the necessary tough
decisions. Co-President Andrianirina had said in a televised
statement Nov 21 that another summit of the four movement
chiefs (Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, Rajoelina, and Zafy) would
be held this week to determine the division of ministerial
posts. Ratsiraka had subsequently called for this meeting to
take place via televised addresses to the Malagasy public;
Ratsiraka pleaded for the other three chiefs to come to Paris
to iron out their differences by the end of November, "as
AGOA would be cut Dec 4" if they did not. The U.S. and
French Ambassadors urged the quartet to solve this issue here
and now amongst themselves now, rather than delaying
resolution further through another chiefs summit abroad. The
French Ambassador did note France's willingness to facilitate
such a summit if the chiefs requested it, but also openly
questioned both its utility and the dubious political message
a meeting in Paris would send at this time. The quartet

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seemed amenable to dropping the summit idea in favor of
resolving the cabinet issue here. Prime Minister Mangalaza
proposed attaching all controversial ministries to his
office, which Rajoelina rejected before the ambassadors took
their leave and left the quarrtet to complete their work.


5. (C) Another reason for opposing a fourth summit is the
sorry state of the mediation team. Acting mainly out of
apparent institutional jealousy, AU Chairman Jean Ping wrote
the UN's Ban Ki-Moon last week stating that "the mediation is
over", which Ban Ki-Moon reportedly protested in a return
phone call to Ping. The AU continues to seek to discredit UN
Mediator Drame personally (particularly unfair and
unfortunate as it is primarily Drame's efforts -- closely
coordinated with Chissano -- that have driven the process so
far); Drame has withdrawn at least temporarily, pending
clarity on his role. Chissano has engaged with the four
chiefs by telephone this week, but his future involvement is
uncertain, particularly given the AU's lack of support. A
follow-on mission of AU and UN envoys due to arrive this week
has been postponed. The Malagasy politicians clearly see the
divisions within the mediation team, thus it is uncertain if
future intervention by anyone other than Chissano would be
productive.


6. (C) Hard-liners within Rajoelina's movement, as well as
current members of cabinet, have threatened to take to the
streets and/or go on strike if he continues to compromise.
Several more moderate members of the divided Rajoelina
movement told the Ambassador Nov 24 that they propose that
each of the four movements submit their allotted six names to
the prime minister, who would then, in coordination with the
president, assign them according to their qualifications to
particular ministries. The Ambassador explained that the
international community did not care how the seats were
divided, as long as the Malagasy agreed, but pointed out that
agreement had been previously reached by the four movements
on all of the key ministries, so the movements should start
from there, rather than zero, to apportion the rest. He
stressed the point that action was urgently needed now for
the good of the country, as well as retaining AGOA and EU
benefits. He also implored them to give Rajoelina the
support he needs within his own movement to make further
concessions.


7. (C) Ravalomanana supporters have relaunched their
previously daily meetings at the burned-out Magro store
parking lot and pledge to continue them until all political
prisoners are released and Ravalomanana returns to
Madagascar. One of three remaining high-profile political
prisoners was granted temporary release Nov 20, pending trial
in early December, but a second was denied bail Nov 23.
Several members of Ravalomanana's movement told Emboffs that
the installation of the cabinet was blocked because Rajoelina
was now claiming all of the ministries that would be key for
running the transition and a presidential campaign. Emboffs
reiterated the points mentioned above made by the Ambassador.



8. (C) Comment: If the transition leaders can succeed in
putting a cabinet in place, the other steps leading up to and
including presidential elections should ultimately be taken,
but continued prodding from the international community will
be necessary. Each step will no doubt be a struggle, but
struggling forward slowly is the best of bad options. Post
will continue to encourage the president, co-presidents, and
PM to fully adopt their new roles as leaders of the nation,
including making necessary difficult decisions, rather than
acting as proxies for their movement chiefs. Transition
President Rajoelina unfortunately continues to evince the
inability to make or stick to those decisions, or to control
his divided movement. End comment.

MARQUARDT