COMOROS STILL VERY FRAGILE AS ELECTIONS APPROACH

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000811


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2014
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV KPIR MA IR
SUBJECT: COMOROS STILL VERY FRAGILE AS ELECTIONS APPROACH

Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.5 D and E.



1. (C) Summary. During a three-day visit to Grande Comore,
only my second visit to the country in 2009, I found the
country busily if somewhat tensely preparing for December
legislative elections. President Sambi was typically upbeat
in his assessment and asked again for the USG to increase its
presence and engagement in the Comoros. The French
Ambassador predicts trouble ahead whatever the outcome of the
upcoming elections, as Sambi continues his manoeuvering to
extend his mandate beyond its normal end in 2010. If he wins
a legislative majority which then votes to extend him beyond
2010, that is likely to provoke separatist tendencies,
especially in Moheli, whose people will resent the delay in
getting (and fear eventually losing altogether) "their turn"
at the rotating presidency; if he fails to get that majority,
Sambi may resort to other means to accomplish his goals, with
unpredicatable but surely negative repercussions for island
stability. The French envoy also sees an increasingly heavy
Iranian hand at play there, including as a surreptitious,
illegal weapons provider. An unseemly confrontation between
Sambi and CHOD BG Salimou is generating coup jitters, most
likely unfounded -- a greater worry is that Sambi will
misstep and fire Salimou for perceived insubordination;
Salimou, for his part, claims to be protecting the military
from attempts at politization by Sambi. The first major
incidence of maritime piracy in Comoros waters -- a recent
but unsuccessful attack twenty miles off Moroni against an
Italian vessel -- has added another challenge to the Comoros'
already daunting list. The inauguration of a major
CJTF-HOA-funded primary school south of Moroni, attended by
Sambi and his entire government, provided a wonderfully
hopeful bilateral focal point to the visit. End Summary.


2. (SBU). I visited Grande Comore island (Ngazidja)
November 21-23, primarily to inaugurate with President Sambi
the new, CJTF-HOA-funded primary school at Nioumamilima 90
minutes south of Moroni on the slopes of the Karthala
volcano. Given the press of events in Madagascar, this was
only my second visit to the Comoros in 2009 (as against six
or seven visits there in 2008),and the first time I had seen
Sambi since last December. (He travels abroad more than he
stays at home, and was absent when I last visited in July.
He had been abroad for the past two weeks -- in Egypt for the
China-Africa Summit, in Rome for the FAO food security
summit, and in Turkey for a bilateral visit -- when he
returned to Moroni late on November 21.) During the visit I
also had contact with both Vice Presidents, several other
members of the Union government, CHOD BG Mohamed Salimou, the
French, AU, and South African ambassadors, and the UNDP
representative. With political campaigning already under way
in preparation for legislative elections on December 6 and
20, I found Moroni atypically animated with large crowds
meeting to hear candidates, convoys of cars circling the city
and island blasting campaign messages, many political
billboards and posters visible, and a general atmosphere of
heightened civic engagement. Sambi marked the first-ever
visit to the Comoros of the World Cup (i.e. the trophy
itself),en route eventually to South Africa, with a festive
buffet on Sunday night at his palace which seemed to be
attended by everyone but the increasingly estranged Ngazidja
opposition. Clearly in campaign mode, Sambi again made an
appearance at a soccer game organized on Monday at which he
again was widely photographed with the Cup hoisted high above
his head.


3. (C) Before driving up to the school event together, I
met for 30 minutes with Sambi on Monday morning, first
introducing to him the Mission's relatively new Comoros
officer, who I said was on his fourth trip to Comoros since
September. Sambi's advisor Nakchami was also present. Sambi
pled for more US engagement, thanking us for the various
school projects being realized by CJTF/HOA teams throughout
the archipelago. Sambi noted that he has no investment
budget at all and thus needs such assistance if he is to
build any new schools. With reference to a recent piracy
attempt in Comoran waters, he inquired about the delivery
date of the Arch Angel patrol boat purchased with FMF; I said
delivery now is expected in February, 2010. Sambi explained
that there even had been a recent attempt by Congolese
migrants to traverse Comoron waters en route to Mayotte --
another mission for the new vessel will be interdiction of
such clandestine efforts, Sambi said. He asked about the
embassy office project in Moroni and the proposal to bring
back the Peace Corps; I told him that we are discussing these
proposals with the new teams at State and PC.


4. (C) Turning to the upcoming legislative elections, I
informed him that although the USG is not providing funding,
we will have a seven-person embassy observer team, covering
each of the three islands, for each of the two rounds. I
observed that the situation in Comoros remains fragile and
expressed our concern for free and fair elections as a
necessary part of the way forward. He welcomed this
engagement and said he is working on creating a "culture of
democracy" in his country. He said that (unnamed) "others
have not kept their promises, but we are pushing ahead. I,
personally, am a democrat," he asserted. I explained briefly
our shock and dismay at how a supposed democracy in
Madagascar had come part so quickly and suddenly, and
suggested that it offers a cautionary example for his country
to consider. I stressed the importance of strengthening
democratic institutions, and of listening carefully to what
the people say. He agreed and noted the existence of freedom
of speech in Comoros. I asked what had recently happened
with opposition leader Larifou, briefly detained last week
for insulting Sambi. Sambi described Larifou as a lawer from
Reunion who only comes to Comoros around elections; "I am not
even a candidate and still he insults me!" I explained that
democratic leaders must develop a tolerance for such speech.
Sambi closed the meeting by quickly recounting with obvious,
deep pride his recent encounters in New York with President
Obama.


5. (C) At the school inauguration, I was seated on the dias
between Sambi and BG Salimou, who had not seen one another
since Sambi's return from abroad. Their body language was
tense because Salimou had sent, during Sambi's absence and
with multiple cc addressees, a very blunt letter to the
Moheli commander who had just been appointed directly by
Sambi, apparently without Salimou's prior knowledge, let
alone assent. The letter directed the commander to ignore
the appointment by Sambi, which Salimou said, obviously
correctly, was not in conformity with the usual command
structure. Sambi leaned over me to crisply direct Salimou to
report to his office at 1900 that evening (Nov. 23). Later,
while Sambi was speaking, Salimou confided to me that he is
concerned that Sambi may dismiss him because of the letter
and his resistance to the appointment. He explained that his
intent was to protect the military from politicization by
Sambi, of which this improper appointment was not the only
example. I asked him to remain in touch with us as this saga
unfolds.


6. (C) Over lunch later on Monday, French Ambassador Luc
Hallade, now at post well over one year, freely shared his
concerns with me and Comoros Officer about the elections and
particularly about what will follow them. He noted that
funds are in short supply for candidates to run, which gives
the advantage to Sambi's supporters. Promised payments by
the EU and AU are delayed, although he does not expect the
elections to be compromised as a result. He is frustrated by
the EU's inefficiencies in running programs in the Comoros,
including electoral support, from distant Mauritius. He also
described a recent fiasco in Brussels where opposition
leaders had asked the EU not to finance the elections --
after having delivered the opposite message in Moroni; that
snafu was worked out, not without difficulty, after Sambi
convened a meeting with opposition resulting in a written
request for EU funding. An elections oversight committee
composed of local diplomats was to meet for the first time on
November 24. Hallade predicts trouble ahead whatever the
outcome of those elections, as Sambi continues his
manoeuvering to extend his mandate beyond its normal end in

2010. If he wins a legislative majority that then extends
him beyond 2010, that is likely again to provoke separatist
tendencies, especially in Moheli, whose people will resent
the delay in getting (and fear eventually losing altogether)
"their turn" at the rotating presidency. If he fails to get
that majority, Sambi may resort to other means to accomplish
his goal, with unpredicatable but surely negative
repercussions for Union stability and cohesion. Hallade
noted that Vice President Ikililou, the senior-most Mohelian
in the GOUC, had turned out to be a strong performer since
taking over the finance portfolio several months ago.
Hallade said the French had not yet done much analysis of
which Mohelian candidates might be strongest if and when
Moheli gets "its turn" at the rotating presidency, but saw
Ikililou as a bit of a rising star. The problem, he said, is
that he doesn't have much popularity on Moheli -- a problem
for any candidate as the first round will be a vote only
among Mohelians to select the three strongest candidates to
be voted on across the Union in the second round.


7. (C) The French envoy also sees an increasingly heavy
Iranian hand at play there, including as a surreptitious,
illegal weapons provider to the Presidential Guard and to the
army (AND) as well. He said he has informed Paris but cannot
prove it. He also blamed the local Iranian intelligence
service for spreading false rumors of an impending coup
attempt by Salimou against Sambi. (Those rumors were much in
evidence across Moroni during the short visit.) Obviously,
Hallade said, if Salimou intended to unseat Sambi by force,
he would not have sent that letter around to everyone in
town! The Iranians, he suggested, are trying to discredit
Salimou to make it easier for Sambi to replace him with a new
CHOD from Sambi's home island of Anjouan. The recent return
from training in Morocco of a certain Anjouanese colonel as
the new presidential military advisor, and the recent
reinstatement in the AND of the former (and also Anjouanese)
Comoran Ambassador to Madagascar -- and former foreign
minister -- are both suspiciously indicative of Sambi's
possible intentions to replace Salimou with an Anjouanese, he
said. Firing Salimou, in Hallade's view, would be a major
error on Sambi's part, but is not to be excluded as a
possibility.

8 (C) Hallade, like Sambi, expresssed concern about the
recent, failed piracy attempt just off Moroni against an
Italian freighter (septel to follow with more detail). This
marked the not-unexpected arrival of Indian Ocean piracy in
Comoran waters. The GOUC was sufficiently alarmed by the
event to have convened three ministerial meetings since it
occurred, to discuss their response options. Hallade said
they really have no response capability, other than calling
France. When the Arch Angel arrives, they may become more
capable. For their part, the French have deployed the
majority of their maritime assets in Reunion, east of
Madagascar and thus too far away to be much use, in real
time, in the Mozambique Channel. He said there are several
patrol boats in nearby Mayotte, but nothing of the size
available in Reunion. He was unaware of any internal GOF
discussion about possibly moving assets to Mayotte from
either Reunion or the Seychelles. Clearly, he said, the
alarm has been sounded on the piracy issue. Noting the
extreme porosity of Comoran borders, Hallade said he would
not be surprised if foreign pirates even set up land bases on
Comoran islands to support their operations at sea. "Nothing
here will stop them," he concluded.


9. (C) Bio note on Luc Hallade: Hallade arrived here in
July 2008 with a background in development across Africa. He
is an AFD (French USAID-equivalent) official with prior
senior embassy experience in DROC, Cameroon, and elsewhere in
Africa. With a young Cameroonian wife and small children, he
cuts a distinctly different -- and much more welcome --
profile from his unapologetically neo-colonialist
predecessor, Christian Job. Job's linen suits, public
rantings, and haughty prescriptions to the Comorans were
little appreciated and helped fuel an enduring and unhelpful
image of the French as unchanged since before independence.
Hallade, for his part, is out and about the island of
Ngazidja visiting development projects and dialoging with
village notables. Without overt reference to Job, he admits
that the task of improving and modernizing France's image in
a country where they are blamed for everything that goes
wrong will require as much of this approach as he can find
time for. He regrets, at the same time, that here is no time
for him to engage in much such personal outreach on the other
two islands.


MARQUARDT